



LEGAL TECH, CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND THE FUTURE OF 
ADVERSARIALISM 
DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM† &  JONAH B. GELBACH† 
“Legal tech” is transforming litigation and law practice, and its steady advance 
has tapped a rich vein of anxiety about the future of the legal profession. Much of the 
resulting debate narrowly focuses on what legal tech portends for the professional 
authority, and profitability, of lawyers. It is also profoundly futurist, full of references 
to “robolawyers” and “robojudges.” Lost in this rush to foretell the future of lawyers 
and their robotic replacements is what should be an equally important, and also more 
immediate, concern: What effect will legal tech’s continued advance have on core 
features of our civil justice system and, in particular, the procedural rules that structure 
it? Tackling that question, this Article seeks to enrich—and, in places, reorient—the 
budding debate about legal tech’s implications for law and litigation by zeroing in on 
the near- to medium-term, not out at a distant, hazy horizon. It does so via three case 
studies, each one exploring how specific legal tech tools (e-discovery tools, outcome-
prediction tools, and tools that perform advanced legal analytics) might alter litigation 
for good and ill by shifting the distribution of costs and information within the system. 
Each case study then traces how a concrete set of civil procedure rules—from 
Twombly/Iqbal’s pleading standard and the work product doctrine to rules and 
doctrines that govern forum-shopping—can, or should, adapt in response. When these 
assorted dynamics are lined up and viewed together, it is not a stretch to suggest that 
legal tech will remake the adversarial system, not by replacing lawyers and judges with 
robots, but rather by unsettling, and even resetting, several of the system’s procedural 
cornerstones. The challenge for courts—and, in time, for rulemakers and legislators—
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will be how best to adapt a digitized litigation system using civil procedure rules built 
for a very different, analog era. This Article aims to jumpstart thinking about that 
process by identifying the principal ways that legal tech will reshape “our 
adversarialism” and mapping a reform and research agenda going forward. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Legal tech,” most agree, is transforming litigation and law practice, and 
its steady advance has tapped a rich vein of anxiety about the future of the 
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legal profession.1 Is law like a driverless car, or is it irreducibly complex and 
grounded in dynamic human judgment? How to square online dispute 
resolution and automated legal advice with rules governing unauthorized 
practice of law? Can BigLaw survive? Much of this has a profession-centered 
and even defensive quality in its narrow focus on what legal tech portends for 
the professional authority and pro+tability of lawyers. Much of it is also 
profoundly futurist—full of prophecies of “robolawyers,”2 “robojudges,”3 or 
 
1 See, e.g., BENJAMIN H. BARTON, GLASS HALF FULL: THE DECLINE AND REBIRTH OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (#"!%); RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR 
FUTURE (#"!&); RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONS: HOW 
TECHNOLOGY WILL TRANSFORM THE WORK OF HUMAN EXPERTS (#"!%); Daniel Martin Katz, 
Quantitative Legal Prediction—or—How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future 
of the Legal Services Industry, '# EMORY L.J. $"$ (#"!&); John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great 
Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, (# 
FORDHAM L. REV. &")! (#"!)); Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers?: Computers, Lawyers, and 
the Practice of Law, &" GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS %"! (#"!*); Tanina Rostain, Robots versus Lawyers: A User-
Centered Approach, &" GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS %%$ (#"!*); Eric L. Talley, Is the Future of Law a Driverless Car?: 
Assessing How the Data Analytics Revolution Will Transform Legal Practice, !*) J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 
!(& (#"!(); David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, ($ WASH. 
L. REV. !!* (#"!)); Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein, Law’s Information Revolution, %& ARIZ. L. REV. 
!!'$ (#"!!); William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, )" PEPP. L. REV. )'! (#"!&). For treatments in the 
popular and lawyer-trade presses, see Mark A. Cohen, ‘Legal Innovation’ Is Not an Oxymoron—It’s Further Along 
Than You Think, FORBES (Mar. !), #"!*, (:%$ AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/markcohen!/#"!*/"&/!)/
legal-innovation-is-not-an-oxymoron-its-farther-along-than-you-think [https://perma.cc/(%TT-XZY)]; 
Jason Koebler, Rise of the Robolawyers, ATLANTIC, Apr. #"!*, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
#"!*/")/rise-of-the-robolawyers/%!**$) [https://perma.cc/QN(P-NLK)]; Steve Lohr, AI Is Doing Legal Work. 
But It Won’t Replace Lawyers, Yet., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. !$, #"!*), https://www.nytimes.com/#"!*/"&/!$/
technology/lawyers-artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/Z*ZX-V&WB]; John Markoff, Armies of 
Expensive Lawyers, Replaced by Cheaper Software, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. ), #"!!), https://www.nytimes.com/
#"!!/"&/"%/science/"%legal.html [https://perma.cc/JD)T-JK&B]; Debra Cassens Weiss, Will Technology Create a 
Lawyer ‘Jobs-Pocalypse’? Doomsayers Overstate Impact, Study Says, A.B.A. J. (Jan. %, #"!', ':)% AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/does_technology_presage_a_lawyer_jobs_pocalypse_naysayers_ove
rstate_impact [https://perma.cc/&'AT-R*L&]; John G. Browning, Will Robot Lawyers Take Our Jobs?, D CEO 
MAG., Mar. #"!$, https://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-ceo/#"!$/march/will-robot-lawyers-take-our-
jobs [https://perma.cc/W'EZ-A)Q$]. 
2 See, e.g., Asa Fitch, Would You Trust a Lawyer Bot with Your Legal Needs?, WALL. ST. J. (Aug. 
!", #"#", !":"" AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/would-you-trust-a-lawyer-bot-with-your-legal-
needs-!!%$*"'(")# [https://perma.cc/*#LX-B*#J]; Gary Marchant & Josh Covey, Robo-Lawyers: Your 
New Best Friend or Your Worst Nightmare?, LITIGATION, Fall #"!(, at #*; Koebler, supra note !. Not 
everyone is so con+dent. See Milan Markovic, Rise of the Robot Lawyers?, '! ARIZ. L. REV. &#%, &#% 
(#"!$) (challenging the notion that lawyers will be displaced by arti+cial intelligence). 
3 The literature that predicts or otherwise assumes a future populated by robojudges is growing fast. 
See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, '( DUKE L.J. !!&% (#"!$) (predicting a future with robot judges); 
Aziz Z. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, !"' VA. L. REV. '!! (#"#") (same); Frank Pasquale, A Rule of 
Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, (* GEO. WASH. L. REV. ! (#"!$) (examining the 
eventual flaws in machine-led law); Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Stephen E. Henderson, Artificial Intelligence 
and Role-Reversible Judgment, !"$ J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY !&* (#"!$) (examining the merits of AI-run 
legal decisionmaking); Rebecca Crootoff, “Cyborg Justice” and the Risk of Technological-Legal Lock-In, !!$ 
COLUM. L. REV. F. #&& (#"!$) (discussing the uptick in AI adjudication); Eric Niiler, Can AI Be a Fair Judge 
in Court? Estonia Thinks So, WIRED (Mar. #%, #"!$, *:"" AM), https://www.wired.com/story/can-ai-be-fair-
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even an eventual state of “legal singularity,”4 when machines can perfectly 
predict the outcomes of cases before they are +led. 
Lost in this rush to foretell the future of lawyers and their robotic 
replacements is what should be an equally or even more important concern: 
what effect will legal tech’s continued advance have on core features of our civil 
justice system and, in particular, the procedural rules that structure it? And how, 
in turn, can or should those rules be adapted to further the ends of justice? This 
Article seeks to enrich—and, in places, reorient—budding debate about what 
many see as a coming revolution in legal tech. Simply put, if law and the legal 
profession will look different ten or fifteen years from now, then civil procedure 
and the inner workings and structure of the adversarial system will look 
different as well. Indeed, though virtually unmentioned in a lively but high-
altitude new literature on legal tech’s potential implications, it is the rules of 
civil procedure and related doctrines that will serve as the front-line regulators 
of the new legal tech tools and critically shape their evolution in the near-to 
medium-term. As a result, judges, rulemakers, and legislators should begin to 
think about whether, and if so how, to adapt civil procedure to new litigation 
realities as legal tech continues its move to the center of the civil justice system. 
We aim to spark concrete thinking about this mediating role for civil 
procedure by focusing on the near future—not out at a hazy horizon dotted 
with robojudges and robolawyers—and then asking how legal tech will change 
litigation and, in turn, how procedure can or should adapt in response.5 The 
core of our argument proceeds from the premise that legal tech’s proliferation 
 
judge-court-estonia-thinks-so [https://perma.cc/ES%C-G$W'] (discussing how Estonia has embraced AI 
in court proceedings); Christopher Markou, Are We Ready for Robot Judges?, DISCOVER MAGAZINE (May 
!%, #"!*, (:"" PM), https://www.discovermagazine.com/technology/are-we-ready-for-robot-judges 
[https://perma.cc/E*AM-PWCH] (examining the increased interest in AI judges); AirTalk Podcast, Can a 
Robot Make a Fair Verdict?, ($.& KPCC, https://www.scpr.org/programs/airtalk/#"!$/")/"!/')&&%/can-a-
robot-judge-make-a-fair-verdict [https://perma.cc/(%%F-VMWH] (discussing AI capabilities in 
adjudication); Victor Tangermann, Estonia is Building A “Robot Judge” to Help Clear Legal Backlog, FUTURISM 
(Mar. #%, #"!$), https://futurism.com/the-byte/estonia-robot-judge [https://perma.cc/P&YV-TJ)U] 
(examining Estonia’s new use of AI for adjudication); H.W.R. (Henriëtte) Nakad-Weststrate, Ton 
Jongbloed, H.J. (Jaap) van den Herik, Abdel-Badeeh M. Salem, Digitally Produced Judgements in Modern Court 
Proceedings, ' INT’L J. DIGIT. SOC. !!"# (#"!%) (investigating the use of AI verdicts in arbitration); see also 
Richard M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing Artificially Intelligent Justice, ## STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
#)#, #)# (#"!$) (“[T]he prospect of ‘robot judges’ suddenly seems plausible—even imminent.”). 
4 See Benjamin Alarie, The Path of the Law: Towards Legal Singularity, '' U. TORONTO L.J. 
))&, ))& (#"!'). 
5 A growing body of opinion holds that a rigorous focus on near- to mid-term development and 
issues is both necessary and under-supplied. See, e.g., Edward Parsons, Alona Fyshe & Dan Lizotte, 
Artificial Intelligence’s Societal Impacts, Governance, and Ethics, UCLA: THE PROGRAM ON 
UNDERSTANDING LAW, SCIENCE, AND EVIDENCE (PULSE) (#"!$), https://escholarship.org/
uc/item/#gp$&!)r [https://perma.cc/%X*Y-TEWZ] (noting a “bi-modal” distribution of inquiry, with 
some attracted to “speculative” thinking about “endpoint, singularity-related issues,” and others more 
disciplinarily inclined toward “current concerns and historical precedents,” leaving a “disturbingly 
empty [and] large middle ground of impacts and challenges lying between these endpoints”). 
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is likely to alter two foundational aspects of any litigation system: the 
distribution of litigation costs and the distribution of information. In a nutshell, 
there is good reason to believe that the concern about high and asymmetric 
litigation costs that has fueled several decades’ worth of litigation reforms will 
progressively fade as new and powerful e-discovery tools propagate. By 
contrast, it is plausible that increasing uptake of legal tech tools, including e-
discovery tools but also tools that perform legal research and analytics and 
predict case outcomes, will worryingly widen information asymmetries within 
the system, between judges and litigants, and also between litigants and 
litigants—particularly litigation’s “haves” as against its “have nots.” 
Isolating legal tech’s effects on these deep dimensions of the system provides 
needed analytic traction and grounds a set of concrete judgments about how an 
array of civil procedure rules and doctrines—among them the plausibility pleading 
standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal, the bundle of procedural rules, doctrines, 
and statutes concerned with forum-shopping, and the work product doctrine—
can, or should, adjust in response. When these assorted dynamics are lined up and 
viewed together, it is not a stretch to say that legal tech will, in time, remake the 
adversarial system, not by replacing lawyers and judges with robots, but rather by 
unsettling, and even resetting, several of its procedural cornerstones. 
These are big claims, and they demand both a technical grasp of the legal 
tech toolkit and command of contemporary civil procedure. Given these 
complexities, we build our argument deliberately, in three steps. 
Part I offers a full and quasi-technical canvass of where legal tech currently is 
and where it is likely to go in the near- to medium-term as natural language 
processing (NLP) and other machine learning techniques that power the most 
consequential legal tech tools continue to improve. In so doing, we strike a skeptical 
note and also go about our labors with a heavy dose of humility. As with any 
emergent technology, legal tech is a fast-moving field, and any effort to capture its 
many facets risks becoming antiquated almost as soon as the ink dries. We manage 
this contingency by surveying the legal tech landscape in three pieces. Section I.A 
reviews legal tech’s flavors and offers some ways to slice and dice them. Section I.B 
turns to legal tech’s technical trajectory. It shows that the frontier is quickly moving 
beyond e-discovery and digital referencing tools (think Westlaw or Lexis) to tools 
that automatically gather legal materials, predict case outcomes, and even draft legal 
documents. However, there are also legitimate questions about how far and how 
quickly legal tech can advance. Just how much progress can be made on outcome 
prediction tools given pervasive confidential settlements and the resulting lack of 
well-labeled data, or the current technical limits of natural language processing 
(NLP) in extracting and analyzing legal argumentation? Section I.C summarizes 
some key implications of legal tech—for the legal profession, for the distribution 
of power within the legal system, and for law itself—as sketched in an emerging 
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academic literature that, while highly abstract, has begun to stake out the poles of a 
rich debate. A thorough survey of the legal tech landscape provides the raw material 
for the more focused case studies of procedure to come. 
Armed with Part I’s extended account of legal tech’s pathways of 
innovation and di,usion, we turn in Part II to o,ering three concrete cuts at 
how legal tech’s advance will reshape American litigation and how procedural 
rules might mediate those e,ects. 
Section II.A starts on familiar ground: e-discovery and, more specifically, the 
“technology-assisted review” (TAR) and “predictive coding” tools that are quickly 
becoming a fixture of complex litigation practice. Our core claim is that, contrary 
to the views of some, civil litigation may well see a steady decline in overall 
discovery costs and, by extension, a narrowing of the litigation cost asymmetries 
that have motivated decades of litigation reforms, from the Civil Justice Reform 
Act of !%%" to the #"!( amendments reshuffling Rule #$’s proportionality 
constraint. In a lower-friction world, we predict, battles over proportionality 
would largely abate or become peripheral. Narrowing litigation cost asymmetries 
may also alter, or at least destabilize, the normative foundation of a very different 
and controversial part of civil procedure: the plausibility pleading doctrine set 
forth in Twombly and Iqbal. That doctrine sits at the intersection of two competing 
concerns: litigation cost asymmetries, with attendant concerns about undue 
settlement leverage and the conversion of low- or even negative-value cases into 
positive-dollar settlements, and information asymmetries in cases where only 
discovery can dislodge privately held information about wrongdoing. By 
systematically narrowing litigation cost asymmetries, TAR could undermine the 
positive foundation of the new plausibility pleading regime. 
Section II.B turns to legal tech tools that predict case outcomes. An obvious 
concern is that continued advances in outcome prediction tools will foster forum 
shopping, placing pressure on the rules, statutes, and doctrines—venue, removal, 
Erie doctrine—that seek to limit or shape its pursuit. Here we sound a more 
skeptical note about legal tech’s implications for civil procedure. Current procedural 
rules and doctrines touching upon forum shopping strike a permissive pose, and so 
an initial question is whether successful deployment of predictive analytics should 
change that pose. Further grounds for skepticism are the technical and practical 
limits of outcome prediction tools, which may not “work” well enough to 
meaningfully increase forum-shopping in the first place. Even if the technical 
hurdles can be leapt, two other major obstacles stand in legal tech’s way. First is the 
huge cost of assembling enough docket and document data to obtain sufficiently 
large and representative samples for contemporary prediction methods. Second are 
a pair of endogeneity problems that raise profound questions about either the initial 
or subsequent usefulness of even predictions based on large samples of data. Still, 
we think it useful to ask: if predictive analytics did “work,” and if machine-aided 
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forum shopping falls into disfavor, what follows? Here lie some of the most bracing 
procedural possibilities. Effective outcome-prediction tools and supercharged 
forum-shopping might steadily widen asymmetries in the quantity and quality of 
information available to litigants and judges. This might warrant changes in the 
treatment of forum shopping motives, in the discoverability of work product, or 
both. It would also raise questions about whether judges making choice-of-forum 
determinations, or deciding motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, should 
be empowered to order parties to disclose their machine outputs or perhaps should 
even be equipped with the same prediction tools litigants are using. Either scenario 
would press on the bounds of current conceptions of “managerial judging” and the 
proper allocation of authority between judge and jury. 
Section II.C asks a key question that looms in the background of the other 
case studies and, indeed, all of legal tech: how might the work product 
doctrine need to change to accommodate a world in which a non-trivial 
amount of lawyering, including not just discovery and outcome prediction, 
but also legal research, brief writing, and strategic litigation judgment, takes 
the form of machine-generated outputs? The fount of the work product rule, 
Hickman v. Taylor, famously brackets distributive concerns—i.e., the fact that 
some parties can a,ord better counsel than others—and instead protects 
against “wits borrowed from the adversary,” as Justice Jackson put it, so that 
parties, and the system, can capture the bene+t of good lawyering. In so 
doing, the work product rule secures the conditions necessary for a well-
functioning adversarial system by ensuring returns on, and thus investment 
in, legal talent. But as legal tech tools grow more powerful, and if the “haves” 
have them and the “have nots” do not, legal tech could well shift the 
normative ground out from under a cornerstone of the American procedural 
system. In this new machine-driven world, should we, to invoke Justice 
Jackson’s turn of phrase in Hickman, protect against “borrowed bits” the same 
way we protect against “borrowed wits”? 
Part III steps back and draws out some connections across the case studies. 
In particular, we show how legal tech’s continued advance will place civil 
procedure in a new and uncharted posture. In particular, judges—and, in 
time, rulemakers and legislators—will come to preside over what amounts to 
a shadow innovation policy because their procedural choices will shape the 
terms of legal tech’s use, its value to litigants, and its market for production. 
Just as important, legal tech’s advance will compel judges and policymakers 
to make explicit or implicit judgments about the optimal balance of adversary 
as against judicial control of civil proceedings. In making those judgments, 
they will shape the future of American adversarialism. 
Before launching, some caveats: First, we bracket the criminal context 
entirely, despite a rich and growing literature on the use of predictive analytics 
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to support decisions about bail and sentencing.6 Second, we make no claims to 
comprehensiveness, nor is ours a case study approach in the rigorous 
comparative sense of making causal judgments about legal tech’s effect on 
procedure or vice versa. Rather, our aim is to map legal tech’s conceptual 
landscape and, by identifying a set of key procedural questions it implicates, 
chart further productive lines of inquiry. Last, we seek to be both far-thinking 
and concrete, thus achieving a salutary, middle-level of abstraction that is 
grounded in actual, not hypothetical, legal tech tools, as mediated by existing, 
not hypothetical, procedural rules. In other words, we aim to cut through the 
“AI fever” that infects the literature on legal tech, and on AI and law more 
broadly, without losing generality or zing. This is not to say legal tech lacks 
implications for the civil justice system beyond civil procedure. Will legal tech 
further vanish the vanishing trial, blunt incentives for private litigants to 
conduct socially valuable discovery, or stunt the dynamic evolution of legal 
norms? Throughout the Article, we address these and other wider-aperture 
questions in passing. However, our focus remains how procedure can, or should, 
mediate the legal tech revolution over the near- to medium-term. 
I. THE LEGAL TECH LANDSCAPE 
In Law’s Empire, Ronald Dworkin builds his influential theory of legal 
interpretation around a mythical uber-judge, Hercules, with a superhuman 
capacity to read and understand every available scrap of legal material and thus 
reach a unique right answer in every case.7 Dworkin’s project was to critique 
the legal positivism of H.L.A. Hart, and so it sits far away, intellectually 
speaking, from the world of legal tech. But Dworkin’s Hercules has recently 
taken on renewed relevance as legal tech’s advance has allowed us to glimpse a 
world in which machines, not just mythical judges, can unerringly adjudicate 
cases or even predict a case’s outcome before it is filed. As Michael Livermore 
and Daniel Rockmore recently put it, judges, lawyers, and much of the legal 
system as we know it may someday soon be replaced by “blinking 
computerized Herculi” that sit in “server farms rather than law offices.”8 
This image of server farms replacing courthouses is an emotive one, and 
a cottage industry of mostly academic commentators has seized on it and set 
about imagining futuristic endpoints—an event horizon of sorts, where law 
 
6 For two excellent entries in a vast and growing literature examining the growing use of 
algorithmic tools, see Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, '( DUKE L.J. !")& 
(#"!$) and Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, !#( YALE L.J. ##!( (#"!$). 
7 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (!$('). 
8 See Michael A. Livermore & Daniel N. Rockmore, Introduction: From Analogue to Digital Legal 
Scholarship, in LAW AS DATA: COMPUTATION, TEXT, & THE FUTURE OF LEGAL ANALYSIS xii, xiv 
(Michael A. Livermore & Daniel Rockmore eds., #"!$) [hereinafter LAW AS DATA]. 
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and technology meet. Blinking Herculi, it is said, will in turn bring a state of 
“legal singularity,” when all legal outcomes are perfectly predictable ex ante, 
and all uncertainty is banished from the system.9 Law itself will be steadily 
transformed into a “catalog of precisely tailored laws” or “microdirectives”10 
made up of “up-to-the-second” and “individualized”11 rules that adjust in real-
time—for instance, an individualized speed limit for a given driver with a 
given amount of experience operating in speci+c driving conditions—and are 
enforced via automatic penalties.12 As this new and “seamless legal order” 
settles into place, there is no longer any need, or any room, for lawyering, 
adjudication, judges, or judicial discretion. Law becomes “self-driving.”13 
But just how likely are we to get there, and, assuming we make it at all, 
how soon? More importantly, what can we expect in the meantime? This Part 
addresses these questions. In so doing, we lower our gaze to a useful middle 
distance—our eyes neither inside the boat nor drifting out to a distant, 
Herculi-blinking horizon—and provide a systematic accounting of what we 
currently know, and don’t know, about the state of legal tech. We address legal 
tech’s current range of applications (Section I.A); its trajectory, as shaped in 
particular by the technological possibilities and limits of text-based analytics 
(Section I.B); and its implications for the legal profession, the legal system, 
and law itself (Section I.C). The resulting composite portrait provides the 
raw materials necessary for Part II’s exploration of some concrete ways the 
rules of civil procedure will mediate legal tech’s incorporation into the 
adversarial system in the near- to medium-term. 
A. Flavors of Legal Tech 
An initial task is to survey legal tech’s sprawling landscape. In what ways, 
and toward what ends, are legal tech tools being deployed within the civil 
justice system? 
A small but growing literature sizes up the legal tech +eld and o,ers some 
ways to slice and dice its component parts.14 One approach honors legal tech’s 
 
9 See Alarie, supra note ), at ))%. 
10 See Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, $# IND. L.J. !)"!, 
!)"#-"& (#"!*). 
11 Brian Sheppard, Warming Up to Inscrutability: How Technology Could Challenge Our Concept of 
Law, '( U. TORONTO L.J. &', &( (Supp. !, #"!(); see also Casey & Niblett, supra note !", at !)")-"' 
(explaining microdirectives); Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Contracts, )& J. 
CORP. L. !, *-!" (#"!*) (providing examples of microdirectives). 
12 See Sheppard, supra note !!, at )" (o,ering the example of regulating tra-c to reduce 
congestion); Casey & Niblett, supra note !", at !)"); Casey & Niblett, supra note !!, at *-!" (same). 
13 See Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, '' U. TORONTO L.J. )#$, )&" 
(#"!') (“The law will become, for all intents and purposes, ‘self-driving.’”) 
14 See, e.g., KEVIN D. ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL ANALYTICS: NEW 
TOOLS FOR LAW PRACTICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE (#"!*) (explaining how computational processes 
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entrepreneurial tilt and focuses on the sales channel, categorizing tools based 
on their end users (e.g., lawyers, clients/parties, businesses).15 Among its 
virtues, this approach separates out tools that substitute for legal 
representation (e.g., online legal advice tools) from those that remain within 
lawyers’ locus of control (e.g., e-discovery tools). Another approach could 
focus on the task performed: legal research, document management and 
creation, and document- and case-level analytics, among others. Still another 
approach could focus on the point in litigation time, beginning at the front-
end of a case at which a tool is used and progressing forward: lawyer-client 
matching, legal research and analysis, discovery, the drafting of pleadings and 
documents, and trial. A +nal approach could categorize legal tech tools based 
on subject area. This approach highlights proliferating domain-speci+c tools, 
particularly in the contracts area, but also patents (e.g., tools that value 
patents and patent portfolios), divorce (the area closest to fully automated 
generation of legal documents), torts (where case valuation tools are most 
regularly in use), and tax (where legal analytics and prediction tools appear 
most advanced), with the rest allocated to a residual, “general” category. 
The reality is that none of these approaches will be mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive. Instead, Table ! o,ers a mash-up of approaches in an 
e,ort to capture, at a glance, the main contours of the legal tech terrain. The 
result is nine categories of tools. 
 
 
will change the practice of law by breaking down the multitude of areas of expected change); Benjamin 
Alarie, Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, How Artificial Intelligence Will Affect the Practice of Law, '( 
U. TORONTO L.J. !"' (Supp. !, #"!(); Daniel Ben-Ari, Yael Frish, Adam Lazovski, Uriel Eldan & Dov 
Greenbaum, Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of Law: An Analysis and Proof of Concept Experiment, #& 
RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. #, art. &, #"!*, https://jolt.richmond.edu/files/#"!*/"&/Greenbaum-Final-#.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NXY&-*GZ#] (dividing the field into two components: strong and weak); Kathryn 
D. Betts & Kyle Jaep, The Dawn of Fully Automated Contract Drafting: Machine Learning Breathes New 
Life Into a Decades-Old Promise, !% DUKE L. & TECH. REV. #!' (#"!*) (examining technological 
innovation in contract drafting); Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted 
Review in E-Discovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient Than Exhaustive Manual Review, !* 
RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. &, art. !!, #"!!, http://jolt.richmond.edu/jolt-archive/v!*i&/article!!.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/*CEE-S*FN]; David Lat & Brian Dalton, How Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming 
Legal Research, ABOVE THE L. (July !', #"!(, $:&% AM), https://abovethelaw.com/#"!(/"*/how-
artificial-intelligence-is-transforming-legal-research [https://perma.cc/VL#*-#VWZ]. For a view of the 
landscape from within the industry, see THOMSONREUTERS, ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICE 
PROVIDERS #"!$, https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/reports/alternative-legal-service-
provider-study-#"!$. 
15 See Daniel W. Linna Jr., What We Know and Need to Know About Legal Startups, '* S.C. L. 
REV. &($, )"#-"& (#"!'). 
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A further task is to identity the subset of legal tech tools that are most 
likely to play a central role in the legal system going forward and, in particular, 
will press most strongly on its adversarial structure and procedural rules. This 
requires more than a laundry list of applications. We need to understand how 
existing legal tech tools intersect with the system, and we also need to look 
under their hood and understand their technical and operational details. 
Toward that end, consider three further ways to carve up the field. 
First, legal tech tools vary based on whether they operate inside or outside 
the litigation system and, in turn, whether they implicate procedural rules as 
opposed to other rules or policies. E-discovery, legal research, legal analytics, 
and outcome prediction tools all operate squarely within litigation because they 
assist lawyers or litigants seeking judicial resolution of disputes. As Part II will 
argue, they thus press on, and may even reshape, a range of civil procedure 
rules. Other legal tech tools, however, largely operate outside the litigation 
system—and, indeed, may seek to supplant it.16 Table !’s DIY dispute 
resolution systems plainly fit this mold. So might automated (and typically 
online) legal advice systems in light of the large mass of disputes that are 
currently resolved, with little or no court proceedings, via direct negotiation 
by injured parties with insurance companies, court-ordered ADR (e.g., 
mediation), or arbitration.17 To be sure, these latter tools hold implications for 
the litigation system. They shrink its domain. And by fueling alternative 
modes of dispute resolution, they exert pressure on the litigation system to 
adapt and can thus shape its inner procedural workings. Still, these tools more 
directly implicate legal-ethical rules sounding in consumer protection, such as 
unauthorized practice of law and solicitation restraints, than procedure.18 
 
16 For a recent overview of legal tools serving the unrepresented, see REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, 
LEGAL TECH FOR NON-LAWYERS: REPORT OF THE SURVEY OF US LEGAL TECHNOLOGIES (#"!$) 
(surveying the tools available to non-lawyers). See also J.J. Prescott, Improving Access to Justice in State 
Courts with Platform Technology, *" VAND. L. REV. !$$& (#"!*) (investigating the impacts of new online 
dispute resolution (ODR) technologies); Amy J. Schmitz, Expanding Access to Remedies Through E-Court 
Initiatives, '* BUFF. L. REV. ($, !"! (#"!$); Amy L. Schmitz, Dangers of Digitizing Due Process, (Univ. Mo. 
Sch. L., Working Paper No. #"#"-"!, #"#") (examining the possible downfalls of computerized law). 
17 See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS. & STATE JUST. INST., THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS v (#"!%), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/
Research/CivilJusticeReport-#"!%.ashx [https://perma.cc/W)B)-YG&H] (finding most litigants with 
resources have “already abandoned the civil justice system” through contract or private ADR). Even 
smart contracting may qualify given that it may obviate the need for any adjudication at all. Kevin 
Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, '* DUKE L.J. &!&, &&$ (#"!*). 
18 Other tools, particularly court vendor companies, have significant access to justice implications 
but fewer procedural implications. See Courts & Judiciary, THOMSON REUTERS, 
https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/solutions/government/courts-judiciary [https://perma.cc/&F*R-
FMJJ] (offering court-oriented technologies); Courts & Justice, TYLER TECHS., 
https://www.tylertech.com/solutions/courts-public-safety/courts-justice [https://perma.cc/%VPV-
WBY#] (offering technologies for courts and justice agencies). The exception is online dispute resolution 
(ODR) platforms, which raise a host of procedural issues, including “traffic rules” for moving litigants 
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Second, legal tech tools plainly differ in their technical sophistication and 
their degree of advance over analog legal practice. Many of the business 
development tools in Table !’s “Lawyer Marketplace and Matching” category 
may be little more than glorified docket monitoring.19 Similarly, some tools 
falling into the “Legal (Re)search” category are merely more feature-rich 
versions of search platforms like Westlaw and Lexis that have long been part 
of the lawyer’s workbench. These tools offer enhanced filtering capacities—
e.g., by judge, or by procedural posture—or improved user interfaces but 
otherwise provide much the same basic service as incumbent tools.20 Other 
tools, however, go well beyond lawyer-directed digital referencing by 
permitting a lawyer to drag and drop a complaint or brief and receive on-point 
cases (i.e., cases sharing facts, legal issues, and jurisdiction). Still other tools 
feel different in kind. After ingesting only the pleadings and papers to that 
point in a specialized tax or labor litigation, some advanced legal tech tools can 
generate a simple draft motion or brief or response to an agency’s civil 
investigative demand at the touch of a button.21 Table ! attempts to capture 
this distinction across the “Legal (Re)search” and “Legal Analytics” categories, 
with the former skewing toward lawyer-controlled tools that return less 
digested baskets of legal materials—a kind of “hunting and gathering”—and 
the latter encompassing, and aspiring to, more advanced legal cognitions.22 
 
into and out of ODR platforms, and also “information rules” that govern what information is provided 
to disputants on the platform about their options and prospects to nudge them toward settlement. See 
David Freeman Engstrom, Digital Civil Procedure, !'$ U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming #"#!). 
19 See Patrick Flanagan & Michelle H. Dewey, Where Do We Go from Here? Transformation and 
Acceleration of Legal Analytics in Practice, &% GA. ST. U. L. REV. !#)%, !#%& (#"!$). 
20 An example is Judicata, which highlights its ability to +lter based on appealing party, cause 
of action, court, and procedural posture. See Introducing Clerk, JUDICATA, https://www.judicata.com 
[https://perma.cc/*YCW-)PJJ] (noting “advanced +lters”); see also ROSS INTELLIGENCE, 
https://www.rossintelligence.com [https://perma.cc/#KDX-VFGZ] (claiming to be “easier to use 
than Westlaw and LexisNexis” and providing a feature-rich search tool based on unique case facts 
and procedural posture). 
21 See Susan Beck, Inside ROSS: What Artificial Intelligence Means for Your Firm, LAW.COM (Sept. 
#(, #"!'), http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/#"!'/"$/#(/inside-ross-what-artificial-intelligence-
means-for-your-firm [https://perma.cc/W&P'-VHWT] (discussing ROSS’s ability to draft motions); 
Rob Carty, Computer-Written Legal Briefs Are Closer Than You Think, ARTIFICIAL LAWYER (Apr. !!, 
#"!$), https://www.artificiallawyer.com/#"!$/")/!!/computer-written-legal-briefs-are-closer-than-you-
think [https://perma.cc/FJ$Z-Y)$L] (reviewing the current abilities of briefs written using A.I.). 
22 See, e.g., Faraz Dadgostari, Mauricio Guim, Peter A. Beling, Michael A. Livermore & Daniel 
N. Rockmore, Law Search as Prediction, A.I. & LAW (#"#") (formulating a mathematical model with 
a more complex search process); Kevin D. Ashley, Automatically Extracting Meaning from Legal Texts: 
Opportunities and Challenges, &% GA. ST. U. L. REV. !!!*, !!&&-&% (#"!$) (arguing that “QA” tools that 
allow a lawyer to ask questions in natural language are a key frontier of legal tech); Kingsley Martin, 
Deconstructing Contracts: Contract Analytics and Contract Standards, in DATA-DRIVEN LAW: DATA 
ANALYTICS AND THE NEW LEGAL SERVICES &* (Ed Walters ed., #"!() (describing automated 
contracting); Albert H. Yoon, The Post-Modern Lawyer: Technology and the Democratization of Legal 
Representation, '' U. TORONTO L.J. )%', )%* (#"!') (noting that most promising tools focus “not 
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A further generalization regarding technical sophistication is that the 
most potentially game-changing legal tech tools perform prediction tasks and 
incorporate one or more elements of machine learning (ML). The +rst part 
of this—a focus on prediction—should not surprise. Litigation takes place in 
the “shadow of the law,” as Mnookin and Kornhauser famously put it,23 and 
much of lawyering involves making predictive judgments in that shadow.24 
Which cases are winners and which losers? Which documents are relevant, 
and which can be defensibly withheld on privilege grounds? And which legal 
arguments and precedents will this judge +nd most persuasive? Machine 
prediction tools aim to replicate these fundamentally predictive cognitions. 
Nor should it surprise that the most promising legal tech tools deploy 
ML. For the uninitiated, machine learning is a family of algorithm-based 
techniques that use statistical models to “learn” from data in speci+c contexts 
rather than relying on more structured rules that an analyst programs 
directly.25 Beyond this high-level commonality, however, ML methods are a 
varied lot, and the techniques that power legal tech are no exception. First, 
many legal tech tools use “supervised” ML methods that analyze a set of 
previously and typically human-labeled data inputs—referred to as “training 
data”—in order to draw predictive inferences about the labels humans would 
assign to new and unseen instances.26 At least for the moment, fewer legal 
 
on replacing lawyers’ routinized tasks but, rather, on facilitating how they understand and analyze 
legal materials”). A good example is CaseText’s CARA, which allows users to input a brief and 
receive back a list and summary of cases. See Valerie McConnell, What is CARA A.I. and How Do I 
Use It?, CASETEXT, https://help.casetext.com/en/articles/!$*!')#-what-is-cara-a-i-and-how-do-i-
use-it [https://perma.cc/$)L'-*&ER]. For an engaging history of the evolution of computerized legal 
search, see John O. McGinnis & Steven Wasick, Law’s Algorithm, '' FLA. L. REV. $$!, $$! (#"!)). 
23 See Robert N. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case 
of Divorce, (( YALE L.J. $%", $%" (!$*$). 
24 See Mark K. Osbeck, Lawyer as Soothsayer: Exploring the Important Role of Outcome Prediction 
in the Practice of Law, !#& PA. ST. L. REV. )!, )&-)) (#"!() (noting that a principal role for lawyers, 
apart from advocacy, is outcome-prediction as advisor and prognosticator, both because of the 
+duciary obligation to act in accordance with a client’s interests and for the lawyer’s own pecuniary 
bene+t in case selection). The fountainhead of scholarly exploration of outcome prediction is two 
early articles by Stuart Nagel: Stuart S. Nagel, Applying Correlation Analysis to Case Prediction, )# 
TEX. L. REV. !""' (!$')); Stuart Nagel, Using Simple Calculations to Predict Judicial Decisions, AM. 
BEHAV. SCIENTIST (!$'"). 
25 A common way of putting this is that machine learning models learn from “examples rather 
than instructions.” Machine Learning, IBM (May #"!$), https://www.ibm.com/design/ai/basics/ml 
[https://perma.cc/BGB)-Q*VD]. 
26 A full accounting of machine learning is beyond the scope of this Article. For a lawyer-
accessible overview of key concepts (train-test splits, k-fold validation, optimizing bias and variance, 
over+tting), see Ryan Copus, Ryan Hübert & Hannah Laqueur, Big Data, Machine Learning, and the 
Credibility Revolution in Empirical Legal Studies, in LAW AS DATA, supra note (, at #%. A leading 
textbook treatment is GARETH JAMES, DANIELA WITTEN, TREVOR HASTIE & ROBERT 
TIBSHIRANI, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL LEARNING !(& (#"!*). For an accessible 
exploration of causal inference in statistics, see JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, 
MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION (#""(). 
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tech applications use “unsupervised” methods that +nd patterns in data 
without pre-labeled examples, leaving to humans to determine post hoc which 
ones matter.27 Second, many current legal tech tools leverage conventional 
ML techniques built around highly -exible statistical models, or 
combinations of models. These approaches are powerful because they 
dispense with the rigid, across-the-board assumptions about the functional 
form of data that characterize and limit conventional data science methods, 
but they are recognizable to those with quantitative training.28 Going 
forward, however, the most advanced legal tech tools are likely to use “neural 
networks”—inspired by the structure of neurons in the human brain and the 
most common exemplar of an advanced form of ML referred to as “deep 
learning”—to perform extremely subtle, multi-layered analyses.29 In Section 
I.B. below, we o,er a quasi-technical accounting of the possibilities and limits 
of deep learning applied to natural language processing (NLP), the family of 
techniques that performs text analytics and so holds the most promise for a 
discipline like law that trades in words.30 For now, it is enough to note that 
ML in all its forms can potentially generate highly accurate predictions where 
conventional data science may not, and so it is—and is likely to continue to 
be—the technical guts of the more consequential legal tech tools.31 
Third, looking across Table !’s entrants reveals a set of technical and 
operational distinctions that will condition legal tech’s trajectory and 
implications. For instance, legal tech tools vary in the degree to which they 
draw upon technical versus legal expertise and, relatedly, the stage at which 
that expertise plugs into the tool’s development and use. A case-level outcome 
prediction tool that aids a litigant’s forum-shopping calculus by analyzing a 
sea of past cases to estimate her relative chances across available jurisdictions 
may largely pose problems of data science. As we detail in Section II.B, key 
challenges will be empirical measurement (e.g., how to quantify judge 
ideology), extracting case features from docket sheets or other texts, and 
obtaining su.ciently large datasets. Moreover, the technical expertise needed 
 
27 JAMES ET AL., supra note #', at #', &*&; see also ASHLEY, supra note !), at #)'. 
28 An example of a flexible ML model is a decision tree model. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 
#', at &"&; Copus et al., supra note #'. Less flexible methods, which might be faster or easier to 
understand, enlist a computer to search across a predetermined set of ways to make predictions. Id. 
29 For an accessible introduction to neural networks, see Victor Zhou, Machine Learning for 
Beginners: An Introduction to Neural Networks, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Mar. %, #"!$), 
https://towardsdatascience.com/machine-learning-for-beginners-an-introduction-to-neural-networks-
d)$f##d#&(f$ [https://perma.cc/E)EQ-BGWN]. 
30 See Mireille Hildebrandt, Law as Computation in the Era of Arti!cial Legal Intelligence: Speaking 
Law to the Power of Statistics, '( U. TORONTO L.J. !#, #* (Supp. !, #"!() (noting NLP’s centrality to 
legal tech); Frank Fagan, Natural Language Processing for Lawyers and Judges, !!$ MICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming #"#!) (manuscript at $) (same). 
31 On ML’s predictive superiority, see Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan & Ziad 
Obermeyer, Prediction Policy Problems, !"% AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS )$!, )$#-$& (#"!%). 
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to create such a tool may largely feed into an up-front process of software 
development. Once a software platform has been built, a lawyer need only 
input key case features—or, as technology advances, perhaps just feed in a 
complaint and pleadings—to prime it. 
Other legal tech tools, in contrast, will require signi+cant lawyerly 
engagement throughout the design and implementation process. For 
example, a legal analytics tool that tells lawyers which arguments to advance 
or avoid in a case before a speci+c judge will likely require, at least given 
current technology, substantial lawyer input to construct logical models of 
doctrinal tests or legal factors that past courts have applied in order to guide, 
and then iteratively revise, the machine’s identi+cation and analysis of 
relevant case law.32 Another example, and the starkest contrast from the 
outcome-prediction tool just described, is the suite of technology-assisted 
review (TAR) and predictive coding tools increasingly used in discovery in 
large and complex cases.33 As discussed in more detail in Section II.A, TAR 
tools follow a common protocol in which lawyers +rst perform manual review 
of a subset of documents—sometimes called a “training set” or “seed set”—
to provide the “labeled” data upon which supervised machine learning tools 
rely.34 Thereafter, as the machine surfaces documents, lawyers are re-
deployed to review documents -agged by the machine and add them to the 
training set as the system iterates toward a best model.35 
To be sure, the expertise required to implement a given tool need not be 
exclusively technical or legal. At least for the moment, TAR tools depend on 
lawyers, but they also require signi+cant technical expertise, both up front 
and during implementation. Contrary to popular belief, machine learning 
models are not merely turned loose on data; rather, programmers make a 
myriad of decisions about how to partition data, which model types and data 
features to choose, and how much to tune the model.36 For now, the take-
 
32 See Kevin D. Ashley & Stefanie Bruninghaus, A Predictive Role for Intermediate Legal Concepts, 
in LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS: JURIX #""& !%& (Daniele Bourcier ed., 
#""&). For more discussion, see infra notes !'&–!'' and accompanying text. 
33 “TAR” is the more general term; “predictive coding” is a marketing term used by only some 
vendors. In what follows, we tend to use “TAR” as the more inclusive term. 
34 For an accessible overview of TAR, see The Sedona Conference Glossary: E-Discovery and 
Digital Information Management ("th ed.), !% SEDONA CONF. J. &"%, &%* (#"!)); Seth Katsuya Endo, 
Technological Opacity & Procedural Injustice, %$ B.C. L. REV. (#!, (##-#) (#"!(); Dana A. Remus, The 
Uncertain Promise of Predictive Coding, $$ IOWA L. REV. !'$!, !*"!-"' (#"!)); Gideon Christian, 
Predictive Coding: Adopting and Adapting Arti!cial Intelligence in Civil Litigation, $* CANADIAN BAR 
REV. )(', )$#-$& (#"!$). 
35 See supra note &). For a more technical accounting, see infra notes !!'–!!( and accompanying text. 
36 See Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust But Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 
&! HARV. J.L. & TECH. !, #( (#"!*) (“[W]hile the control algorithm is not developed by a human, 
the learning algorithm, the data, and any necessary guiding hints are.”); David Lehr & Paul Ohm, 
Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, %! U.C. DAVIS L. 
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home point—returned to in more detail below—is that a tool’s ratio of 
technical to lawyerly expertise and the point at which that expertise plugs 
into its design and use may shape a tool’s e,ect on the role and status of 
lawyers within the system, the ability of generalist judges to oversee its use, 
and its distributive impact as between litigation’s haves and have nots. 
A +nal notable operational distinction is that legal tech tools vary in their 
data inputs and, in particular, whether those inputs are widely available at 
little or no cost, or instead are proprietary and thus held only by certain actors 
within the system. Of course, much of the legal system operates in full view, 
and one might think it provides a treasure trove of constantly updating and 
curated data as an army of litigants and judges move product through it. 
However, data limitations will signi+cantly shape legal tech’s future. A core 
challenge for outcome prediction and legal analytics tools is the pervasiveness 
of “secret settlements” and the fact that most settled cases exit docket sheets 
via unelaborated voluntary dismissals under Rule *!.37 Importantly, however, 
these constraints may a,ect some system actors more than others. Past 
representations give large law +rms a ready-made source of data—including 
case outcomes, but also document productions and repositories of contracts—
to develop and optimize legal tech tools, subject only to client consent to use 
them.38 Other actors within the system who trade in large case volumes—
among them insurance companies and litigation +nanciers—may likewise 
have privileged access to data and be uninclined to share it. 
Mapping the full landscape in this way suggests an entirely di,erent set 
of frameworks for thinking about legal tech than the current debate’s 
overriding focus on the future health of the legal profession. In so doing, it 
helps to tee up more expansive thinking about legal tech’s trajectory and 
implications—the subject of Sections I.B and I.C—and ultimately informs 
Part II’s case studies of how civil procedure might adapt in response. 
B. Technical Limits and the Trajectory Puzzle 
A second key task in taking legal tech’s measure is to realistically and 
concretely forecast its future trajectory. Just how far will Table !’s tools advance 
 
REV. '%&, '(&-*"" (#"!*) (discussing the human interaction involved in statistics review, data 
partitioning, model selection, and model training). 
37 See Osbeck, supra note #), at $$ (noting unavailability of settlement information except in 
specialty areas—e.g., securities litigation); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Legal Ethics: The Plainti,s’ 
Lawyer (#"!$) (unpublished manuscript) (collecting sources estimating secret settlements). Still 
another barrier is the incompleteness of many commercial legal databases. See generally Merritt 
McAlister, Missing Decisions, !'$ U. PA. L. REV. !!"! (#"#!). 
38 Cf. Flanagan & Dewey, supra note !$, at !#'! (noting potential usability of “internal law-+rm 
information” but also detailing barriers to doing so, including “client con+dences”); see also Re & 
Solow-Niederman, supra note &, at #%$-'" (noting the problem of “proprietary data sets”). 
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in the near- to medium-term? Though it runs contrary to the futurist 
orientation of much of the existing literature, the best way to accomplish this 
is not by imagining robotic endpoints but rather by gauging legal tech’s current 
capabilities and then soberly evaluating the barriers to further advances. 
A growing literature starts down that road by exploring the impediments 
that will condition legal tech’s future. A significant regulatory constraint is 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct (.* and state counterparts outlawing 
unauthorized practice of law (UPL). Because “practice of law” is capaciously 
defined, UPL rules have the potential to stunt legal tech tools that operate 
outside the litigation system, such as lawyer-client matching, automated legal 
advice, and DIY dispute resolution.39 A vivid example is the trench warfare 
between state bars and lawyer-client matching system Avvo.40 Invoking these 
struggles, some commentators bet on lawyers’ guild-like capacity to fend off 
even the most potent tech innovations,41 while others see technology as an 
unstoppable force even for a strong professional monopoly.42 Still others focus 
 
39 Some suggest that UPL rules may apply to predictive coding. See Remus, supra note &), at 
!*"( (“[A] predictive-coding approach to discovery . . . raises new questions regarding what 
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law—questions that are not readily answerable in the 
current framework of unauthorized practice rules.”). 
40 See Benjamin H. Barton & Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice and Routine Legal Services: 
New Technologies Meet Bar Regulators, *" HASTINGS L.J. $%% (#"!$) (providing a detailed account of 
Avvo’s legal challenges). 
41 See, e.g., Gillian K. Had+eld, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of 
Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, '" STAN. L. REV. !'($, !*#)-#% (#""() (explaining 
how regulation precludes an e-cient market for innovative legal tools and thus dampens 
development incentives); Larry E Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, #"!" WIS. L. REV. *)$, ("*-"( 
(“Licensing laws also constrain the development of legal information products . . . . Without this 
regulation, +rms would have incentives to invest in, for example, software and data that could 
automate contract drafting or aspects of litigation . . . .”). 
42 See McGinnis & Pearce, supra note !, at &"%*-') (describing how “the legal services market 
has largely become de facto deregulated” and “even increased unauthorized practice enforcement” 
would not prevent the delivery to U.S. consumers of legal services through machine intelligence); 
see also Ray Worthy Campbell, Rethinking Regulation and Innovation in the U.S. Legal Services Market, 
$ N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. !, ! (#"!#) (explaining why innovation occurs despite regulation); BARTON, 
supra note !, at & (#"!%) (noting that many new legal technologies “have grown so large and prevalent 
that the time to quietly nip them in the bud has passed”). Part of this debate centered on whether 
increased adoption of legal tech re.ects economic pressure from the #""$ downturn or a broader 
and deeper trend. See William D. Henderson, From Big Law to Lean Law, &( INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
%, !) (#"!)) (“To survive and thrive in the years to come, +rms will increasingly follow Lean Law 
principles—better, faster, cheaper through collaboration, process engineering and technology—
rather than the Big Law model.”); Linna, supra note !%, at &$& (“The #""( U.S. recession accelerated 
changes in the demand for legal services.”); SUSSKIND, supra note ! (discussing drivers of legal 
change); Yoon, supra note ##, at )'# (describing litigants response to the recession as drawing “a 
harder line on their legal expenses”); see also Alarie et al., supra note !), at !!"-!! (explaining how 
post-recession client demands “provided the necessary impetus” for law +rms to embrace 
technological advances); Eli Wald, Foreword: The Great Recession and the Legal Profession, *( 
FORDHAM L. REV. #"%!, #"'!-'# (#"!") (“Increasingly competitive practice conditions in the 
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on broader professional and cultural barriers, emphasizing the inherent 
conservatism of lawyers as a profession,43 their aversion to “mathiness,”44 or the 
disconnect between the heavy, up-front, fixed costs necessary to develop many 
legal tech tools and a legal services industry that remains economically organized 
around the billable hour and pass-through of case-specific costs to clients.45 
These barriers are real and substantial. But the most signi+cant 
determinant of legal tech’s trajectory is likely to be technical, and it extends 
from an inescapable fact: Law “has language at its heart.”46 As a result, many 
legal tech tools depend on text analytics and, more speci+cally, a family of 
ML techniques noted previously called natural language processing (NLP).47 
At a high level of abstraction, NLP aims to identify patterns in human 
language in ways that facilitate problem-solving. But, as with machine 
learning more generally, NLP has many tributaries. 
The earliest NLP techniques were simple expert systems—i.e., hand-
written rules using, for instance, regular expressions to parse text.48 A second 
generation relied upon statistical analysis keyed to the frequencies of words 
appearing in a corpus of documents in order to draw inferences about their 
content.49 The current research frontier, and a rapidly advancing one, is a mix 
 
market for corporate legal services, accentuated by the economic downturn, are transforming . . . 
the practice realities, the organization, and the structure of large law +rms . . . .”). 
43 See Flanagan & Dewey, supra note !$, at !#%' (noting lawyers’ “professionally honed risk aversions”). 
44 See Remus & Levy, supra note !, at %)" (citing the “well-documented distaste that many 
lawyers have for technology and ‘mathiness’ of any kind”). 
45 See Flanagan & Dewey, supra note !$, at !#'"-'! (“If clients will not absorb the cost [of new 
technologies] or if the vendors’ pricing model does not easily permit pass-through billing, then cost 
becomes a more considerable barrier of adoption.”). 
46 See Robert Dale, Law and Word Order: NLP in Legal Tech, MEDIUM (Dec. !%, #"!(), 
https://towardsdatascience.com/law-and-word-order-nlp-in-legal-tech-bd!)#%*ebd"' [https://perma.cc/
T%WY-XZNU]; see also ALFRED DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW (!$*$) (“Words are the lawyer’s 
tools of trade.”). 
47 See supra notes &"–&! and accompanying text; Hildebrandt, supra note &", at #* (noting NLP’s 
centrality to legal automation). 
48 Canonical overviews of NLP include CHRISTOPHER D. MANNING & HINRICH SCHÜTZE, 
FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICAL NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING (!$$$) and DANIEL 
JURAFSKY & JAMES H. MARTIN, SPEECH AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING (#d ed. #""(). 
49 The basic assumption is that each document was generated from a mix of topics, and each 
topic was generated from a mix of words. Through statistical analysis of word frequencies, an analyst 
can infer the topic(s) of new documents and deploy those inferences. See Joakim Nivre, On Statistical 
Methods in Natural Language Processing, !& PROC. NORDIC CONF. COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 
(#""!) (discussing the use of inferences from corpus data to process natural language); David M. Blei, 
Probabilistic Topic Models, COMM. ACM, Apr. #"!#, https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/#"!#/)/!)*&'!-
probabilistic-topic-models/fulltext [https://perma.cc/)$(U-VUPE] (detailing the evolution of topic 
modeling). Note that the frequencies used, as contained in a “term-document matrix,” are not just 
simple counts. Many statistical NLP applications depend on TF-IDF—short for term-
frequency/inverse-document frequency—values in which a term’s frequency in a document is 
discounted by its frequency in the full corpus to avoid merely classifying based on the most common 
words. ASHLEY, supra note !), at #!(. Statistical NLP can be either supervised or unsupervised. A 
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of linguistics and “deep learning” (i.e., neural network) techniques.50 In a 
nutshell, deep-learning NLP machines make language computationally 
tractable by converting words, sentences, documents, or, in the legal context, 
entire cases into unique vectors, called “embeddings.” Each vector can be 
envisioned as an arrow from the origin to a point that represents the item of 
interest in a large, n-dimensional space, its magnitude a function of the 
presence of words, case citations, indexing concepts, or other features.51 Once 
this vast vector space has been constructed and human-annotated labels 
a.xed to training materials (again, words, sentences, documents, cases), a 
sophisticated machine learning model can manipulate the vectors 
mathematically using large numbers (on the order of billions) of calculations 
to model relationships between them.52 With su.cient data and computing 
power, the system’s outputs enable a range of legal tasks, such as identifying 
relevant or privileged documents, past legal decisions that may be controlling, 
or, though we will see it is far trickier, the winning argument in a case. 
Many of the more speci+c technical challenges that will shape legal tech’s 
trajectory are generic NLP challenges. As a data science method, machine 
learning developed alongside increases in computing power and “big data”—
de+ned as larger quantities of data, but also higher-dimension data (i.e., data 
with more predictors)—which presented rich analytic possibilities while 
exposing the shortcomings of conventional econometrics.53 But textual data 
 
good example of the latter is Latent Dirichlet allocation, or LDA, a topic modelling tool used to 
cluster words and documents into topics without up-front guidance. See generally CHRIS TUFTS, THE 
LITTLE BOOK OF LDA: AN OVERVIEW OF LATENT DIRICHLET ALLOCATION AND GIBBS 
SAMPLING, https://ldabook.com/index.html [https://perma.cc/DG'(-(GTS] (describing LDA); 
David M. Blei, Andrew Y. Ng & Michael I. Jordan, Latent Dirichlet Allocation, & J. MACHINE 
LEARNING RES. $$& (#""&) (same). 
50 See Christopher D. Manning, Computational Linguistics and Deep Learning, )! 
COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS *"!-"# (#"!%) (describing the “tsunami”-like impact that deep 
learning will have on NLP). A textbook-length treatment is Jurafsky & Martin, supra note )(. 
51 See Ashley, supra note ##, at !!#! (explaining the vector concept). For technical and applied 
examples, see Benjamin R. Baer, Skyler Seto & Martin T. Wells, Exponential Family Word 
Embeddings: An Iterative Approach for Learning Word Vectors, &#d CONF. NEURAL INFO. PROCESSING 
SYS., MONTRÉAL, CAN. (#"!(). See also Elliott Ash, Daniel L. Chen & Arianna Ornaghi, Gender 
Attitudes in the Judiciary: Evidence from U.S. Circuit Courts (Warwick Econ. Rsch. Papers, Paper No. 
!#%', #"#"), https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/#"#"/twerp_!#%'_-
_ornaghi.pdf [https://perma.cc/$BZM-H$VK] (using word embedding to study how gender 
stereotypes a,ect the behavior of U.S. Appellate Court judges). 
52 For a good but technical overview, see Tomas Mikolov, Kai Chen, Greg Corrado & Je,rey 
Dean, E-cient Estimation of Word Representations in Vector Space (Sept. *, #"!&) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://arxiv.org/abs/!&"!.&*(! [https://perma.cc/'CZF-WYNK]. Vector space similarity 
uses a measure of Euclidian distances between the end-points of the vectors in the n-dimensional 
vector space. By computing the cosine of the angle between a pair of vectors, one can quantify the 
similarity of vector pairs. The smaller the cosine/angle, the greater the similarity. Id. at %. 
53 See Marion Dumas & Jens Frankenreiter, Text as Observational Data, in LAW AS DATA, supra note 
(, at '! (noting how computational tools allow for representation of texts as “high-dimensional vectors”). 
!"## University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !$%: !""! 
brings further unique challenges. The easiest to see arise from the richness of 
human language.54 Sarcasm, implicit meanings, multiple words with the same 
meaning (synonymy), and the same word with multiple meanings (polysemy) 
are just the beginning.55 The result is that advanced NLP requires extensive 
manipulation of raw texts before analytics can be performed. NLP machines 
must +rst break text down into manipulable pieces by normalizing and 
tokenizing it (i.e., eliminating super+cial variations in words via “stemming,” 
and removing punctuation and “stop words”56), parsing it (i.e., tagging words 
for parts of speech and other syntactic structure, including grammatical 
roles), and representing it (i.e., converting the reduced form “tokens” to 
vector-based embeddings that permit semantic comparisons).57 This latter 
step relies upon an encoder-decoder that assigns semantic value to a word 
based on its context—that is, the words appearing before and after it—to 
disambiguate it and link it to synonyms to move its representation closer to 
its intended human meaning.58 
 
54 Adam Zachary Wyner, Weaving the Legal Semantic Web with NLP, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. 
INST. (May !*, #"!", #:#* PM), https://blog.law.cornell.edu/voxpop/#"!"/"%/!*/weaving-the-legal-
semantic-web-with-natural-language-processing [https://perma.cc/N()L-()V%] (discussing the 
intricacies of natural language). 
55 A more technical framing is that language’s large lexicon, rich grammar, and near-in+nite 
semantic realizations renders text analytics a sparse and underdetermined problem. 
56 Stop words are high-frequency words with “low information content,” such as articles or 
pronouns. See Peter D. Turney & Patrick Pantel, From Frequency to Meaning: Vector Space Models of 
Semantics, &* J. A.I. RSCH. !)!, !%) (#"!") (explaining the methods by which NLP machines process 
pronunciation, grammar and syntax). 
57 For an overview of the first two steps, see Elvis Saravia, Fundamentals of NLP—Chapter 
#—Tokenization, Lemmatization, Stemming, and Sentence Segmentation, NOTEBOOKS BY DAIR.AI, 
https://dair.ai/notebooks/nlp/#"#"/"&/!$/nlp_basics_tokenization_segmentation.html 
[https://perma.cc/XA)'-WWTG]. 
58 Attention is where the most rapid recent advances in NLP have come, particularly the #"!( 
publication of Google’s BERT model. See Jacob Devlin, Ming-Wei Chang, Kenton Lee & Kristina 
Toutanova, BERT: Pre-training of Deep Bidirectional Transformers for Language Understanding 
(May #), #"!$) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/!(!".")("% [https://perma.cc/V%S*-
#GEF] (discussing the means by which BERT achieves “bi-directional representations from 
unlabeled text”); Ashish Vaswani, Noam Shazeer, Niki Parmar, Jakob Uszkoreit, Llion Jones, Aidan 
N. Gomez, Lukasz Kaiser & Illia Polosukhin, Attention Is All You Need (Dec. ', #"!*) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/!*"'."&*'# [https://perma.cc/E#HV-WCPS] (proposing a new 
network architecture that uses attention mechanisms to achieve language representations of superior 
quality). An accessible, non-math explanation of vectorization as contextualization and a solution to 
synonymy, etc., is Noah A. Smith, Contextual Word Representations: Putting Words into Computers, 
COMM. OF THE ACM, June #"#", at ''. Another signi+cant recent advance is Open AI’s GPT-& 
model. Like BERT, it is a self-supervised learning model that pre-trains a base model by obfuscating 
a word from a sentence and training the model to predict that word. In a sense, the vast corpus of 
human language, not humans explicitly engaged in labeling, provides the labels. Once the base 
model is trained, it can be “+netuned” or “primed” for more speci+c tasks on smaller datasets. On 
self-supervision and also GPT-&’s speci+c approach, see Longlong Jing & Yingli Tian, Self-
supervised Visual Feature Learning with Deep Neural Networks: A Survey (Feb. !', #"!$) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/!$"#."'!'# [https://perma.cc/D%GS-'(SE]; Tom B. 
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A related challenge is that advanced NLP is computationally demanding. 
The most cutting-edge applications require enormous compute power to 
perform the billions of calculations required for even seemingly straightforward 
tasks. In one sense, NLP’s cost has declined recently due to the availability of 
open-source tools (e.g., Google’s TensorFlow software59 and its BERT encoder-
decoder system,60 Stanford’s CoreNLP,61 and Facebook’s PyTorch62). There is, 
however, a potential trade-off. Open-source, off-the-shelf NLP models are 
trained on general text corpora (e.g., Wikipedia, the so-called Google Books 
“corpus,”63 IMDb movie reviews), and their language representations may not 
“transfer” well to domain-specific, technocratic areas, particularly “legalese.”64 
For many discrete legal tasks, fully harnessing NLP may thus require significant 
re-training of pretrained models—and may also require data and computing 
power that tends to be concentrated in key industrial players, such as law firms 
and tech companies.65 While domain adaptability remains an open research 
question in computer science, the need for retraining to improve upon 
benchmark NLP tasks could be a significant constraint. 
The most acute challenge facing legal tech is more law-speci+c: NLP 
cannot yet reliably “read” legal texts in the sense of extracting legal concepts 
 
Brown et al., Language Models Are Few-Shot Learners (July ##, #"#") (unpublished manuscript), 
https://arxiv.org/abs/#""%.!)!'% [https://perma.cc/(MAT-WCCN]. 
59 See TENSORFLOW, https://www.tensor.ow.org [https://perma.cc/NK#V-G)ZM]. 
60 See Devlin et al., supra note %(. 
61 See CORENLP, https://stanfordnlp.github.io/CoreNLP/ [https://perma.cc/EE&D-G##W]; see also 
Christopher D. Manning, Mihai Surdeanu, John Bauer, Jenny Finkel, Steven J. Bethard & David 
McClosky, The Stanford CoreNLP Natural Language Processing Toolkit, %# PROC. ANN. MEETING ASS’N 
COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS: SYSTEM DEMONSTRATIONS %% (#"!)). 
62 See Tools: PyTorch, FACEBOOK AI, https://ai.facebook.com/tools/pytorch 
[https://perma.cc/&UJS-R(PR]. 
63 Eitan Adam Pechenick, Christopher M. Danforth & Peter Sheridan Dodds, Characterizing 
the Google Book Corpus: Strong Limits to Inferences of Socio-Cultural and Linguistic Evolution, PLOS 
ONE (Oct. *, #"!%), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id/!".!&*!/journal.pone."!&*")! 
[https://perma.cc/'EUS-PZ'W]. 
64 See Ilias Chalkidis, Manos Fergadiotis, Prodromos Malakasiotis, Nikolas Aletras & Ion 
Androutsopoulos, LEGAL-BERT: The Muppets Straight Out of Law School (Oct. ', #"#") 
(unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/#"!"."#%%$ [https://perma.cc/)Z'Q-#&T&] (detailing the 
comparatively poor performance of the model used in the legal context without the proper model pre-
training). For transfer learning challenges in other expert domains, see Iz Beltagy, Kyle Lo & Arman 
Cohan, SciBERT: A Pretrained Language Model for Scientific Text (Sept. !", #"!$) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/!$"&.!"'*' [https://perma.cc/%*Y%-GPHA] (finding that a domain 
specific-model over scientific texts outperformed a model trained on general texts); Emily Alsentzer, 
John Murphy, William Boag, Wei-Hung Weng, Di Jindi, Tristan Naumann & Matthew McDermott, 
Publicly Available Clinical BERT Embeddings, # PROC. CLINICAL NAT. LANGUAGE PROCESSING 
WORKSHOP *# (#"!$), https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/W!$-!$"$ (finding that a domain specific-
model over clinical texts outperformed a model trained on general texts). 
65 See Flanagan & Dewey, supra note !$, at !#%$ (noting transfer problem in legal context); 
Remus & Levy, supra note !, at %## (providing accessible overview of language parsing tools). For the 
privileged access of litigation’s “haves” to needed data, see infra notes !"'–!"$ and accompanying text. 
!"#* University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !$%: !""! 
or legal rules in logical forms.66 One reason is that, while second-nature to 
seasoned lawyers, legal reasoning consists of a dizzying array of analytic 
moves. Case outcomes often turn on a dense mix of rule-based reasoning and 
case-based reasoning, including: linguistic arguments about a statutory or 
regulatory term’s “ordinary” meaning; systemic arguments about 
harmonization across statutory sections; analogical arguments from past case 
law; evidentiary arguments about key facts; and teleological arguments from 
legislative purposes or other substantive values.67 Not only must the machine 
identify and manipulate di,erent types of legal argument—linguistic, 
systemic, analogical, evidentiary, teleological—it must also develop tra.c 
rules for navigating between them.68 
To be sure, NLP has improved rapidly in its capacity to parse legal 
argument. NLP can now identify the rhetorical roles played by sentences in 
court decisions (e.g., statements of legal rules, fact determinations) and who 
among possible speakers (judge, litigants, testifying expert, evidentiary 
document) is making an assertion.69 Classi+cation and attribution of this sort 
 
66 See Ashley, supra note ##, at !!#", !!&'(“Computer programs cannot yet read legal texts like 
lawyers can. . . . In particular, computer programs cannot read contracts the way that attorneys do.”); 
see also ASHLEY, supra note !), at & (distinguishing between “legal information retrieval” and 
“argument retrieval”). 
67 ASHLEY, supra note !), at ((. 
68 Id. Law is also indeterminate because legal language is ambiguous semantically (e.g., 
“reasonable” and “discrimination,” which both su,er from uncertainty about the boundaries of what 
the terms refers to) and syntactically (the logical connectors—the “ands” and “ors”—that structure 
propositions). Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, !# U. CHI. L. REV. %"! (!$)(). 
Computational modeling requires “propositionalizing” legal rules in ways that reduce both forms of 
ambiguity and then weight each proposition. 
69 See, e.g., Vanessa Wei Feng & Graeme Hirst, Classifying Arguments by Scheme, )$ PROC. ANN. 
MEETING ASS’N FOR COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS $(* (#"!!) (demonstrating an experiment’s 
relative success in identifying common argumentation structures); Ben Hachey & Claire Grover, 
Extractive Summarization of Legal Texts, !) A.I. & L. &% (#""') (detailing research project on the 
automatic text summarization of rulings from the UK House of Lords); Marie-Francine Moens, Erik 
Boiy, Raquel Mochales Palau & Chris Reed, Automatic Detection of Arguments in Legal Texts, !! PROC. 
INT’L CONF. A.I. & L. ##% (#""*) (detailing results of experiments on detection of arguments in legal 
texts); M. Saravanan, B. Ravindran & S. Raman, Improving Legal Information Retrieval Using an 
Ontological Framework, !* A.I. & L. !"! (#""$) (explaining the benefits of ontological frameworks to 
extract legal judgments); Vern R. Walker, Parisa Bagheri & Andrew J. Lauria, Argumentation Mining 
from Judicial Decisions: The Attribution Problem and the Need for Legal Discourse Models (#"!%) 
(unpublished manuscript peer-reviewed and presented at the #"!% Workshop on Automated 
Detection, Extraction & Analysis of Semantic Info. in Legal Texts), https://sites.hofstra.edu/vern-
walker/wp-content/uploads/sites/'$/#"!$/!#/WalkerEtAl-AttributionAndLegalDiscourseModels-
ASAIL#"!%.pdf [https://perma.cc/%E)P-%ALJ] (detailing the outstanding challenges of identifying 
augmentation structures using automated methods). One reason this is hard is that legal texts, relative 
to other kinds of texts, lack a common structure and format. For a proposal that judges write 
“structured, machine-readable” opinions and tag “key elements . . . treating facts, issues, cited cases 
or other elements of the case as pieces of data,” see Jameson Dempsey & Gabriel Teninbaum, May It 
Please the Bot?, MIT COMPUTATIONAL L. REP. (Aug. !), #"#"), https://law.mit.edu/
pub/mayitpleasethebot/release/! [https://perma.cc/#DM(-G#AC]. 
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are canonical NLP tasks and a critical step for analyzing legal texts.70 But 
NLP has not yet made the leap from these simpler tasks to full-on argument 
mining—that is, automated discovery of discourse structure and argument-
related information, including propositions, premises, conclusions, and 
exceptions.71 This is important, because argument representations serve as the 
bridge between legal texts and a wide range of legal cognitions to which legal 
tech aspires, from information retrieval and legal analytics to outcome 
prediction.72 For each of these tasks, it is only with a jump to fully 
computational analysis of substantive legal merits that legal tech can perform 
tasks with robust reasoning and thus explain machine outputs in ways that a 
lawyer can put to use or a client or judge might expect.73 A machine 
prediction that a case has an &" percent chance of victory might help a lawyer 
decide whether to +le a complaint or seek an early settlement; however, it 
tells her precisely nothing actionable about how to actually win the case.74 
A consequence is that legal tech tools are currently bounded by their 
supervised nature—that is, by their need for labeled, typically lawyer-labeled, 
data.75 For the moment, even the most cutting-edge legal analytics tools 
require lawyers to perform two critical and resource-intensive tasks. First, 
lawyers must translate an operative doctrinal test into a hierarchical structure 
of pre-de+ned elements—for instance, a list of factors that appear in past 
cases adjudicating, say, the line between employees and independent 
 
70 On text summarization techniques, see Mehdi Allahyari, Seyedamin Pouriyeh, Mehdi 
Asse+, Saeid Safaei, Elizabeth D. Trippe, Juan B. Gutierrez & Krys Kochut, Text Summarization 
Techniques: A Brief Survey (July #(, #"!*) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/!*"*."##'(.pdf [https://perma.cc/B)Y%-KXY#]. 
71 See Ashley, supra note ##, at !!!* (implying that NLP has yet to achieve legal information retrieval 
to “match document structure, concepts, and argument roles with aspects of the problems users seek to 
solve”); see also Remus & Levy, supra note !, at %&( (describing still-embryonic field of argument mining). 
72 See Faraz Dadgosari, Mauricio Guim, Peter A. Beling, Michael A. Livermore & Daniel N. 
Rockmore, Modeling Law Search as Prediction, A.I. & L. (#"#") (discussing the importance of 
arguments in information retrieval to complete legal tasks). 
73 See ASHLEY, supra note !), at !(; Ashley, supra note ##, at !!&(. See generally Frederick 
Schauer, Giving Reasons, )* STAN. L. REV. '&& (!$$%) (discussing explanation in law). 
74 ASHLEY, supra note !), at #& (noting that fully functional computational legal analysis 
requires “an ability to explain its reasoning, and that reasoning has to be intelligible to legal 
practitioners”); Remus & Levy, supra note !, at %%" (noting that most prediction programs “give a 
user results without showing the precise combination of factors that produced those results”). 
75 See ASHLEY, supra note !), at % (noting that computer science has not yet learned to 
“automate the knowledge representation process”). See also Talley, supra note !, at !(% (noting law’s 
“irreducible complexity” and concluding that it “will necessarily implicate signi+cant human input 
over the longer term”). For an interesting account of big tech’s investment in supervision and the 
rise of the “labeling” industry, see Madhumita Murgia, AI’s New Workforce: The Data-Labelling 
Industry Spreads Globally, FIN. TIMES (July #&, #"!$), https://www.ft.com/content/%'dde&'c-aa)"-
!!e$-$()c-fac(&#%aaa") [https://perma.cc/*DKJ-UJQZ]. 
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contractors.76 Second, lawyers must annotate legal texts in order to train 
machines to identify these argument-related elements—here again, legal 
factors or other discourse structures—in old cases in order to compare them 
to new ones.77 The results of this lawyer-intensive process of translation and 
annotation can be powerful. Fed well-labeled data, machine learning tools can 
determine that factor X or an entire case, long thought to drive case outcomes, 
has become, or has always been, irrelevant.78 Put another way, legal tech tools 
perform well in assigning weights to legal factors, even if they cannot, as of 
yet, discover those factors on their own.79 But the result is still a long way 
from the fully automated robolawyers and robojudges in the more futurist 
accounts of legal tech.80 It is only with signi+cant further NLP advances that 
legal tech will achieve the holy grail: a legal app that can, in fully automated 
fashion, construct an “ontology” of a legal area, extract substantive legal 
 
76 ASHLEY, supra note !), at !!, #"$ (noting legal tech’s “knowledge acquisition bottleneck” and 
need for “hand-tooled knowledge representations”); Osbeck, supra note #), at %) (describing the 
“element-focused analysis” and “factor tests” that commonly structure much legal reasoning). 
77 Even then, detection of argumentative structures is far from perfect. See, e.g., Kevin D. 
Ashley & Stefanie Bruninghaus, Automatically Classifying Case Texts and Predicting Outcomes, !* A.I. 
& L. !#% (#""$) (describing results of the SMILE interface for extracting argument-related legal 
factors in legal texts but noting reliability concerns); Adam Wyner & Wim Peters, Semantic 
Annotations for Legal Text Processing Using GATE Teamware, #"!# PROC. LANGUAGE RES. & EVAL. 
CONF.: SEMANTIC PROCESSING OF LEGAL TEXTS WORKSHOP &) (describing an annotation 
pipeline for identifying legal factors in court decisions); Adam Wyner & Wim Peters, Towards 
Annotating and Extracting Textual Legal Case Factors, #"!" PROC. LANGUAGE RES. & EVAL. CONF.: 
SEMANTIC PROCESSING OF LEGAL TEXTS WORKSHOP &' (same). 
78 See Fagan, supra note &", at !& (“Old-fashioned positive studies of black-letter law carried 
out with sophisticated NLP tools can clarify standards and help make law more precise.”); Wolfgang 
Alschner, AI and Legal Analytics, in AI AND THE LAW IN CANADA (Teresa Scassa & Florian Martin-
Bariteau eds., forthcoming #"#!) (manuscript at )) (noting the potential of network analysis models 
to “empirically support or debunk textbook accounts of what judicial decisions proved most 
in.uential”); Jens Frankenreiter & Michael Livermore, Computational Methods in Legal Analysis, !' 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. &$ (#"#") (reviewing NLP uses for “interpretation and description” of 
doctrinal trends). For recent concrete examples, see Jonathan Macey & Joshua Mitts, Finding Order 
in the Morass: The Three Real Justi!cations for Piercing the Corporate Veil, !"" CORNELL L. REV. $$, !!% 
(#"!)); Frank Fagan, From Policy Confusion to Doctrinal Clarity: Successor Liability from the Perspective 
of Big Data, $ VA. L. & BUS. REV. &$!, &$)-$% (#"!%); Frank Fagan, Waiving Good Faith: A Natural 
Language Processing Approach, !' NYU J.L. & BUS. '&&, '&& (#"#"); Nikolaos Aletras, Dimitrios 
Tsarapatsanis, Daniel Preo0iuc-Pietro & Vasileios Lampos, Predicting Judicial Decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights: A Natural Language Processing Perspective, PEERJ COMPUT. SCI. (Oct. #), 
#"!'), https://peerj.com/articles/cs-$&.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQ#(-JYER]. For an early e,ort to 
computationally model “conceptual change” in case law, see Edwina L. Rissland & Timur M. 
Friedman, Detecting Change in Legal Concepts, % PROC. INT’L CONF. ON A.I. & L. !#* (!$$%). 
79 See ASHLEY, supra note !), at !#% (noting distinction between assigning weights to factors 
and discovering them). 
80 See supra notes *–!& and accompanying text (outlining the possible future in which the law becomes 
self-driving); see also Remus & Levy, supra note !, at %#! (noting that the closest legal tech has come to 
retrieving underlying arguments are the Q/A—i.e., question-and-answer—systems touted by Ross 
Intelligence and others that purport to retrieve case passages in response to natural language questions). 
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features from relevant legal texts, and then link those features to 
computational models to perform key tasks, from retrieving well-tailored 
legal materials to predicting case outcomes.81 
Finally, even with signi+cant advances in NLP, it is possible that legal 
tech tools will not, or at least not soon, be able to mimic the legal cognitions 
that seasoned lawyers possess. There is no single way to capture what lawyers 
do, but a rough approximation is that sound legal judgment must be both 
synoptic and subtle.82 It must be synoptic in simultaneously marrying an 
“internal” perspective on a case (grappling with law on its own terms and 
under its own logic—i.e., its legal “merit”) with an “external” perspective 
(how a particular judge or litigant or myriad other case characteristics external 
to a case’s internal logic or “merit” relate to the outcome).83 Legal judgment 
must also be subtle in its capacity to parse highly individualized, near-in+nite 
fact patterns, work back and forth between minor fact shadings and legal 
propositions, sift holdings and dicta, transport concepts from one legal area 
to another, and account for policy-based and equitable “teleological” 
reasons.84 Legal judgment further depends on an ability to predict subtle 
changes over time, particularly social (and thus judge- or jury-held) norms.85 
Indeed, law’s dynamism means that weighing both the “internal” and 
 
81 ASHLEY, supra note !), at !*#, &%). 
82 Another helpful framing reduces legal cognition to two problems: haystack problems (i.e., 
assembly of relevant “needles” from a haystack of materials) and forest problems (extracting overall 
trends and themes and/or weighing the “gravitas” of particular trees—a form of dimensionality 
reduction). See Vlad Eidelman, Brian Grom & Michael A. Livermore, Analyzing Public Comments, 
in LAW AS DATA, supra note (, at #&%, #%*. 
83 See Michael A. Livermore & Daniel N. Rockmore, Distant Reading the Law, in LAW AS 
DATA, supra note (, at (-$. See also ASHLEY, supra note !), at !"* (o,ering a similar internal-versus-
external accounting); Katz, supra note !, at $'# (same). For an important early e,ort that o,ers a 
similar “internal” and “external” account of prediction using the contrasting views of Justice Holmes 
and Karl Llewellyn, see Frederick Schauer, Prediction and Particularity, *( B.U. L. REV. **& (!$$(). 
84 See Remus & Levy, supra note !, at %)$ (describing how, while computers can serve predictive 
functions, they cannot yet move the law forward through creative ways). For more on case equities, see 
Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Four Futures of Legal Automation, '& UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE #', 
)% (#"!%); Trevor Bench-Capon & Giovanni Sartor, A Model of Legal Reasoning with Cases Incorporating 
Theories and Values, !%" A.I. $* (#""&); Donald H. Berman & Carole D. Hafner, Representing Teleological 
Structure in Case-Based Legal Reasoning: The Missing Link, ) PROC. INT’L CONF. ON A.I. & L. %", %"-%$ 
(!$$&); Alison Chorley & Trevor Bench-Capon, AGATHA: Automated Construction of Case Law Theories 
Through Heuristic Search, !" PROC. INT’L CONF. ON A.I. & L. )%-%) (#""%). 
85 See Levi, supra note '(, at %"!-") (describing law as a “moving classi+cation scheme”). This 
is especially true with case-based reasoning, where courts working against a precedential backdrop 
must decide whether to restrict, extend, or replace legal concepts to deal with new and proximate 
fact contexts or shifting social values—a process that often turns on teleological considerations. See 
ASHLEY, supra note !), at (" (“The challenge for cognitive computing is how to design computer 
programs that can assist users in constructing such arguments by formulating theories, linking them 
to analogous positive case examples and distinguishing them from negative instances.”); see also 
KARL BRANTING, REASONING WITH RULES AND PRECEDENTS $-#% (!$$$) (describing approach 
that isolates “criterial facts” driving judicial decisions). 
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“external” determinants of a case is more than just a brute-force analytic 
exercise. It is a subtle, trend-sensitive, predictive one. 
When it comes to synopticism, computation may well prove superior to 
human cognition. Indeed, computation’s comparative advantage may be its 
ability to perform sweeping and comprehensive analyses of myriad case 
factors, whether “internal” or “external” to law, and perfectly weight each.86 
An insightful way to capture legal tech’s promise in this regard, highlighted 
by Livermore and Rockmore, is that NLP permits a kind of “distant 
reading”—an idea lifted from literary criticism to describe analysis of large 
text corpora at a coarse level of abstraction, as contrasted with the “close 
reading” literary critics and lawyers perform.87 
The more difficult question may be whether machines can perform legal 
judgment’s subtler analytic tasks as well as or better than humans. Here, there 
is more reason to doubt machine prowess. Machine-based legal analytics, 
focused as they are on “distant” or coarse pattern recognition, may only be able 
to handle easy cases, not hard ones,88 and may miss subtly evolving internal 
(doctrinal) or external (social) trends.89 Human cognition, the argument goes, 
is strongest in its capacity for parsimonious reasoning with incomplete 
information—precisely the cases at the doctrinal frontier where fine-grained 
fact distinctions or less tractable “teleological” arguments control.90 
A pair of conclusions follow from this quasi-technical accounting of legal 
tech’s possibilities and limits. First, legal tech’s advance will not be 
 
86 See Alschner, supra note *( (manuscript at %) (comparing the ability of a computational tool 
to comprehensively consider past caselaw to the “convenience sample” of human analysis). 
87 See Livermore & Rockmore, supra note (&, at (-$; see also FRANCO MORETTI, GRAPHS, 
MAPS, TREES: ABSTRACT MODELS FOR A LITERARY HISTORY ! (#""%) (coining the term in the 
literary criticism context); Mireille Hildebrandt, The Meaning and Mining of Legal Texts, in 
UNDERSTANDING DIGITAL HUMANITIES: THE COMPUTATIONAL TURN AND NEW 
TECHNOLOGY !)%, !%& (David. M. Berry ed., #"!#). 
88 See Tim Wu, Will Arti!cial Intelligence Eat the Law? The Rise of Hybrid Social-Ordering Systems, 
!!$ COLUM. L. REV. #""!, #""& (#"!$) (noting human adjudication’s perhaps unique “facility for 
‘hard cases’”); see also Pasquale & Cashwell, supra note (), at )& (describing how human judgment is 
needed where more complexity is present, such as with persuasive authority). 
89 Remus and Levy frame this latter point as ML’s limited ability to handle “unanticipated 
contingencies.” Remus & Levy, supra note !, at %&(, %)!. 
90 Alarie, supra note ), at ))); see also ASHLEY, supra note !), at !# (explaining the paradigms 
of IR that aid attorneys in the parsing of information necessary to solve a problem rather than 
replace human thinking); Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Prediction, Persuasion, and the 
Jurisprudence of Behaviourism, '( U. TORONTO L.J. '&, '( (#"!() (noting the argument that facts 
matter more than law in case outcomes, rendering predictive AI software in this area weaker than a 
human’s cognitive capability). The counter from computer scientists is that parsimonious reasoning 
under limited information is just a form of “dimensionality reduction”—separating wheat from 
cha,—and a task that computers can and will perform better than humans. Even grasping trending 
social dynamics may ultimately favor machines because messy social processes tend to be enshrined 
in speech that NLP can access more e-ciently. See Dumas & Frankenreiter, supra note %&, at '* 
(outlining how big data provides opportunities to study social processes). 
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monolithic. Rather, its incorporation into the civil justice system will be 
siloed, incremental, and halting—across prediction tasks and subject-matter 
silos.91 In particular, it is a good bet that legal tech tools will arrive sooner, 
and advance most rapidly, in legal areas where data is abundant, regulated 
conduct takes repetitive and stereotypical forms, legal rules are inherently 
stable, and case volumes are such that a repeat player stands to gain +nancially 
by investing.92 This helps to explain why some of the most advanced legal 
tech tools are found in technocratic and self-contained areas of law (e.g., tax, 
labor and employment, patents), or highly routine ones (e.g., auto accidents), 
but not more open-ended legal contexts.93 The question is whether, or how 
quickly, prediction tools can move beyond those self-contained legal areas, 
and how soon it will reliably perform other higher-order legal cognitions, 
including legal search and analysis that goes beyond simple “hunting and 
 
91 Remus & Levy, supra note !, at %!!-&* (o,ering predictions about which legal tasks will be 
subject to “light, moderate, or heavy employment e,ects”). 
92 See Casey & Niblett, supra note !!, at % (predicting the “likely rise of a market for third-
party vendors providing certi+ed computer code to govern contractual relationships”); see also 
Remus & Levy, supra note !, at %&( (noting “major inroads” in some areas, especially e-discovery, 
but stating that legal tech tools remain “embryonic” in other areas, particularly legal analytics); John 
Armour & Mari Sako, AI-Enabled Business Models in Legal Services: From Traditional Law Firms to 
Next-Generation Law Companies?, * J. PROS. & ORG. #*, &" (#"#") (noting that legal successes have 
“so far been limited to large organizations with su-cient value at stake to justify the investment”). 
See generally ASHLEY, supra note !), at *# (discussing “standardized schemes . . . developed for 
annotating or tagging statutes and regulations with procedural and substantive semantic information 
that can then be used to search for relevant provisions”). 
93 Compare Alarie, supra note ), at ))' (predicting success with regard to tax law), Benjamin 
Alarie, Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Using Machine Learning to Predict Outcomes in Tax Law, 
%( CANADIAN BUS. L.J. #&!, #&( (#"!') (reporting success in the tax area), Benjamin Alarie & Abdi 
Aidid, Predicting Economic Substance Cases with Machine Learning, J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., Summer 
#"#", at &%, &' (demonstrating that machine learning “algorithms can correctly predict the case 
outcomes and give practitioners opportunities to re+ne their understanding and ultimately provide 
better tax advice”), Blakeley McShane, Oliver P. Watson, Tom Baker & Sean J. Gri-th, Predicting 
Securities Fraud Settlements and Amounts: A Hierarchical Bayesian Model of Federal Securities Class Action 
Lawsuits, $ J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. )(# (#"!#) (same as to securities), Mihai Surdeanu, Tamesh 
Nallapati, George Gregory, Joshua Walker & Christopher D. Manning, Risk Analysis for Intellectual 
Property Litigation, !& PROC. INT’L CONF. A.I. & L. !!' (#"!!) (reporting a predictive accuracy rating 
of ')% in patent cases), Hannes Westermann, Vern R. Walker, Kevin D. Ashley & Karim 
Benyekhlef, Using Factors to Predict and Analyze Landlord-Tenant Decisions to Increase Access to Justice, 
!* PROC. INT’L CONF. ON A.I. & L. (#"!$) (reporting signi+cant success in landlord-tenant 
disputes), and Samuel Dahan, Jonathan Touboul, Jason Lam & Dan Sfedj, Predicting Employment 
Notice Period with Machine Learning: Promises and Limitations, '% MCGILL L.J. (forthcoming #"#") 
(manuscript at !-#), https://ssrn.com/abstract/&%$%*'$ (same as to employment disputes), with 
Charlotte S. Alexander, Khalifeh al Jadda, Mohammad Javad Feizollahi & Anne M. Tucker, Using 
Text Analytics to Predict Litigation Outcomes, in LAW AS DATA, supra note (, at &!" (describing 
prediction challenges in the employment discrimination context). For general discussion, see Ashley, 
supra note ##, at !!#&. For a seminal outcome prediction e,ort, since superseded by powerful new 
methods, see Theodore W. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The 
Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking, !") COLUM. L. REV. !!%", !!%# (#"")). 
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gathering” to return cases based on argumentation structure or legal analytics 
that can identify the best argument to lay before this judge.94 
Second, understanding legal tech’s current technical limits suggests that, 
in the near to medium-term, even the most advanced legal tech tools will 
entail substantial lawyer engagement. Rather than full automation, legal tech 
may instead yield a kind of “advanced lawyering”—a spin on chess-master 
Gary Kasparov’s notion of “advanced chess,” in which human and machine 
ally and compete against other human-machine teams, working symbiotically, 
rather than merely pitting human against machine.95 Lawyers, on this view, 
may often use commoditized systems that fully substitute for human 
lawyering.96 But a large slice of legal tech will for the foreseeable future 
remain customized and operate within a paradigm of “cognitive computing” 
de+ned by intensive human-machine collaboration, not simple keystrokes, as 
overseen by a new breed of “hybrid” legal professional.97 
C. Implications 
While legal tech’s precise technical trajectory is unknowable, the +eld has 
nonetheless begun to sketch a set of claims, though often abstract and 
con-icting ones, about legal tech’s likely impacts on lawyers, law, and the legal 
system. Three concerns predominate: (i) legal tech’s e,ect on the legal 
profession; (ii) its e,ect on conceptions and implementations of rule of law; 
and (iii) its distributive e,ects. Much of this discussion is jurisprudential, 
with eyes cast out at a distant horizon populated by robojudges and 
robolawyers and featuring fully automated decisionmaking. But armed with 
Section I.A’s overview of the legal tech toolkit and Section I.B’s sober account 
of its technical trajectory, we can begin to distill a set of more concrete ways 
legal tech will impact the litigation system over the near- to medium-term. 
 
94 Katz, supra note !, at $%* (stressing the need for the retrieval of analogically similar cases for 
“highest end prediction”). 
95 See, e.g., Mary (Missy) Cummings, Man versus Machine or Man $ Machine?, IEEE 
INTELLIGENT SYS., Sept./Oct. #"!), at '#, '* (recognizing that although engineers prefer 
autonomy to be left to machines, human judgment is necessary for cognitive reasoning machines 
where “knowledge-based behaviors and expertise are required”); Livermore & Rockmore, supra note 
(, at xiv; Yoon, supra note ##, at )'' (“Intelligence augmentation . . . re.ects a symbiotic relationship 
between humans and technology.”); Wu, supra note ((, at #"") (“[F]or the foreseeable future, 
software systems that aim to replace systems of social ordering will succeed best as human–machine 
hybrids, mixing scale and e-cacy with human adjudication for hard cases.”). 
96 SUSSKIND, supra note ! (comparing commoditized and customized/bespoke tools). 
97 ASHLEY, supra note !), at &%, &%", &%%-%' (noting likely ascendance of tools that “engage 
users in collaboratively posing, testing, and revising hypotheses about how an issue should be 
decided”); Armour & Sako, supra note $#, at #$ (reviewing literature on how di,erent business 
models will fuel the emergence of “hybrid professionals” and “organizing professionals” in an 
increasingly automated and digitized legal system). 
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!. Legal Tech and the Legal Profession 
“Predictions of structural change in the legal industry,” Michael Simkovic 
and Frank McIntyre recently noted, “date back at least to the invention of the 
typewriter.”98 But this has not stopped commentators from weighing in on 
legal tech’s e,ect on the legal profession. The result is a welter of competing 
claims running the gamut from continuation of business as usual, with only 
modest shifts to the traditional set-up of law +rms selling billable-hour legal 
services in a leveraged partner-associate hierarchy, to the near-complete 
e,acement of lawyers by robotic stand-ins. But whatever legal tech’s e,ect on 
the economic and organizational structure of the legal services industry, most 
agree that its proliferation will reshape—and, indeed, has already begun to 
do so—the professional status and authority of lawyers. 
Core to the debate over the future of lawyers—but also emblematic of its 
unsettled nature—is the application of a standard pair of economics concepts: 
Are legal tech and analog lawyering substitutes or complements? On the one 
hand, it is hard to deny that legal tech will function, to at least some degree, 
as a substitute for conventional legal services, thus shrinking the profession 
and reducing aggregate lawyer income (even if it increases the income of law 
+rm equity holders). Big +rm lawyers now spend perhaps less than (% of 
their time on document review—previously a pro+t center for the profession’s 
upper echelon.99 TAR may shrink this further. On the other hand, legal tech 
and human lawyering can also act as complements, increasing demand for, 
and thus the premium on, higher-order lawyer judgment, from parsing 
machine-distilled “hot docs” to crafting litigation strategy. Though some 
lawyers will be displaced, law practice for the remainders may be both more 
stimulating and more pro+table.100 Finally, many analyses of displacement 
miss the fact that the supply of and demand for legal representation are 
endogenous to its cost. The cheaper legal representation is, the more of it 
litigants can a,ord, opening new and potentially pro+table markets for legal 
services to those with cognizable claims who currently, lacking willing 
counsel, choose to “lump it.”101 Some lawyers will be displaced, but others will 
 
98 Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, )& J. LEG. STUD. 
#)$, #*% (#"!)). 
99 See Remus & Levy, supra note !, at %"( tbl.! (+nding large-+rm lawyers spent ).!% of billable 
hours on document review from #"!#-#"!%). 
100 Casey & Niblett, supra note !", at !))'-)* (noting that similar previous technological 
advancements reduced transaction costs like the introduction of AI could); Livermore & Rockmore, 
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would without the technology.”); see also Remus & Levy, supra note !, at %&% (noting possibility that 
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+nd entirely new markets for their skills. PeopleLaw, the steadily shrinking 
sector that serves individuals rather than corporations, might rebound.102 
A separate literature stakes out the poles of debate about legal tech’s e,ect 
on the structure of the legal services industry.103 Some predict that legal tech 
will doom BigLaw’s leveraged business model by allowing smaller +rms to 
perform as well as larger ones without the leverage—i.e., small armies of 
associates—that BigLaw has uniquely had at its disposal.104 Legal tech may 
also reduce BigLaw’s economies of scale by sharpening the case intake and 
risk management of smaller +rms and litigation +nanciers.105 Others, 
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show/!"""!($")&s/true2!""#')&( [https://perma.cc/'WZ*-PAYM] (noting law’s “lagging 
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105 John C. Co,ee Jr., Understanding the Plainti% ’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory 
for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, (' COLUM. L. REV. ''$, *"'-!# 
(!$(') (discussing the factors that explain the small size of plainti, ’s +rms, including the inability 
to adequately bring in cases that diversify their portfolio); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Re-Re-
Financing Civil Litigation: How Lawyer Lending Might Remake the American Litigation Landscape, 
Again, '! UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE !!", !!# (#"!&) (noting that “changes to lawyers’ +nancial, 
social, and business structures have the power to in.uence case outcomes”). In addition, legal tech 
may empower corporate clients to do their own legal work by “in-sourcing” it and thus moving it 
from outside counsel to general counsel o-ces. See Daniel N. Kluttz & Deirdre K. Mulligan, 
Automated Decision Support Technologies and the Legal Profession, &) BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (%&, (($ 
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however, have their doubts. Indeed, many legal tech tools will not be o,-the-
shelf tools developed by entrepreneurs and delivered across the industry, but 
rather more tailored, bespoke ones designed via lawyer-technologist 
collaborations within law +rms. And here larger +rms, with privileged access 
to data that comes with their repeat-player status and their ability to build 
internal capacity, may enjoy a decisive advantage.106 Indeed, even the crustiest 
of white-shoe law +rms—for instance, New York’s Cravath—have built 
dedicated data analytics groups,107 and others are actively entering the legal 
tech space and marketing their own proprietary tools.108 While many 
 
result in an increased pace of change). Legal tech can also leave smaller +rms with more time to 
perform the core work of legal representation. Some studies suggest that smaller +rms spend the 
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entrepreneurs talk of disrupting the industry, legal tech may not spell doom 
for BigLaw. It may provide a new pro+t center.109 
Both of these debates—about substitutes and complements and the 
structure of the legal services industry—center on pro+tability and so bear 
only a weak relationship to the question of how legal tech will reshape the 
litigation system or its rules. But a +nal strand of the debate turns toward 
legal tech’s e,ect on the professional authority and orientation of lawyers and, 
in so doing, moves closer to procedural concerns. Summarizing a di,use 
literature, two dynamics loom largest: lawyer de-skilling and lawyer de-
centering. Both proceed from the premise that legal tech’s rise will not merely 
displace lawyers but rather e,ect a subtler reshaping of relationships among 
lawyers, courts, and clients by introducing new kinds of professionals into 
litigation and by diminishing lawyers’ professional agency and skill.110 
Deskilling comes through reductions in learning opportunities and 
“automation bias,” de+ned as uncritical reliance on machine outputs.111 Both 
dynamics lead lawyers to invest less, and have fewer opportunities to invest,112 
in the skillsets and knowledge necessary to validate and check machine 
outputs.113 The unhappy result might be a segregated profession, with tech-
savvy domain experts developing and using highly e,ective, skill-augmenting 
tools, and the rest of the profession progressively losing its capacity to 
understand those uses or counter or question their use.114 More generally, the 
 
[https://perma.cc/QG#D-H'*W]; Littler CaseSmart, https://www.littler.com/service-
solutions/littler-casesmart [https://perma.cc/SE#W-%NFM]; Press Release, Littler Mendelson, 
Introducing Littler OnDemand: A Data-Driven Solution for Employment Law Advice and Counsel 
(May $, #"!$), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/press/introducing-littler-ondemand-data-
driven-solution-employment-law-advice-and [https://perma.cc/%&GB-L#G*]. 
109 This may be especially true as lawyers’ professional monopoly is relaxed and non-lawyer 
ownership of +rms expands, providing new sources of capital and making data accessibility central. 
See Armour & Sako, supra note $#, at !&. 
110 See Kluttz & Mulligan, supra note !"%, at (%& (noting quiet revolution centered not on lawyer 
displacement but rather a subtler reshaping of professional role and status). 
111 See John D. Lee & Bobbie D. Seppelt, Human Factors in Automation Design, in SPRINGER 
HANDBOOK OF AUTOMATION )!* (Shimon Y. Nof ed., #""$) (analyzing risks from failure to 
address automation’s restructuring of tasks, including deskilling). 
112 Medicine provides a useful analogy here, particularly the rise of robotic surgery, which has 
reduced training opportunities and pushed surgical residents into “shadow learning” practices. See 
Matthew Beane, Shadow Learning: Building Robotic Surgical Skill When Approved Means Fail, ') 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. (*, (* (#"!$) (de+ning shadow learning as “an interconnected set of norm- and 
policy-changing practices enacted extensively, opportunistically, and in relative isolation that 
allowed only a minority of robotic surgical trainees to come to competence”). 
113 Hildebrandt, supra note (*, at !%' (recommending that scrutinizing “the ‘intestines’ of the 
data mining process” should become part of a lawyer’s training). 
114 Kluttz & Mulligan, supra note !"%, at (() (suggesting that most lawyers currently do not 
understand “testing and validation terms and metrics”); Pasquale & Cashwell, supra note $", at (! 
(recommending that all lawyers should have access to this technology if it becomes signi+cant 
enough to impact advocacy). 
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legal profession could experience a kind of “judgmental atrophy” or a 
creeping “epistemic sclerosis.”115 We return to this idea shortly in considering 
legal tech’s e,ect on rule of law. 
Decentering is easiest to see in the e-discovery context. As use of TAR 
proliferates, discovery disputes will play out as expert battles in which dueling 
technologists opine about the propriety of data manipulations, modeling 
choices, and performance metrics.116 TAR thus encroaches on the legal 
profession’s control over one of the fundamental domains of litigation procedure 
and, as commentators have put it, “transform[s] litigation procedure—
traditionally the exclusive domain of judges and lawyers—into a domain that is 
shared with computer scientists, commercial vendors, and others.”117 Put another 
way, lawyers will progressively cede professional jurisdiction to technologists. 
Even if law remains a profession with most of its current trappings—partial 
professional monopoly, self-regulation, sizeable returns to talent—the result will 
be a steady leakage of professional status and authority.118 
#. Legal Tech and Rule of Law 
A second strand of an emerging literature explores legal tech’s 
implications for conceptions and implementations of rule of law. Some of the 
most dramatic follow from the futurist predictions noted previously about a 
state of “legal singularity” and a “self-driving” legal order.119 Those scenarios, 
however, hold few implications for litigation over the near- to medium-
term—and, if realized, will ultimately render much of the legal tech toolkit 
irrelevant because procedures, judicial discretion, and legal systems as we 
know them will cease to exist.120 
A more tractable set of rule-of-law concerns posed by legal tech’s advance can 
be bucketed into two categories: personnel-based concerns (i.e., concerns rooted 
in the changing role and status of lawyers) and process-based concerns (i.e., 
concerns rooted in coming changes to the process of adjudicating legal claims). 
 
115 See Hildebrandt, supra note &", at &#-&&. 
116 See Remus, supra note &), at !*!! (explaining that attorneys’ lack of technological expertise 
now requires the use of experts to defend their use of certain technologies). 
117 Id. at !*!"-!! (warning that lawyers are “ceding control” over procedure); see also Kluttz & 
Mulligan, supra note !"%, at (($ (reporting that lawyers increasingly rely upon “non-lawyer support 
sta, and vendor judgment” on selection and con+guration of systems and model-testing); Shannon 
H. Kitzer, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Is Seed Set Disclosure a Necessary Check on Technology-Assisted 
Review and Should Courts Require Disclosure?, ! J.L. TECH. & POL’Y !$*, #"! (#"!() (same). 
118 See, e.g., Armour & Sako, supra note $#, at !" (noting the emergence of a new and contested 
“expert division of labor” within the legal system); Pasquale, supra note &, at % (arguing that an 
automated legal system “shifts personal responsibility from attorneys, regulators, and judges, to 
those coding their would-be replacements”). 
119 See supra notes $–!& and accompanying text. 
120 See, e.g., Casey & Niblett, supra note !", at !)&', !))". 
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Understanding each highlights some trade-offs of legal tech’s incorporation into 
the civil justice system that may demand a procedural response. 
Personnel-based concerns extend from the twin processes of lawyer 
“decentering” and “deskilling” just noted.121 Hildebrandt puts it well: As the 
practice of law is progressively turned over to technologists, there are fewer 
“legal natives” with a “vested interest in or experience with the issues of the 
Rule of Law.”122 In lawyers’ stead will come an array of non-lawyer experts 
with a very di,erent worldview, built around using and promoting 
technology. As one commentator puts it, these new legal professionals “have 
no reason to recognize, much less incorporate within their opinions, lawyers’ 
ethical obligations to clients, the courts, and the public”—and, worse, may 
have “internalized their employers’ pro+t motive.”123 
Process-based concerns, in contrast, stem from the basic insight that legal 
tech tools will actively shape law rather than just being used to deploy it. A 
fast-growing literature on legal tech o,ers a master class in jurisprudence, 
from Holmes to Hart to Hayek and from Langdell to Long Fuller to 
Llewelyn (and back again), taking on the e.ciency of the common law, rules 
versus standards, dialogic versus more instrumental approaches to law, and 
even conceptions of legality itself. This is neither the time nor place to review 
its many tributaries. But much of this thinking comes back to a single key 
insight: Outcome prediction tools, to choose one part of the legal tech toolkit, 
are not, as Frank Pasquale and Glyn Cashwell artfully put it, just “a camera 
trained on the judicial system,” but rather an “engine of in-uence.”124 One 
easily glimpsed possibility that follows is that outcome prediction tools, and 
likely other parts of the legal tech toolkit as well, will progressively drain the 
system of its -exibility, its adaptive capacity, and its dialogic core. Legal 
automation, on this view, brings “a fast and re+ned prediction of the relevant 
legal e,ect”125 and thus achieves one of the highest (but by no means only) 
purposes of law: fast and cheap resolution of disputes. But it comes at a steep 
 
121 Personnel-based concerns might also include legal tech’s e,ects on judicial self-conception 
and the psychology and practice of judging. For a recent and insightful study of the long-term e,ect 
of Israel’s Legal-Net system, see generally Amnon Reichman, Yair Sagy & Shlomi Balaban, From a 
Panacea to a Panopticon: The Use and Misuse of Technology in the Regulation of Judges, *! HASTINGS L.J. 
%($ (#"#"). See also Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, The New New Courts, '* AM. U. L. REV. 
!'%, !'% (#"!*) (analyzing the implications of alternative and online dispute resolution on the judicial 
system). In particular, any e,ort to quantify the production of legal decisions will likely skew 
thinking toward e-ciency and away from other values (quality, dignity of litigants, etc.). 
122 Hildebrandt, supra note (*, at !)$ (noting how lawyers buttress rule of law); Hildebrandt, 
supra note &", at !# (same). For an historical account, see DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S 
NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, !$""-!$)" (#"!)). 
123 Remus, supra note &), at !*!! (describing the danger of deferring to non-lawyer IT experts). 
124 See Pasquale & Cashwell, supra note $", at '* (describing the in.uence of the deployment 
of predictive models on the judicial system). 
125 Hildebrandt, supra note &", at #! (describing positive impacts of artificial intelligence on litigation). 
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cost, draining the law of its capacity to adapt to new developments or to 
ventilate legal rules in formal, public interpretive exercises.126 At the extreme, 
legal tech may even work a change in our conception of legality itself, 
substituting prediction for persuasion and reason-giving and shifting law’s 
normative center to a Skinnerian model of cognition in which law is merely 
“a black-boxed transformation of inputs into outputs.”127 The resulting 
“reductionism and functionalism,” and the related elevation of predictability 
over vitality, does more than impair the system’s adaptive capacity. The 
system also loses its legitimacy as a way to manage social con-ict when the 
process of enforcing collective value judgments plays out in server farms 
rather than a messy deliberative and adjudicatory process, even where 
machine predictions prove perfectly accurate.128 
'. Legal Tech and Distribution 
A third and final broad implication of legal tech, related to but distinct from 
the other two, is political in the classic distributive sense of that term—the “who 
 
126 Id. at #!-#&; Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note &, at #%&-%) (arguing that legal tech will 
favor “codi+ed” justice” over “equitable justice” and thus “standardization” over “discretion”); 
McGinnis & Wasick, supra note ##, at !")' (exploring computation’s implications for the persistent 
tension in law between “comprehensibility” and “predictability”). In Re and Solow-Niederman’s 
view, legal tech will favor codi+ed justice, which privileges e-ciency and uniformity, over equitable 
justice, which is more discretionary, contextual, and dynamic. Lost in the process will be values of 
mercy, mitigation, and extenuation. Worse, the move to codi+ed justice will have a “self-legitimating 
power” because dati+cation will center and foreground values linked to available data, that are 
themselves conducive to further automation. See Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note &, at #*" 
(likening this to the man who searches for lost keys under the streetlamp); see also Kleinberg et al., 
supra note &!, at )$) (noting data’s tendency to orient organizations toward questions that can be 
quanti+ed and computed); Harry Surden, The Variable Determinacy Thesis, !# COLUM. SCI. & TECH. 
L. REV. !, ( (#"!!) (arguing that AI might generate pressure for legislators and rulemakers to adapt 
law in ways that are susceptible of computational analysis). But this is far from clear: Some predict 
a collapse of rules and standards—or, rather, standards into rules. Casey & Niblett, supra note !", at 
!)"%. Powerful machines using advanced analytics on rich datasets can take account of more +ne-
grained di,erences across cases than a human judge, not fewer. This suggests that there may be a 
temporal dynamic that AI-driven adjudication must push through, something that Re and Solow-
Niederman wisely acknowledge. Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note &, at #'" (“At least in the near 
term, . . . AI adjudication will not embody equitable justice.”). In other words, with technological 
advances, one could code equity into AI adjudicators or legal tech tools, and so AI adjudication may 
ultimately prove more perfectible. Id. at #'(. 
127 Pasquale & Cashwell, supra note $", at '% (describing how the use of algorithmic predictive analytics 
in judicial contexts is an “emerging jurisprudence of behaviorism”); see also Sheppard, supra note !!, at &'. 
128 See Joshua P. Davis, Law Without Mind: AI, Ethics, and Jurisprudence, %% CAL. W. L. REV. 
!'% (#"!() (providing reasons to not rely on technology for legal issues due to the inability of 
machines to make moral judgements); Mireille Hildebrandt, Law as Information in the Era of Data-
Driven Agency, *$ MOD. L. REV. !, * (#"!') (noting AI’s threat of “mindless agency”). See generally 
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (!$')) (describing the connections between legal 
morality and major themes in law). 
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gets what, when and how” of political science129 or, in Marc Galanter’s 
litigation-specific formulation, whether and how the “haves” come out ahead.130 
Legal tech’s promise is that if, as some predict, new tech tools erode 
BigLaw’s economies of scale and empowers smaller firms and solo practitioners, 
then one might expect a leveling of the playing field between “haves” and “have 
nots.”131 Perhaps most important of all, and to circle back to a claim explored 
previously, supply and demand are endogenous to legal costs.132 The declining 
cost of supplying legal services may render claims marketable that cannot 
currently draw counsel, particularly given the paring back of aggregation 
mechanisms like the class action.133 For champions of civil rights or consumer 
protection, among others, the result could be a golden age of litigation in which 
those priced out of the current litigation system can more reliably vindicate 
their rights.134 Legal tech, on this view, might have its greatest impact in areas 
where would-be litigants with quality claims are not currently being served.135 
If some see legal tech as a democratizing force, others have their doubts. 
A common theme is that legal tech will at best replicate and at worst 
exacerbate existing power and resource disparities within the litigation 
system. As already noted, few legal tech tools are turnkey; most require 
signi+cant mid-stream customization in order to enrich search results, re+ne 
predictions of case outcomes, or iteratively label documents for relevance and 
privilege.136 As a result, legal tech tools may merely replicate asymmetries in 
the quantity and quality of lawyering within the system. Similar dynamics 
might play out as the process of lawyer decentering noted previously steadily 
converts traditional procedural wrangling, particularly around discovery, into 
 
129 HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN AND HOW (!$$"). 
130 See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, $ L. & SOC’Y REV. $% (!$*)) (explaining why repeat-players and those with more 
resources and power come out ahead in litigation). 
131 See Paul Gowder, Transformative Legal Technology and the Rule of Law, '( U. TORONTO L.J. 
(#, (& (#"!(); Yoon, supra note ##, at )%*, )*" (describing increased lawyer productivity and bene+ts 
to both lawyers and clients as a result of emerging technologies). 
132 See supra note !"! and accompanying text. 
133 For example, Radvocate (now FairShake) is an internet-based tool that helps individual 
consumers pursue arbitration claims, in return for a contingency fee. See FAIRSHAKE, 
https://fairshake.com [https://perma.cc/#)%V-P'KP]. 
134 See supra notes !"!–!"% and accompanying text. 
135 Other examples: Firms are developing Q/A systems covering aspects of tax or privacy law 
compliance that are unlikely to justify retaining a lawyer. See Australian Privacy Compliance Packages, 
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Dec. #"!(), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/
publications/bcf&&bd$/australian-privacy-compliance-packages [https://perma.cc/XC')-&N*A] (displaying 
examples of packages clients can buy to remain in compliance with new Australian regulations). 
136 See supra notes *%–(! and accompanying text. 
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expert battles between technologists.137 In the current system, better-heeled 
litigants can a,ord better experts and so may systematically win out over less-
resourced ones. Legal tech may reproduce or amplify those e,ects. 
Darker predictions imagine a world that is more di,erent in kind than 
degree. As just noted, some of the best legal tech tools may emerge from 
BigLaw’s in-house expertise and privileged data access, something larger law 
+rms are more likely to have.138 From there, one can imagine a more 
signi+cant divergence in the counsel available to the better and worse o,, 
with the “haves” enjoying the services of a new kind of super-lawyer whose 
superior skill and connections are further augmented by software, and the 
“have nots” settling for unboosted human lawyering or, perhaps worse, an 
inferior machine-only version.139 Bleaker still is the possibility that legal tech 
may yield proportionally greater deployment of law by “haves” than “have 
nots.”140 Witness, for instance, the use of robo-approaches in evictions, 
mortgage foreclosures, or consumer credit disputes,141 or more recent reports 
that law +rms, tech companies, and large employers and retailers (e.g., 
Walmart) are using advanced analytics to draft responsive pleadings and 
discovery requests at low cost and make outcome predictions that can guide 
their settlement calculus and litigation strategy.142 
 
137 Endo, supra note &), at ('#-'( (discussing the normative trade-o, between economic 
e-ciency and participation); Remus, supra note &), at !*!! (detailing the increased reliance on non-
lawyer IT experts with the increased use of technology in legal matters). 
138 See supra notes !"'–!"$ and accompanying text. 
139 See Remus & Levy, supra note !, at %%! (imagining a similar “two-tiered system”); see also 
Michael Livermore & Dan Rockmore, France Kicks Data Scientists Out of Its Courts, SLATE (June #!, 
#"!$, *:&" AM), https://slate.com/technology/#"!$/"'/france-has-banned-judicial-analytics-to-
analyze-the-courts.html [https://perma.cc/C&LV-V&%C]. Livermore and Rockmore elaborate on 
these potential inequities: 
Already, access to legal services is doled out according to ability to pay, with money 
buying higher-quality representation. A.I. could supercharge this phenomenon, with 
only the rich able to buy the latest software, while the rest of us are stuck with wetware 
humans with their limited memory and processing speed. Alternatively, government 
cutbacks in legal services for the poor might eventually result in over-reliance on 
subpar A.I. tools, with (possibly) more nimble human lawyers and customized 
software reserved for the well-heeled. 
Id. 
140 See Gowder, supra note !&!, at $" (arguing that legal tech may expand legal services against 
subordinated groups, worsening the relative situation between the “haves” and “have nots”). 
141 See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 
($ WASH. L. REV. !, ) (#"!)) (discussing effects of using algorithms to the detriment of individuals). 
142 Though the precise bounds of the practice are hard to determine, there is substantial evidence 
that BigLaw firms (among them Ogletree Deakins and Littler Mendelson) and legal tech companies 
(among them LegalMation) are working with Walmart and other large entities to develop automated 
tools that automatically draft responsive pleadings and discovery requests in high-volume litigation areas 
such as employment and personal injury (“slip and fall” cases), saving defendants valuable time, and also 
predict case outcomes in those cases. See, e.g., Episode &&: Using AI in Litigation—Thomas Suh (LegalMation 
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On this view, it may be better-heeled litigants—who are also litigation’s 
repeat-players143—who will capture the bene+ts of procedural streamlining 
and data analytics. Rather than leveling the playing +eld, legal tech may make 
it easier for employers, creditors, and landlords to prosecute cases against 
employees, debtors, and tenants.144 
Finally, legal tech’s distributive e,ects will turn on the economic and legal 
structure of access to it. Legal tech tools that act as force-multipliers cannot 
democratize litigation if most lawyers and clients are priced out of their use. 
Nor can they serve as levelers if the fallo, from the advanced versions sitting 
behind paywalls and simpler open-source versions is too steep.145 For those 
who worry above all about legal tech’s distributive e,ects, the overriding 
imperative going forward will be to ensure that all parties to disputes have 
access to key technology and the data necessary to power it.146 But that access, 
and legal tech’s broader incorporation into the litigation system, will also be 
modulated by legal structures, including the twin workings of IP and trade 
secrets evidentiary privilege and legal-ethical rules that govern non-lawyer 
+rm ownership. The legal structure of access to legal tech and the types of 
+rm organization and business models that are permitted and prohibited 
under legal-ethical rules will profoundly shape its cost structure and its 
development path, yielding wide access to legal tech’s fruits or, to the 
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Walmart/Ogletree/LegalMation tool, see Alan Bryan, Senior Assoc. Gen. Couns. Legal Operations, 
Walmart, Patrick DiDomenico, Chief Knowledge Officer, Ogletree Deakins, Tariq Abdullah, Senior Dir. 
Legal Operations and Data & Analytics, Walmart, & James Lee, Chief Exec. Officer, LegalMation, 
Using A.I. to Digitize Lawsuits to Perform Actionable Data Analytics, Presentation at the #"!$ 
Corporate Legal Operations Consortium Vegas Institute (May !%, #"!$), [https://perma.cc/B)C#-
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Discrimination Lawsuits, FORBES (Aug. #', #"!$, %:)" PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
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[https://perma.cc/%WBU-XXVW]. 
143 See Galanter, supra note !&", at !"*-!!) (detailing how rules favor repeat players rather 
than one-shotters). 
144 See Pasquale & Cashwell, supra note $", at '% (stating that predictive analytics will be used 
by “richer litigants to gain advantages over poorer ones”). 
145 Brian Sheppard, Why Digitizing Harvard’s Law Library May Not Improve Access to Justice, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. !#, #"!%, #:#! PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-
practice/why-digitizing-harvards-law-library-may-not-improve-access-to-justice 
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its more advanced analytics and research sit behind a paywall). 
146 See Pasquale & Cashwell, supra note $", at (! (arguing that jurisdictions should develop 
rules to “level the playing +eld”). On data accessibility, see Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note &, at 
#(% (calling for “public option” legal tech and data accessibility as “an institutional counterweight to 
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contrary, ensuring that legal tech remains a proprietary tool of litigation’s 
“haves.”147 We return to these ideas below, particularly in Section II.C, 
because civil procedure rules, particularly the work product doctrine, may act 
to bolster or curtail those rights. 
* * * 
More than a hundred years ago, Justice Holmes, in The Path of the Law, 
wrote: “For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man 
of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master 
of economics.”148 Shorn of its fusty, turn-of-the-century diction, this 
statement could just as easily have come, in #"#! rather than !&%), from the 
mouth of a legal tech entrepreneur. And there is for sure an element of 
pu,ery in such claims, both then and now, in light of NLP’s signi+cant 
technical challenges. There is, however, no doubt that substantial change is 
afoot, even if its particulars remain fuzzy. In the next two decades, we will 
likely see a substantial change in how lawyers do their work, sometimes for 
the better, sometimes not. We are also likely to see a diminution in lawyers’ 
professional role, stature, and authority, but also a newly powerful cadre of 
tech-savvy super-lawyers. And we will witness a shift in the litigation 
landscape toward both democratization and domination. 
But amidst all of this contingency is a single, undeniable certainty: Over 
the near to medium-term, legal tech will be shaped in important part by how 
the litigation system and, in particular, judges armed with little more than 
the rules of civil procedure manage and guide its uptake. In the next Part, we 
aim to add concreteness to current thinking about legal tech by asking, in 
three case studies, how particular legal tech tools will reshape the litigation 
system and how civil procedure can, or should, adapt in response. 
II. LEGAL TECH AND CIVIL PROCEDURE: THREE CASE STUDIES 
This Part climbs down from the heights of thinking about legal tech’s longer-
run effects on law and the legal system and offers three concrete cuts at legal 
tech’s evolution over the near- to medium-term. As to each, we ask: Assuming 
 
147 See Remus, supra note &), at !*!% (“[P]atent protection threatens to increase unequal access 
to predictive-coding technologies, which will entrench existing disparities in resources and power.”); 
Armour & Sako, supra note $# (interrogating the relationship between lawyer regulation, available 
business models and +rm structures, and legal tech innovation); HENDERSON, supra note !"#, at 
#"-#) (investigating how ethics rules regulate the market for legal services and legal tech); Gillian 
K. Had+eld, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice Through the (Un)corporate Practice of Law, &( 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. )& (#"!)) (discussing how access to justice issues arise under the existing 
infrastructure for provision of legal services). 
148 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, !" HARV. L. REV. )%*, )'$ (!($*). 
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continuing advances in legal tech tools over the next ten or fifteen years, how 
will legal tech change litigation, and how might civil procedure adapt? 
This posture, we believe, brings two advantages. First, in focusing on the 
near- to medium-term, we aim to avoid some of the pitfalls of working at the 
intersection of law and technology. Technology can evolve in wholly 
unexpected ways, and even short-range predictions about technological 
innovation can be deeply misguided.149 Yet hewing too closely to present-day 
technology can yield an analysis akin to rearranging deck chairs on the 
Titanic, imagining a modest set of altered litigation realities, and a set of legal 
procedural responses, just before a wave of innovation upends the system. 
Limiting our inquiry to the foreseeable trajectory of legal tech over the near- 
to medium-term aims to steer between these two extremes. 
Second, by grounding our analysis in civil procedure, we gain traction by 
focusing in on a discrete set of more litigation-centered legal tech tools. We 
further maintain focus by building each case study around speci+c legal tech 
tools, a prediction about their e,ect on the distribution of costs or 
information within the system, and potential amendments to one or more 
speci+c civil procedural rules or doctrines. More speci+cally, Section II.A 
links TAR tools, the distribution of litigation costs within the system, and 
rules governing proportionality and pleading. Section II.B links outcome-
prediction tools, the distribution of information as between judges and 
litigants, and the rules and doctrines that govern forum-shopping. Section 
II.C. links TAR and various legal analytics and outcome-prediction tools and 
the distribution of information among litigants to the work product doctrine. 
A. Predictive Coding, Proportionality, and Plausibility Pleading 
No analysis of legal tech, civil procedure, and the future of the adversarial 
system would be complete without attending to the technological revolution 
in discovery practices that is already well underway. This section glimpses the 
new world of discovery as new technological tools proliferate and then spins 
out the implications for civil procedure, focusing in particular on legal tech’s 
capacity to shift the distribution of litigation costs within the system. 
 
149 See Ryan Calo, Commuting to Mars: A Response to Professors Abraham and Rabin, !"% VA. L. 
REV. ONLINE (), ((-$" (#"!$) (noting that technological change occurs against the backdrop of 
social, cultural, and economic forces that shape the trajectory of the technology itself). 
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!. The New World of Discovery 
Discovery is variously described as the “heart,” “backbone,” “focal point,” 
and “foundation” of American litigation, and with good reason.150 The 
essential purpose of discovery, after all, is to identify material facts that prove 
or disprove a claim. Moreover, because discovery is the backdrop for 
everything that follows it—motions, trial, appeal—cases are often won or lost 
at the discovery stage. And indeed, at least since the !%'& Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, discovery has been deliberately structured—some say overly 
so—to facilitate settlement and thus obviate the need for trial at all.151 To be 
sure, this was not always so. In an era of “non-suits,” trial was discovery and, 
if new facts surfaced, a do-over called. Even today, large swathes of cases—
low-stakes auto accidents, among many others—involve no discovery at all.152 
Still, no part of the litigation system has generated more heated debate in 
 
150 Diego A. Zambrano, Discovery as Regulation, !!$ MICH. L. REV. *!, *# (#"#"); Nora Freeman 
Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, !#$ YALE L.J. #, '* (#"!$); Robin Page West, Letters for Litigators, 
&! LITIGATION, Spring #""%, at #!, #%. 
151 J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, (* N.Y.U. L. REV. !*!&, !*%# (#"!#) 
(describing the settlement-focused features of the system but noting that “[i]n the context of modern 
litigation, the notion that more discovery will always promote better merits-based resolution of 
claims needs to be revisited”); John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 
!## YALE L.J. %##, %#', %)# (#"!#) (describing that discovery has had the e,ect of displacing trial in 
most cases); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, !$$) WIS. 
L. REV. '&!, ')*-)(, '*! (!$$)) (asserting that the !$&( Federal Rules of Civil Procedure empowered 
trial judges to urge parties to settle). Compared to civil law countries and even most common law 
ones, American discovery yields far broader information exchange. See generally Owen M. Fiss, 
Comment, Against Settlement, $& YALE L.J. !"*& (!$()) (critiquing the system’s orientation toward 
settlement); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, $' HARV. L. REV. &*), &*( (!$(#) (noting that the 
creation of pretrial discovery rights facilitated the rise of managerial judging). 
152 The data is noisy. PAUL R. CONNOLLY, EDITH A. HOLLEMAN & MICHAEL J. KUHLMAN, 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY #( 
(!$*() (suggesting more than half of cases involve little discovery); EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. 
WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL CASEBASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY 
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ( (#""$) 
(finding no discovery in approximately fifteen percent of cases); James S. Kakalik, Deborah R. Hensler, 
Daniel McCaffrey, Marian Oshio, Nicholas M. Pace & Mary E. Viana, Discovery Management: Further 
Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, &$ B.C. L. REV. '!&, '&' (!$$() (reporting that 
thirty-eight percent of general civil cases do not involve lawyer hours worked on discovery); Susan 
Keilitz, Roger A. Hanson & Henry W.K. Daley, Is Civil Discovery in State Trial Courts out of Control?, 
STATE CT. J., Spring !$$&, at $ (noting that forty-two percent of general litigation cases lack discovery, 
and thirty-seven percent of those with discovery had three or fewer pieces of discovery). 
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recent decades, including a parade of reform proposals153 and frequent 
amendments to the federal and state rules.154 
Discovery is a lightning rod not just because of its centrality in modern 
litigation, but also because it has been one of the most dynamic parts of the 
system. Two seismic developments have remade the discovery process in 
recent decades. The +rst is the pervasive digitization of society, which has 
fueled a steady rise, beginning in the !%%"s, of electronically stored 
information, or ESI. Some estimate that the total amount of digitized 
material in the current “Big Data” era doubles every few years—a kind of 
Moore’s law of digital information.155 The second development is the advent 
of new automated tools for identifying, retrieving, processing, and analyzing 
this crush of materials. At +rst, managing it meant a move beyond “linear 
manual review,” in which lawyers put eyeballs on every document, to more 
automated approaches centered around processing techniques that make 
documents machine-readable (e.g., OCR) and searchable (e.g., keywords).156 
 
153 See Seth Katsuya Endo, Discovery Hydraulics, %# U.C. DAVIS L. REV. !&!*, !&)&-%" (#"!$) 
(summarizing reform proposals). See also ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE 
ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE #!'-!$ (#""&) (considering two major complaints about 
discovery costs: excessive discovery and abusive discovery); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, #& J. LEGAL STUD. )&%, )%% (!$$)) (proposing a 
“two-part rule” to reform discovery and shift a portion of costs to the requesting party); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, '$ B.U. L. REV. '&%, ')#, ')', ')( (!$($) (investigating several 
proposals, such as “break[ing] the process [] into smaller chunks,” to reform discovery); Martin H. 
Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, %! DUKE L.J. %'!, '"(-!) (#""!) (proposing a 
reformed cost-shifting model for electronic discovery). 
154 See Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, !* 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. '&*, '%* n. *$ (#"!&) (noting amendments made to the Federal Rules in 
response to complaints about discovery); Endo, supra note !%&, at !&)&-%" (describing a variety of 
discovery reforms that have been proposed and implemented since #""'). 
155 See JOHN GANTZ & DAVID REINSEL, THE DIGITAL UNIVERSE IN #"#": BIG DATA, 
BIGGER DIGITAL SHADOWS, AND BIGGEST GROWTH IN THE FAR EAST (#"!#) (“From [#"!#] 
until #"#", the digital universe will about double every two years.”); PETER LYMAN & HAL R. 
VARIAN, HOW MUCH INFORMATION? (#""&), https://groups.ischool.berkeley.edu/archive/how-
much-info-#""& [https://perma.cc/*ZGS-V('$] (“We estimate that the amount of new information 
stored on paper, +lm, magnetic, and optical media has about doubled in the last three years.”). For 
discussion in the legal context, see Jason R. Baron, Law in the Age of Exabytes: Some Further Thoughts 
on ‘Information In'ation’ and Current Issues in E-Discovery Search, !* RICH. J.L. & TECH. !, )-% (#"!!). 
156 See, e.g., Remus & Levy, supra note !, at %!% (describing the evolution of document review, 
which at +rst relied on “deductive instructions to search documents for keywords” and more recently 
is shifting to predictive coding); see also Christian, supra note &), at )$'-$*, %#) (describing keyword 
searches and noting that the progression to TAR stems in part from the unsuitability of keyword 
searches for truly massive document productions). See generally Symposium, The Sedona Conference 
Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, ( 
SEDONA CONF. J. !($ (#""*). Precise estimates of the pervasiveness of automated forms of 
discovery are hard to come by. But one recent survey of federal judges found that some forty-+ve 
percent of district judges and +fty-nine percent of magistrate judges had ordered use of a computer 
search methodology of one sort or another for discovery of voluminous materials, especially ESI. 
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More recently, automated discovery has leaped ahead with the advent of the 
TAR (or “predictive coding”) tools described previously that use machine 
learning classi+ers to -ag relevant and privileged documents. Taken together, 
these two trends—proliferating ESI and new automated ways of analyzing 
it—have progressively remade the world of discovery and ensured that the 
discovery process, already a burning topic, has remained at the white-hot 
center of debate about procedure and litigation’s role in American society. 
This new world of discovery has generated a predictable set of concerns, 
some new and some reaching back to the old world. The first is the acceleration 
of the trend away from comprehensiveness in discovery.157 At the creation of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the !%'"s, some cheered that the new 
rules permitted “an almost unlimited discovery.”158 Soon after, Justice Murphy 
penned an iconic statement of comprehensiveness: “Mutual knowledge of all 
the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.”159 
But that utopian ideal has steadily eroded as litigation has grown in scale and 
complexity. The first dents in the armor came with the !%)$ Pound 
Conference, which some see as the wellhead of a cost-obsessed, anti-litigation 
strain that has defined American law and politics ever since.160 A rule-based 
version came in !%&', when the Judicial Conference amended Rule #$ of the 
federal rules to require proportionality between discovery requests and the 
needs of a case, and then again in #""$, when the rules were amended to adapt 
e-discovery to this goal. The crush of ESI and increasing use of automation 
has been the final nail in the coffin. Indeed, in complex litigations, it is already 
the case that the Hickman mindset of exhaustive discovery has been eclipsed 
by a far less ambitious approach in which discovery is more a negotiation about 
quantitative error tolerance—that is, the production of an acceptable 
percentage of documents at an acceptable level of accuracy—and a truly 
exhaustive surfacing of evidence is only rarely cost-justified.161 
 
See Paul W. Grimm, Are We Insane? The Quest for Proportionality in the Discovery Rules of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, &' REV. LITIG. !!*, !&( tbl.& (#"!*). 
157 Remus, supra note &), at !*!( (highlighting the trend towards proportionality, which 
entails “agreement on the production of a particular percentage of documents at a particular level 
of accuracy . . . .”). 
158 Edson R. Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, !% TENN. L. REV. 
*&*, *&( (!$&$). 
159 Hickman v. Taylor, &#$ U.S. )$% (!$)*) (emphasis added). 
160 STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION !"! (#"!*) (“Some scholars have 
‘characterized the . . . Pound Conference . . . as the most important event in the countero,ensive 
against notice pleading and broad discovery.’”). 
161 Remus, supra note &), at !*!( (de+ning proportionality within a predictive-coding regime); 
Geo,rey P. Miller, On the Costs of Civil Justice, (" TEX. L. REV. #!!%, #!!*-!( (#""#) (+nding that the 
American litigation system is “at an ine-cient point” when comparing trade-o,s between the costs 
of error and the costs of procedure). Despite the commitment of these resources, no one could or 
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A second broad concern, and one noted previously, is that the rising 
sophistication of e-discovery tools is eroding lawyers’ professional jurisdiction 
and authority.162 But TAR does not cut lawyers out of the equation entirely. 
Rather, they perform traditional document review on a subset of a production 
to create a “labeled” set of documents—or a “seed set”—to train the model, 
then engage in further such efforts as the system iteratively moves toward a 
best model.163 But beyond this lawyer-centered data-labeling role, TAR is a 
highly technical exercise. It involves an array of methodological choices, as 
evidenced by a growing literature evaluating seed set selection strategies,164 
choices among “learning protocols” at the more iterative stage of model 
training,165 and performance metrics,166 that sit far beyond the average lawyer’s 
ken. Lawyers, the worry goes, will progressively cede professional authority to 
technologists (the people who develop, tune, and deploy the models) and 
technologist experts (the people who opine about the quality of this or that 
approach before judges in motions practice) in a key procedural domain. 
 
should expect perfection from this process. A representative contemporary judicial statement of 
lowered ambition comes in Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., No. !!-'!($, #"!) 
WL %()&"", at *# (S.D.N.Y. Feb. !), #"!)) (“The production of documents in litigation such as this 
is a herculean undertaking, requiring an army of personnel and the production of an extraordinary 
volume of documents . . . . Despite the commitment of these resources, no one could or should 
expect perfection from this process.”). 
162 See supra notes !!"–!!(, and accompanying text. 
163 See supra notes &)–&%, and accompanying text. 
164 See Christian J. Mahoney, Nathaniel Huber-Fliflet, Haozhen Zhao, Jianping Zhang, Peter 
Gronvall & Shi Ye, Evaluation of Seed Set Selection Approaches and Active Learning Strategies in Predictive 
Coding, ! PROC. INT’L WORKSHOP ON A.I. AND INTELLIGENT ASSISTANCE FOR LEGAL PROS. 
DIGIT. WORKPLACE # (#"!$) (evaluating seed set selection strategies, including “random” sampling 
and more complex, “judgmental” sampling in which attorneys use case-specific knowledge). 
165 At the second iterative step, one chooses an “active learning protocol” to select further 
training documents to add to the seed set. Protocol options include: the strongest matches, 
borderline matches, a random set of matches, or a mix of each. Mahoney et al., supra note !'), at &; 
see also Gordon V. Cormack & Maura R. Grossman, Autonomy and Reliability of Continuous Active 
Learning for Technology-Assisted Review ) (Apr. #', #"!%) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/!%")."'('(.pdf [https://perma.cc/(&TH-TM%V] (discussing active learning in 
the context of TAR); Rishi Chhatwal, Nathaniel Huuber-Fli.et, Robert Keeling, Jianping Zhang & 
Haozhen Zhao, Empirical Evaluations of Active Learning Strategies in Legal Document Review, #"!* 
IEEE INT’L CONF. ON BIG DATA !)#( (providing an empirical analysis of the utility of active 
learning in the legal domain). 
166 These metrics include measures of when the system has stabilized and requires no further 
iteration. They also include performance metrics, including recall (the percentage of targeted 
documents returned by the algorithm); precision (the percentage of recalled documents that meet 
targeting criteria); and the F!-Score (the harmonic mean of precision and recall—i.e., 
#*(P*R)/(P3R)). See ASHLEY, supra note !), at !!). A +nal metric is the area under the receiver 
operating characteristic curve (“AUC”), which plots true positive and false positive rates against a 
set of possible thresholds and thus gives information for various levels of precision and recall how 
con+dent one can be that the model captures relevant documents. Id. at #%*. An AUC score of !""% 
is perfect; a score of %"% means it is no more likely than chance that all relevant documents have 
been ranked higher than irrelevant ones. Id. 
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Perhaps the most signi+cant concern connecting the old and new worlds 
of discovery is litigation costs. The American approach to liberal discovery, 
embedded in an adversarial scheme in which parties (mostly) bear their own 
costs, has many virtues, but it creates two glaring incentive problems. First, 
the propounding party can externalize a large share of the cost of discovery 
requests onto her adversary, constrained only by the cost the party 
subsequently incurs in requesting and then processing and reviewing the 
material produced.167 Second, tasking the responding party with 
responsibility for determining relevance creates “cross-party agency costs.”168 
The responding party both has superior information about the value of the 
discovery in question and is also strongly incentivized to produce as little 
relevant material as possible. By producing limited relevant information, she 
can minimize her own discovery costs and legal exposure and, by burying that 
information in a mountain of extraneous materials, raise her adversary’s 
review costs or even prevent her adversary from +nding the “needle in the 
haystack.”169 The system in e,ect trusts a party to act as her “adversary’s 
agent” and “decide whether a document is useful to her adversary’s case.”170 
The result of these misaligned incentives is two types of cost concern. 
One is that excessive discovery can yield high aggregate litigation costs 
relative to case stakes—i.e., the (dis)proportionality concern that has long 
occupied courts and rulemakers. Adjudication of these disputes, the argument 
goes, diverts valuable social resources that could be better deployed 
elsewhere. The other is that discovery costs are often asymmetrically 
distributed among the parties. As a result, one side in a litigation, often the 
defendant, bears more of the cost of litigation, giving the other side, often 
the plainti,, undue settlement leverage and perhaps even yielding 
settlements in cases lacking any merit at all.171 These two types of litigation 
 
167 See Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Proportionality in 
Discovery, %" GA. L. REV. !"$&, !!"& (#"!') (discussing the externalization of costs in modern 
discovery practice). 
168 Id. at !!") (arguing that the responding party’s attorney sometimes has much discretion in 
deciding whether a document is useful to the adversary’s case, thus forcing the responding party’s 
attorney to act as his adversary’s agent). 
169 See Bruce H. Kobayashi, Law’s Information Revolution as Procedural Reform: Predictive Search 
as a Solution to the In Terrorem E%ect of Externalized Discovery Costs, % U. ILL. L. REV. !)*&, !)*(, !)$(-
!%"! (#"!)) (examining the “nature and e,ect of cross-party agency costs” in the context of 
discovery); see also Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note !'*, at !!"% (noting that, when a responding 
party limits its e,ort in accurately sorting between relevant and non-relevant documents, that party 
increases its adversary’s cost of discovery while simultaneously reducing its own). 
170 Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note !'*, at !!"); see also Kobayashi, supra note !'$, at !)*(. 
171 See Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation 
and Modern Procedural Theory, *$ GEO. WASH. L. REV. **% (#"!!) (challenging the long-held 
assumption that the producing party bears the costs of discovery, arguing that there are important 
di,erences between discovery costs in production and the normal costs in preparing a legal defense); 
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costs need not, of course, yield an ine.cient system. Even costly litigations 
or litigations featuring wide cost asymmetries produce a mix of social costs 
(excessive litigation) and social bene+ts (deterrence, surfacing additional 
wrongdoing) that can be complex depending on the circumstances.172 In 
economics terms, the private and the social motive can diverge in ways that 
lead to either too much or too little litigation. 
Despite their centrality in legal and policy debates, discovery costs have 
drawn little careful rigorous empirical inquiry, particularly recently.173 Indeed, 
much of the best empirical evidence dates back to the !%)"s and !%&"s, as 
private litigation grew in importance as a regulatory mechanism and concern 
about litigation’s ine.ciencies crested.174 While di,erences across litigation 
systems (federal, state) and litigation types make generalizations di.cult, 
three core +ndings establish an empirical baseline about cost concerns while 
leaving plenty of room for debate as to their salience. First, discovery is a 
substantial, though probably not dominant, source of litigation costs—
perhaps one-quarter to one-third of the total.175 But discovery costs also 
 
BONE, supra note !%&, at )%-%" (discussing the asymmetrical discovery costs through a hypothetical 
that focuses on information asymmetry between parties); Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note !%&, at )&* 
(noting that asymmetrical transaction costs in discovery distort the terms of settlement, giving one 
party undue advantage over the other); David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits 
Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, % INT’L REV. L. & ECON. &, )-% (!$(%) (providing numerical 
examples to illustrate that, even in instances where the plainti, brings an unmeritorious claim, 
settlement might be the most cost-e,ective option for the defendant). 
172 See Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note !'*, at !!"# (“Since external costs are associated with 
too much litigation, while external social bene+ts are associated with too little, there are gross e,ects 
operating in both directions. As a matter of simple arithmetic, then, the net impact of these gross 
e,ects might point in either direction.”); see also Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between 
the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, #' J. LEGAL STUD. %*%, %*% (!$$*) (arguing 
that litigants do not think about negative or positive externalities—which include cost and 
deterrence respectively—resulting in litigation that is either “socially excessive” or “inadequate”). 
173 See, e.g., Alexandra D. Lahav, A Proposal to End Discovery Abuse, *! VAND. L. REV. #"&*, 
#"%# (#"!() (lamenting lack of empiricism and calling for required docketing of discovery requests); 
see also Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, &$ B.C. 
L. REV. *(%, *$'-$* (!$$() (making similar complaints about lack of empiricism surrounding the 
costs of modern discovery). 
174 On the anti-litigation trend, see BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note !'"; Resnik, supra note 
!%!. Key empirical studies throughout the !$*"s and !$("s include CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note !%#; 
WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM !'#-** (!$'(), Wayne 
D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers’ Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, !$(" AM. 
BAR FOUND. RSCH. J. *(*, Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago 
Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, !$(" AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. #!*; Susan Keilitz, Roger 
Hanson & Richard Semiatin, Attorneys’ Views of Civil Discovery, JUDGES’ J., Spring !$$&, at #; Keilitz 
et al., supra note !%#; David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & 
Joel B. Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, &! UCLA L. REV. *# (!$(&). 
175 See LEE & WILLGING, supra note !%#, at &(-&$ (#""$) (considering individual federal cases 
in #""(, including those that went to trial, and reporting that the median portion of total litigation 
costs incurred for discovery was #"% for plainti,s and twenty-seven percent for defendants); Kakalik 
et. al., supra note !%#, at '&* (+nding that lawyer hours per litigant was #&# hours, with an average of 
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appear to vary signi+cantly across cases.176 Second, while many lawyers 
believe that discovery costs are often out of proportion with case stakes,177 the 
best recent study puts attorney estimates of discovery’s proportion at !.$% to 
'.'% of total stakes in the median case, and roughly one-quarter to one-third 
of total stakes at the top end.178 Third, litigation cost asymmetries are real but 
vary in magnitude throughout the system. For instance, older studies found 
that, in patent cases, discovery consumed more than twice the defendant’s 
costs as it did the plainti, ’s.179 More recent data suggests that, in the more 
general run of cases, defendant-side discovery costs are somewhat smaller—
perhaps not quite double plainti,s’.180 
 
(& hours, or thirty-six percent spent on discovery, including motions practice); Trubek et al., supra 
note !*), at $"-$! (+nding that only !'.*% of attorney time was spent on discovery, setting aside 
outlier “megacases”); Paula Hannaford-Agor, Measuring the Cost of Civil Litigation: Findings from a 
Survey of Trial Lawyers, VOIR DIRE, Spring #"!&, at ##, #' (reporting survey results and concluding 
that in six common types of disputes discovery accounted for twenty-two percent of lawyer and 
paralegal hours). Older studies tend to +nd relatively higher discovery costs. See Thomas E. 
Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean Miletich, An Empirical Study of Discovery and 
Disclosure Practice Under the #((& Federal Rule Amendments, &$ B.C. L. REV. %#%, %&! (!$$() (+nding 
that, among cases involving discovery, +fty percent of litigation costs came in discovery); Judicial 
Conference Adopts Rules Changes, Confronts Projected Budget Shortfalls, U.S. CTS. (Sept. !%, !$$$), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/!$$$/"$/!%/judicial-conference-adopts-rules-changes-confronts-
projected-budget-shortfalls [https://perma.cc/KMR'-BJDY] (reporting a similar +gure). 
176 See LEE & WILLGING, supra note !%#, at &(-&$ (reporting attorney-based estimates of the 
proportion of total litigation costs consumed by discovery as low as ".!% and as high as eighty percent 
across roughly !,""" cases); NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST., 
WHERE THE MONEY GOES: UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING 
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY !*-!( (#"!#), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/#"!#/
RAND_MG!#"(.pdf [https://perma.cc/KEA'-UXDR] (reporting highly variable total discovery costs 
across various types of cases). 
177 See LEE & WILLGING, supra note !%#, at #( (reporting that attorneys in #%% of cases 
believed discovery costs are too high relative to AIC). In addition, studies report that most lawyers 
erroneously believe that discovery consumes about two-thirds of litigation costs and estimate that 
%"% would be a more appropriate number. A.B.A., ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION MEMBER 
SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: DETAILED REPORT $( (#""$); REBECCA M. HAMBURG & 
MATTHEW C. KOSKI, NAT’L EMP. LAWS. ASS’N, SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CENTER SURVEY OF NELA MEMBERS &) (#"!"). 
178 LEE & WILLGING, supra note !%#, at )#-)&. 
179 GLASER, supra note !*), at !''. 
180 The most comprehensive recent federal-level study is the #""$ Federal Judicial Center 
report, which +nds that the median proportion of total litigation costs incurred in discovery was 
twenty percent of 1!%,""" in total litigation costs, or 1&,""", for plainti,s, and twenty-seven percent 
of 1#",""" in total litigation costs, or 1%,)"", for defendants; these costs rose by between +ve to ten 
percentage points for both parties in cases with ESI. See LEE & WILLGING, supra note !%#, at #. By 
contrast, a !$$( study, which found that +fty percent of total litigation costs went to discovery, 
showed no di,erence across plainti,s and defendants. See Willging et al., supra note !*%, at %&!. It is 
important to remember that cost statistics are necessarily based on cases selected for litigation. See 
infra notes #%#–#%& and accompanying text (exploring theories of selection of disputes for litigation). 
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An even harder question to interrogate empirically is where costs will go 
in the new world of AI-boosted discovery.181 One oft-articulated view is that 
discovery costs will continue to rise because of the ever-growing universe of 
discoverable material—“in+nite ESI”—and because ever cheaper digital 
storage will allow us to keep all of it.182 Some of this has come from 
predictable precincts—the Chamber of Commerce and other anti-litigation 
standard bearers who have worked hard, and successfully, to establish an 
often-misleading “cost-and-delay narrative” about litigation.183 But it has also 
come from more o.cial and less con-icted quarters, including judges184 and 
rulemakers,185 among others.186 
However, close attention to data, economic theory, and a technical 
understanding of TAR and related e-discovery tools, suggests something very 
nearly the opposite may prove true. Indeed, largely missing from the debate 
is a key and, we believe, unmistakable observation: In recent decades 
digitization has produced a substantial uptick in the volume of ESI, while the 
advanced analytics necessary to manage that volume have lagged behind; as 
TAR continues to proliferate and improve, however, the discovery cost curve 
 
181 See Kluttz & Mulligan, supra note !"% at (%) (“[P]redictive coding methods . . . challenge 
the current model for evaluating whether and how tools are appropriate for legal practice.”); 
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, #"!( LITIGATION TRENDS ANNUAL SURVEY: PERSPECTIVES FROM 
CORPORATE COUNSEL & (#"!() (reporting a survey of corporate counsel +nding that +fty-four 
percent of companies had used TAR). 
182 See, e.g., Andrew Jay Peck, Foreword, #' REGENT U. L. REV. !, & (#"!)) (noting the 
explosion of digital information and inability of discovery methods to catch up); see also John H. 
Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for E%ective Civil Litigation Reform, '" DUKE L.J. %)*, %%" 
(#"!") (arguing that “exponential growth” in electronic documents has fueled “abusive discovery”); 
Endo, supra note !%&, at !&&( (noting that cost concerns animate most discovery reforms). 
183 Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and 
Functions, $" OR. L. REV. !"(%, !"(%-(' (#"!#) (reviewing and criticizing the debate). For an example 
of claims from within the interest group landscape, see AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. 
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF 
THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE 
INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM # (#""$) [hereinafter 
COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS] (concluding that there are serious problems in the civil justice system 
and that the discovery structure is in need of reform). 
184 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, #!* F.R.D. &"$, &!! (S.D.N.Y. #""&) (referring to an 
“exponentially” increasing universe of discovery material). 
185 See Memorandum from David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules, on Report 
of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to Jeffery S. Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. 
#) (May #, #"!)) (noting impact of the “information explosion” on the !$$& amendments to Rule #'). 
186 See, e.g., PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note !*', at #' (explaining participant’s concerns with 
“high costs” of discovery review); The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, Recommendations 
& Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, !$ SEDONA CONF. J. !, %$ (#"!() 
(describing the growth of ESI). 
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is likely to bend down more quickly than the digitization curve bends up.187 
This, we submit, will have important implications for procedure, and may 
drain the proportionality constraints built into federal and state civil 
procedure rules of much of their importance. Further, powerful new e-
discovery tools seem poised to steadily narrow the litigation cost asymmetries 
that have motivated a second key procedural reform in recent years: 
Twombly/Iqbal’s shift in the pleading rules. 
#. Proportionality’s Retreat in a Frictionless World 
Growing concern about litigation costs has spurred a wide catalog of 
reform ideas in recent decades,188 but the reform that judges and policymakers 
have arguably preferenced above all others is the imposition of 
proportionality constraints on discovery. As noted previously, proportionality 
became part of the federal rules in !%&', but it was beefed up signi+cantly in 
#""$, when the Advisory Committee added an ESI-speci+c rule designed to 
guard against “undue burden and cost.”189 In #"!(, the Committee re-centered 
the proportionality constraint by moving it front and center in Rule #$(b)(!)’s 
provisions governing discovery’s scope, although the operative text changed 
little.190 In its current guise, Rule #$(b)(!) now permits discovery 
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 
defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance 
of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ 
relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance 
of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense 
of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely bene!t.191 
Many states have followed suit.192 
The newly centered proportionality provisions have, by most accounts, had 
a substantial effect, drawing both criticism and praise.193 However, there are 
 
187 Against the backdrop of a chorus of voices focused on ever-increasing costs, only a few 
commentators have acknowledged this possibility. See, e.g., Grimm, supra note !%', at !'* (noting 
that new predictive technologies may reduce the cost of ESI discovery). 
188 See supra notes !%&–!%) and accompanying text. 
189 FED. R. CIV. P. #'(b)(#)(B). 
190 The proportionality mandate was moved from FED. R. CIV. P. #'(b)(#)(C)(iii) to FED. R. 
CIV. P. #'(b)(!) in #"!%. 
191 FED. R. CIV. P. #'(b)(!). 
192 See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. #'(b)(!); COLO. R. CIV. P. #'(b)(!); ILL. SUP. CT. R. #"!(c)(&); 
MD. CODE ANN., CT. R. § #-)"#(b)(!); KAN. STAT. ANN. § '"-##'(b)(!) (#"!$); MINN. R. CIV. P. 
! & #'."#(b)(#)-(&); OKLA. STAT. tit. !# § &##'(B)(!)(a) (#"#"); UTAH R. CIV. P. #'(b)(#); VT. R. 
CIV. P. #'(b)(!); WYO. R. CIV. P. #'(b)(!)). 
193 But see Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, &$ B.C. L. REV. *)*, **&-*) (!$$() 
(reviewing claims but arguing that the shift in the rules has not had a major impact); see also Ion 
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two reasons to believe that legal tech will shift the ground out from under 
proportionality constraints, progressively eliminating much of their force.194 
First, there are reasons to doubt the pervasive claims about “infinite” ESI that 
have helped drive reform efforts. In trial litigation, much discovery comes 
from communication, which is, in important ways, bounded by the limits of 
human attention and cognition and may bear only a weak relationship to the 
growth in other kinds of digital materials. There are limits to the quantity of 
email that even large, sprawling organizations can generate.195 
Second, and more importantly, evidence is mounting that continued 
diffusion of TAR tools will reduce, perhaps substantially, total discovery costs. 
Only recently, commentators expressed doubt about TAR’s accuracy and 
efficiency relative to manual review.196 But a growing cluster of studies 
establishes that well-implemented TAR tools are as good as, and often better 
than, purely human review in terms of recall (i.e., the proportion of documents 
in the total pool of documents that the tool accurately identifies as relevant) and 
almost certainly better than humans in precision (i.e., the proportion of 
documents among those the tool identifies that are in fact relevant).197 And, they 
 
Meyn, The Haves of Procedure, '" WM. & MARY L. REV. !*'%, !*$! (#"!$) (decrying test’s vagueness 
and resulting judicial discretion); Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note !'*, at !!!* (observing that 
proportionality brings “subjectivity and a reduction of predictability”). 
194 Cf. Endo, supra note !%&, at !&%)-%% (providing a framework for considering proportionality 
issues in discovery); see also Ralph C. Losey, Predictive Coding and the Proportionality Doctrine: A 
Marriage Made in Big Data, #' REGENT U. L. REV. *, !%-!' (#"!&) (arguing that predictive coding is 
the answer to the proportionality doctrine); Peck, supra note !(#, at & (suggesting that technology 
o,ers solutions to the discovery problems it created). 
195 Cf. THE RADICATI GRP., EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT, #"!%–#"!$ at &-) (#"!%) (estimating 
that the number of business emails per user per day will grow from !## to !#' from #"!%-#"!$, an 
increase of just three percent over ) years). 
196 See Remus, supra note &), at !*"* (noting a general lack of validation of existing tools and 
likely variation in their quality). 
197 “Well-implemented” is the key qualifier here and includes the quality of the algorithm itself, 
the technologists who deploy it, the data set, and the broader workflow and pipeline around each of 
these things. Importantly, the legal tech industry’s marketing efforts, and even a growing academic 
literature, frequently overstate TAR’s capabilities. Perhaps the best source of empirical studies of 
TAR’s efficacy come from the Legal Track Interactive Task Studies at the Text Retrieval Conference 
(TREC), convened by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) from #""( to #"!". 
See generally TREC Legal Track, https://trec-legal.umiacs.umd.edu [https://perma.cc/SLM&-(GLB]. 
In what were, in effect, competitions among invited commercial and academic entrants, few achieved 
an F! statistic higher than fifty percent, and fewer still achieved an F! higher than seventy percent. 
For an explanation of F!, see supra note !''. All told, only a small number of entrants were 
conclusively better than human, eyes-on review. This is important, for many of the most frequently 
cited claims as to TAR’s efficacy are based on the TREC results. See, e.g., Grossman & Cormack, supra 
note !), at #-% (offering evidence of TAR’s efficiency and accuracy based on an analysis of data 
collected from the TREC). For an accounting of academic studies and conference exercises up 
through #"!#, see PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note !*%, at '!-'$. Of course, it is possible that the 
technology has improved since the TREC studies, which are nearly ten years old. More recent studies 
report impressive findings. See, e.g., Chhatwal et al., supra note !'%, at !)&& (reporting ninety percent 
 
#"#!] Legal Tech, Civil Procedure, and the Future of Adversarialism !"(' 
do so at a fraction of the cost.198 Put another way, well-implemented TAR may 
not consistently capture substantially more relevant or privileged documents, 
but it yields less surplusage and requires a fraction of attorney time.199 
All of this comes with caveats—and spotlights future avenues for research. 
First, the performance metrics that underpin claims about TAR’s cost-savings 
are not ironclad. We lack perfectly accurate “ground truth” because we can 
never “know” which documents in a production are relevant within Rule #$’s 
meaning because that meaning is subjective and contestable.200 However, 
while it is possible that skepticism about these measures will slow TAR’s 
advance, the better bet remains that it will continue to improve and earn 
judicial sanction.201 Second, it is important to concede that TAR, while 
 
recall based on review of only forty percent of the documents and concluding automation can be 
better than linear human review). But see Robert Keeling, Rishi Chhatwal, Peter Gronvall & Nathaniel 
Huber-Fliflet, Humans Against Machines: Reaffirming the Superiority of Human Attorneys in Legal 
Document Review and Examining the Limitations of Algorithmic Approaches to Discovery, #' RICH. J.L. & 
TECH., no. &, #"#", at # (challenging the “prevailing wisdom” about TAR’s efficacy relative to manual 
review and critiquing studies). A new round of highly-controlled TREC-like studies might provide a 
more reliable sense of current performance. 
198 Grossman & Cormack, supra note !), at )& (suggesting “a +fty-fold savings over exhaustive 
manual review”). Some courts have begun to hear testimony on TAR’s e-ciency gains. See Dynamo 
Holdings Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r, !)& T.C. !(&, !$) (#"!)) (featuring expert testimony that TAR 
would reduce discovery costs from around 1%""k to around 1("k). Courts are also increasingly 
willing to tout TAR’s e-ciencies. See Chevron Corp. v. Donzinger, No. !!-"'$!, #"!& WL !"(*#&', 
at *&& n.#%% (S.D.N.Y. Mar. !%, #"!&) (rejecting argument about burdensome discovery and noting 
that TAR allows for review at a “fraction of the cost of human reviewers”); Hyles v. New York City, 
No. !"-&!!$, #"!' WL )"**!!), at *& (S.D.N.Y. Aug. !, #"!') (stating that “TAR is the best and most 
e-cient search tool” for discovery). 
199 TAR will not be the only source of cost-savings. Cheaper storage means that fewer 
resources will also be spent extracting ESI from ine-cient storage (e.g., backup tapes). See SEDONA 
CONFERENCE WORKING GRP. ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA 
PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING 
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION % (#d ed. #""*) (“[T]he fact that many forms of 
electronically stored information and media can be searched quickly and accurately by automated 
methods provides new e-ciencies and economies.”). 
200 See Peter Bailey, Nick Craswell, Ian Soboro,, Paul Thomas, Arjen P. de Vries & Emine 
Yilmaz, Relevance Assessment: Are Judges Exchangeable and Does It Matter?, &! PROC. ANNUAL INT’L 
ACM SIGIR CONF. ON RES. & DEV. INFO. RETRIEVAL ''* (#""() (suggesting that judges vary 
signi+cantly in their assessments of what material is relevant). The best studies manage this concern 
by reporting numerous pair-wise comparisons of multiple manual (human) reviews and machine 
outputs. See PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note !*', at '!-'' (summarizing the methods and results of 
four studies comparing TAR to manual review). The TREC studies create a single measure of 
relevance by appointing a “Topic Authority” who played the role of a senior attorney directing a 
discovery e,ort by developing relevance criteria, and who was accessible to participants. The 
resulting standard thus did not aspire to intersubjective validity but instead provided a single, albeit 
subjective, standard of relevance for purposes of judging performance. 
201 The general trend is toward judicial acceptance. See, e.g., Moore v. Publicis Groupe, #(* 
F.R.D. !(#, !(* (S.D.N.Y. #"!#) (concluding that TAR “works better than most of the alternatives, 
if not all of the [present] alternatives”), adopted sub nom. Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, No. !!-!#*$, 
#"!# WL !))'%&) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. #', #"!#); Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigr. & 
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reducing the need for lawyers, will add new entries to the cost side of the 
discovery ledger, including software, technologists, and litigation experts.202 
These new inputs could render TAR ine.cient in smaller-scale 
productions.203 The more general question is whether the uptick in costs will 
be less or more than the downtick in lawyer time necessary to perform linear 
manual review. The smart money is on less, but one cannot predict with 
certainty where reality will land. 
A +nal caveat looms larger: Studies proclaiming TAR’s superiority assume 
a static litigation system. This assumption, however, may not hold. To begin, 
cost reductions can reshape how much of the task is demanded and/or 
supplied, and this is no less true in law than elsewhere.204 The unit cost of 
discovery can drop precipitously, but aggregate costs may not budge if judges 
proceed to green-light ever more expansive discovery requests. Moreover, 
most studies touting TAR do not account for possible shifts under the 
discovery rules. But in a growing set of cases, lower courts are struggling with 
whether to compel party cooperation.205 In early cases, courts declined to 
mandate disclosure of seed sets because the parties had arrived at 
arrangements themselves.206 Where con-icts arise, however, courts must 
 
Customs Enf ’t Agency, (** F. Supp. #d (*, !"$ (S.D.N.Y. #"!#) (“[P]arties can (and frequently 
should) rely on . . . machine learning tools to +nd responsive documents.”); Dynamo Holdings, !)& 
T.C. at !$# (“[W]e understand that the technology industry now considers predictive coding to be 
widely accepted for limiting e-discovery to relevant documents and e,ecting discovery of ESI 
without an undue burden.”); Rio Tinto PLC v. Vale S.A., &"' F.R.D. !#%, !#' (S.D.N.Y. #"!%) 
(holding that TAR is “an acceptable way to search for relevant ESI in appropriate cases”). But see 
Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Delaney, No. !!-""'*(, #"!) WL &%'&)'*, at *!! (D. Nev. #"!)) 
(refusing party request to use TAR but mostly because of the party’s bad faith in abandoning an 
agreed-to protocol). For cases in Anglo-American legal systems beyond the U.S., including the U.K., 
Ireland, and Canada, see Christian, supra note &), at %"&-!". 
202 Remus, supra note &), at !*"* (noting that existing studies fail to account for the possibility 
of these other costs). 
203 Remus & Levy, supra note !, at %&) (claiming that training and review, in particular, might 
render TAR ine-cient for small classi+cations); see also Endo, supra note &), at (%% (assessing 
whether predictive coding is +scally e-cient across all cases). 
204 See supra notes !"!–!"# and accompanying text. Basic economic reasoning suggests the 
point: if technology reduces the cost of producing a good or service, that means it increases supply, 
but if it also increases the quality of the good or service, demand also may increase. For example, 
improved knee replacement devices might lead to cheaper treatment of knee problems as well as 
more demand for that kind of treatment. With reduced cost per treated patient but more patients 
treated, total health spending might rise or fall as a result of the new technology. See also John G. 
Heyburn II & Francis E. McGovern, Evaluating and Improving the MDL Process, &( LITIGATION #', 
#(-&" (#"!#) (noting the dynamic relationship of supply and demand in managing MDL dockets). 
205 For general law review commentary, see Kitzer, supra note !!*, at #"'; Christian, supra note 
&), at %#)-#%; Tonia Hap Murphy, Mandating Use of Predictive Coding in Electronic Discovery: An Ill-
Advised Judicial Intrusion, %" AM. BUS. L.J. '"$, '&# (#"!&). 
206 See Rio Tinto, &"' F.R.D. at !#$ (approving TAR protocol agreed to by parties); Bridgestone 
Americas, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., No. !&-!!$', #"!) WL )$#&"!), at *! (M.D. Tenn. July ##, 
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choose, with some strongly encouraging disclosure but not mandating it207 
and others requiring disclosure or making it a condition of a responding 
party’s use of TAR.208 Academic commentators go furthest of all, proposing 
that the requesting party be made solely responsible for constructing the seed 
set and tuning the machine learning model.209 We provide a fuller analysis of 
the implications of these positions in Section II.C below, including the 
possibility that the work product doctrine might protect seed sets from 
disclosure. For now, it is enough to observe that each of these positions could 
have a range of as-yet-unanalyzed e,ects on the distribution of discovery 
costs, including perhaps increasing costs in certain cases.210 
These are important caveats, and yet the broader conclusion seems sound. 
Short of substantial changes to current discovery rules, the near- to medium-
term is likely to see a reduction in overall discovery costs. As a corollary, the 
proportionality concerns that have animated much recent litigation reform 
activity are likely to fade in importance, particularly in cases whose major 
costs are driven by large-corpus electronic document discovery. 
 
#"!)) (same); In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prod. Liab. Litig., No. !!-##$$, #"!# WL *('!#)$, at *)-% 
(W.D. La. July #*, #"!#) (same). 
207 See, e.g., Aurora Coop. Elevator Co. v. Aventine Renewable Energy-Aurora W., LLC, No. 
!#-#&", #"!% WL !"%%"#)", at *# (D. Neb. Jan. ', #"!%) (noting that Rule #'(b)(!) does not authorize 
discovery of the irrelevant documents in a seed set but then “encourag[ing]” the parties to work 
cooperatively); In re Biomet M#a Magnum Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., No. !#-#&$!, #"!& WL 
')"%!%', at *# (N.D. Ind. Aug. #!, #"!&) (noting lack of authority under Rule #'(b)(!) but “urg[ing] 
Biomet to re-think its refusal”); Win!eld v. City of New York, No. !%-"%#&', #"!* WL %'')(%#, at *!# 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. #*, #"!*) (“encourag[ing]” but not requiring disclosure). 
208 Moore v. Publicis Groupe, #(* F.R.D. !(#, !$$ (S.D.N.Y. #"!#) (ordering collaboration, 
including “iterative seed selection” and “quality control processes”). In Progressive, the court refused 
a request to use TAR because the party advocating it had refused to share seed sets and other 
methodological details. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Delaney, No. !!-""'*(, #"!) WL &%'&)'*, 
at *!! (D. Nev. #"!)) (“Progressive is unwilling to engage in the type of cooperation and transparency 
that its own e-discovery consultant has so comprehensibly and persuasively explained is needed for 
a predictive coding protocol to be accepted by the court or opposing counsel as a reasonable method 
to search for and produce responsive ESI.”). In at least one other case, the judge ordered seed set 
disclosure in a ruling from the bench. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., No. !!-
'!($, #"!) WL %()&"" (S.D.N.Y. #"!)). 
209 See Kobayashi, supra note !'$, at !%") (arguing that the requesting party should be 
responsible for the up-front costs of search). 
210 As an example, privilege (as opposed to relevance) determinations cannot be re-allocated 
to the requesting party under the current work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege. As a 
result, even if the requesting party is given sole responsibility for tagging the seed set for relevance, 
the responding party must still review documents for privilege prior to turning over the seed set, 
embroiling both parties in substantial review work. Particularly in smaller-scale cases where 
predictive coding brings only small e-ciency gains, an approach that imposes review obligations on 
both parties could increase total litigation costs. 
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'. Re-Centering Twombly and Iqbal 
If proportionality has created a slow burn of reform skirmishes in recent 
decades, then recent changes to the pleading rules, anchored by the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s opinions in Twombly and Iqbal, were more of a surprise 
revolution.211 In its Twombly and Iqbal opinions, the Supreme Court, 
ostensibly interpreting Rule & of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, swept 
away the “notice pleading” system that had prevailed since the creation of the 
federal rules in !%'& and replaced it with a regime in which a plainti, ’s 
complaint must assert a “plausible” claim for relief in order to withstand a 
motion to dismiss.212 Heated debate has ensued about whether this is in fact 
just a probability requirement in fancy clothes, and lower courts have often 
struggled with how to implement the Court’s new mandate in any other 
way.213 A long academic literature of varying rigor and sophistication has also 
questioned whether and to what extent the change matters, particularly for 
speci+c case types (e.g., civil rights).214 And whether or not Twombly and Iqbal 
have had tangible e,ects on judicial decisions, the new pleading regime may 
still have impacted pleading practice—for instance, causing many plainti,s 
to make costly investments in pre-+ling investigation to avoid dismissal.215 
At the normative core of the Twombly/Iqbal debate is a value judgment 
about the collision of two kinds of asymmetries: asymmetric discovery costs 
 
211 See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
(' COLUM. L. REV. )&&, )$#-$& (!$(') (predicting the demise of notice pleading). For the cases, 
see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, %%" U.S. %)) (#""*); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, %%' U.S. ''# (#""$). 
212 Twombly, %%" U.S. %)); Iqbal, %%' U.S. ''#. 
213 See, e.g., Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., '!) F.&d )"", )") (*th Cir. #"!") (“As we understand 
it, the Court is saying instead that the plainti, must give enough details about the subject-matter of 
the case to present a story that holds together. In other words, the court will ask itself could these 
things have happened, not did they happen.”); Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., %(( F.&d %(%, %$) 
((th Cir. #""$) (“The plausibility standard requires a plainti, to show at the pleading stage that 
success on the merits is more than a ‘sheer possibility.’ It is not, however, a ‘probability requirement.’” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
214 David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, '% STAN. 
L. REV. !#")-"' (#"!&) (reviewing studies that analyze the systemic impact of Twombly and Iqbal). 
215 See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, $& 
JUDICATURE !"$, !!( (#""$) (“Perhaps the most troublesome possible consequence of Twombly and 
Iqbal is that it will deny access to court to plainti,s and prospective plainti,s with meritorious 
claims who cannot satisfy their requirements . . . because they lack the resources to engage in 
extensive pre-+ling investigation or because of informational asymmetries.”). There is no direct 
evidence of any such e,ect. However, studies suggest that the decisions a,ected other aspects of 
pleading practice and so it is eminently plausible. See Christina L. Boyd, David A. Ho,man, Zoran 
Obradovic & Kosta Ristovki, Building a Taxonomy of Causes of Action in Federal Complaints, !" J. EMP. 
LEG. STUDS. #%&, #*) (#"!&) (o,ering preliminary evidence that plainti,s pled fewer causes of 
action after Twombly). But see REBECCA M. HAMBURG & MATTHEW C. KOSKI, SUMMARY OF 
RESULTS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER SURVEY OF NELA MEMBERS, FALL #""$ (#"!") 
(reporting survey results in which employment discrimination plainti,s’ counsel reported no change 
in the amount of detail in their pleadings). 
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and asymmetric information. The first of these, we just noted, arises from the 
misaligned incentives of the American system of discovery in which costs lie 
where they fall, allowing parties to externalize the costs of discovery requests 
onto adversaries. By subjecting a party’s claims to pre-discovery scrutiny, 
Twombly/Iqbal’s pleading rule seeks to blunt such in terrorem effects on 
settlement.216 But whatever its value in paring back litigation cost asymmetries, 
plausibility screening also creates a countervailing concern founded upon 
information asymmetries. Simply put, not all claimants have access to needed 
evidence at the pleading stage, and only coercive discovery and compulsory 
process can dislodge privately held information about wrongdoing. The result 
is that the effects of litigation cost asymmetries can be mitigated only by 
exacerbating information asymmetries, and vice versa. Twombly/Iqbal’s 
plausibility pleading standard is merely a choice, and a highly subjective one, 
along a spectrum of possible accommodations of the two concerns. 
Twombly/Iqbal’s balancing act may involve distributional considerations, 
but it is not necessarily intractable. One option is to relax the “plausibility” 
mandate in the subset of cases most a/icted by asymmetric information 
(though doing so might strain the American commitment to 
transubstantivity).217 Another partial solution is phased discovery, akin to 
jurisdictional discovery, to target key evidentiary issues—the “jugular” of a 
case—at the pleading stage in order to test plausibility, but leaving the bulk 
of discovery to later stages, once a motion to dismiss has been beaten back. 
For those cases in which document discovery is a key cost driver, TAR adds 
a third potential solution to this menu of options. A small, but growing, 
academic literature has begun to explore this possibility, and the reasoning, 
pivoting off of the earlier discussion of TAR’s effect on proportionality, should 
now be familiar.218 The core of the argument is that TAR will substantially 
narrow asymmetric discovery costs because a prime source of those 
asymmetries—review of documents for relevance and privilege—is the 
 
216 Twombly, %%" U.S. at %%$ (justifying plausibility pleading on need “to avoid the potentially 
enormous expense of discovery in cases with no ‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] 
process will reveal relevant evidence’ to support a . . . claim”); see also Samuel Issacharo, & Geo,rey 
Miller, An Information-Forcing Approach to the Motion to Dismiss, % J. LEGAL ANALYSIS )&*, ))( (#"!&) 
(suggesting that heightened pleading standards serve to “prevent[] deadweight losses through 
fruitless discovery”); Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the E%ects of 
Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, !#! YALE L.J. ##*", ##** (#"!#) (showing that Twombly/Iqbal 
standards prevent discovery in some cases that would otherwise reach it). 
217 See, e.g., Swanson, '!) F.&d at )")-"% (discussing the application of the Twombly/Iqbal 
standard to di,erent substantive areas of law); see also Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly is the Logical 
Extension of the Mathews v. Eldridge Test to Discovery, '# FLA. L. REV. !, &( (#"!") (discussing the 
ill e,ects of Twombly and Iqbal on civil rights and discrimination cases). 
218 Kobayashi, supra note !'$, at !%"#. 
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discovery cost that is most directly abated by TAR.219 Moreover, these review 
costs tend to be unevenly distributed between requesting and responding 
parties, the argument continues, because the responding party must review the 
full set of collected documents for both relevance and privilege before producing 
them while the requesting party receives and reviews only the distilled set.220 
As with our claims around proportionality, the empirical case for TAR’s 
capacity to narrow cost asymmetries is less than ironclad. Time will tell, and 
will open signi+cant opportunities for future research. First, TAR’s capacity 
to mitigate the in terrorem e,ect of cost asymmetries may not be evenly felt 
on both sides of the “v,” yielding substantial reductions in discovery costs 
among responding and requesting parties alike. Requesting parties, for 
instance, might utilize TAR to more e.ciently distill a large document 
production for review. If new algorithmic tools cut the requesting party’s 
costs as much or nearly as much as the responding party’s, then cost 
asymmetries, and the in terrorem e,ect they underwrite, may not budge. 
TAR’s capacity to narrow cost asymmetries may also be limited in smaller-
stakes cases. Because TAR’s economies fade as the quantity of discovery 
declines, there is a point at which the +xed cost of software, seed set 
construction, and model tuning is not worth the candle. This is important, 
because at least some empirical evidence suggests that cost asymmetries may 
be at their widest in smaller-stakes cases, not the mega-litigations that feature 
most prominently in litigation reform debates.221 
Second, TAR’s capacity to mitigate the e,ects of cost asymmetries will—
as with TAR’s e,ect on proportionality—depend on how courts modulate its 
use by litigants. As just noted, lower courts are grappling with how much 
inter-party cooperation to require when implementing TAR protocols, and 
some academics go further and advocate a shift to a “task allocation” rule in 
which the requesting party performs the work, and bears the cost, of 
constructing the seed set and training the model as a way to limit cost 
externalization and cross-party agency costs.222 However, privilege 
determinations, we also noted, may be non-delegable, making any re-
allocation of discovery tasks to the requesting party at best partial.223 The 
result is that TAR might narrow, but likely cannot -atten, discovery costs. 
These and other objections to TAR’s capacity to mitigate litigation cost 
concerns provide fruitful avenues for future research, both theoretical and 
 
219 PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note !*', at )! (estimating that maximum savings can be achieved 
by increasing the speed of document review and reducing associated labor costs). 
220 FED. R. CIV. P. #'(b)(%)(A). 
221 See LEE & WILLGING, supra note !%# at )#-)& (reporting that the median portion of 
discovery costs was !.'% of stakes for plainti,s and &.&% for defendants). 
222 See supra note #"$ and accompanying text. 
223 See supra note ##". 
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empirical, particularly as TAR proliferates and the judicial response 
crystallizes. However, from the current vantage, and with appropriate 
humility about predicting technological change, TAR’s proliferation is likely 
to progressively erode the cost asymmetries upon which the Court’s 
Twombly/Iqbal doctrine is founded. 
B. Predictive Analytics and Forum Selection 
Forum selection offers a second concrete context in which to explore the 
intersection of legal tech and procedure. Indeed, legal tech firms are already 
marketing software that helps litigants choose the most advantageous forum in 
which to litigate their dispute. A leading example is Ravel Law, whose website 
features the following client testimonial: “With Ravel I can quickly perform a 
deep dive into how certain types of cases fare in a jurisdiction and the law that 
tends to control in a particular kind of case.”224 Surveys suggest substantial 
recent increases in use of data-based outcome-prediction tools among law 
firms.225 In this Section, we seek to understand the possibilities, and also the 
significant limits, of outcome-prediction tools. In so doing, we offer a more 
skeptical take on legal tech’s potential than in the e-discovery domain.226 
Even so, focusing on forum selection o,ers an invaluable opportunity to 
probe legal tech’s e,ect on the distribution of information within the system 
and explore how that might warrant a procedural response. 
 
224 What People Are Saying, RAVEL LAW, https://home.ravellaw.com [https://web.archive.org/
web/#"!$"#"*#!)'#$/https:/home.ravellaw.com/] (quoting Daniel Newman, Shareholder, Greenberg 
Traurig). Another example comes from a Shareholder at law firm Littler Mendelson: 
We are well on our way to being able to provide our clients with predictive analytics 
about case outcomes. If you have a case similar to one brought by a particular lawyer 
in a certain part of the country with the same judge, based on analytics we can predict 
the length of the case, the cost range and the possible outcome. That kind of 
information o,ers the power of prediction, and we serve our clients best when we can 
accurately predict outcomes and cost. 
Lee Schreter, In Their Words: Using Analytics and AI in Legal Practice, GA. STATE UNIV.: GA. STATE 
NEWS HUB (Mar. !$, #"!(), https://news.gsu.edu/#"!(/"&/!$/in-their-words-using-analytics-and-ai-
in-legal-practice-# [https://perma.cc/SE)Y-PBDS]. 
225 See COALITION OF TECHNOLOGY RESOURCES FOR LAWYERS, DATA ANALYTICS IN 
CORPORATE LEGAL DEPARTMENTS: #"!*-#"!( TRENDS ' (#"!() (reporting a )&% increase in use 
by law +rms of data analytics to perform outcome analysis and a !*%% increase in anticipated 
spending on such tools). 
226 It is possible that predictive tools will be most useful not for forum-selection within the 
civil justice system but rather within the arbitration system, where litigants retain at least some 
agency in the selection of arbitrators. See Catherine A. Rogers, Arbitrator Intelligence: From Intuition 
to Data in Arbitrator Appointments, N.Y. DISP. RESOL. LAW., Spring #"!(, at )!, )# (noting use of 
tech tools to gain informational advantage in selecting arbitrators). 
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!. Forum-Shopping in Federal Courts and the Promise of Predictive 
Analytics 
A trio of features of the American litigation system has drawn 
entrepreneurial attention to forum selection as a legal tech target. First, the 
American system of federalism means that lawsuits can be heard in multiple 
fora, and a basic organizing principle is that plainti,s in the U.S. civil justice 
system have the “venue privilege”—the right to choose the default place 
where a case is adjudicated.227 Even so, defendants at both the federal and 
state level may move for statutory transfer to a new district or, in the federal 
system, seek dismissal from the federal system entirely using a common law 
forum non conveniens motion.228 The result is that litigants on both sides of 
the “v” have a say in where a case is adjudicated. 
Second, forum choice can have a signi+cant impact on case outcomes, and 
so parties will have powerful strategic incentives to select or avoid particular 
fora by engaging in “forum-shopping.” One set of incentives is the cost and 
convenience of litigating the suit. A party may hesitate to +ght if forced to 
litigate in a faraway courthouse, or one that won’t entitle the party to 
compulsory process for key witnesses.229 Parties may also prefer a fast or slow 
resolution, and a forum that will facilitate it. Finally, a litigant’s choice of 
forum can a,ect which law applies. In federal court cases involving state law 
claims, the court where a case is originated might a,ect choice of law because, 
under the Supreme Court’s Erie-Klaxon-Van Dusen framework, courts 
typically apply the choice of law rule of the state where a civil action was 
removed or originally +led.230 
Some of these differences are amenable to relatively low-cost analysis 
using conventional legal approaches—by reading cases and thinking like a 
lawyer. But forum choice can also matter for how law is applied. If advanced 
predictive analytics can be made to work in this arena—a very big “if” for 
reasons we discuss below—it would enjoy a decisive advantage. Regardless 
 
227 Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Tex., %*! U.S. )$, '& (#"!&). 
228 See #( U.S.C. § !)"); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, )%) U.S. #&%, #)"-)! (!$(!). 
229 For classic examples, see Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, )$$ U.S. %(% (!$$!) and J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, %') U.S. (*& (#"!!). 
230 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., &!& U.S. )(*, )(* (!$)!) (holding that federal courts 
must follow the choice of law rules of the states in which they sit); see also Van Dusen v. Barrack, &*' 
U.S. '!#, '&&-'&) (!$')) (applying the choice of law rules of the +ling state even if the case is 
transferred in the interests of convenience under § !)")(a)). Klaxon and Van Dusen further ensure 
that this is also true for removable cases initially +led in state court. However, there are two 
exceptions. If venue was improper in the original district, then following a transfer under #( U.S.C. 
§ !)"', the choice of law rules of the destination court’s state will apply instead. In addition, the 
destination court’s rules apply when an action is transferred to one designated in a forum selection 
clause. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co., %*! U.S. at ''-'* (holding the parties to their forum-selection 
clause in the “interest of justice”). 
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what law applies, judges in some jurisdictions might be more plaintiff-friendly 
than others in adjudicating motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, and 
the jury that awaits at trial if those motions are denied might be more 
generous.231 The salience of these “discretionary” choices may grow over time 
amidst an increasingly politicized judiciary, as selected by an increasingly 
polarized political process,232 and a jury pool shaped by Americans’ growing 
tendency to sort along socioeconomic and ideological lines.233 
A third feature of American litigation that makes predictive forum 
selection a potentially valuable growth area is that, by and large, American 
courts accept forum shopping as an intrinsic part of the system. An obvious 
exception, of course, is the Erie doctrine, which is explicitly structured around 
curtailing law-based incentives for forum-shopping as between federal and 
state courts.234 But beyond Erie, and despite occasional judicial outbursts 
noting “the danger of forum shopping”235 or declaring it “evil,”236 the 
underlying doctrinal story, from the Supreme Court on down, is a far more 
accommodating one.237 Part of this is a brute accommodation of the messiness 
of American federalism.238 Part of it may be a determination that other 
procedural doctrines and statutes—among them personal jurisdiction, 
statutory limits on venue, and, as just noted, Van Dusen’s e,ort to ensure that 
 
231 See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, () N.C. L. REV. &&&, &%" (#""') (providing 
examples of these more “subjective and personal factors”); see also Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense 
of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, *( NEB. L. REV. *$, $$ (!$$$) (suggesting 
that, even if the underlying law is the same, some courts are more likely to interpret and apply the 
law in a favorable way). 
232 See NATHANIEL PERSILY, SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA %-' 
(#"!%) (explaining the increasing polarization of contemporary American politics and exploring 
potential solutions); Richard L. Hasen, Polarization and the Judiciary, ## ANN. REV. POL. SCI. #'!, 
#'# (#"!$) (arguing that increased polarization affects both judicial selection and litigation outcomes). 
233 See, e.g., BILL BISHOP & ROBERT CUSHING, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING 
OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US APART !, )" (#""() (noting the consequences of 
increasing ideological and socioeconomic segregation). 
234 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, &") U.S. '), *( (!$&(). 
235 Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Du, & Assocs., )(& U.S. !)&, !%) (!$(*) (discussing the 
danger of forum shopping as it pertains to RICO cases). 
236 Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., &)% U.S. %!), %#! (!$%&) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (discussing 
how the application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause will not lead to the evil of forum shopping). 
237 See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., )$) U.S. %!', %#*-#( (!$$") (recognizing that plaintiffs 
engage in forum shopping); Van Dusen v. Barrack, &*' U.S. '!#, '&&-&) (!$')) (same as to 
defendants); Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., )'% U.S. **", **$ (!$()) (characterizing state-to-state 
forum shopping as a standard litigation strategy); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, )%) U.S. #&%, #%" (!$(!) 
(same); see also Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA 
and Shady Grove, !"' NW. U. L. REV. !, &#-&& (#"!#) (describing normative ambivalence about forum 
shopping). Interestingly, American ambivalence about forum shopping does not hold for global forum 
shopping. See Pamela K. Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, $# NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. %*$, %($, %$# (#"!') (countering critics’ view that international forum shopping is illegitimate). 
238 See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, '& TUL. L. REV. %%&, 
%'$ (!$($) (arguing that federalism permits or even invites forum shopping). 
!"$# University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !$%: !""! 
transfers on convenience grounds do not a,ect which law applies—place 
reasonable bounds around forum-shopping opportunities.239 And part of it 
may be an artifact of a thoroughgoing adversarial system that sees litigation 
strategy, including forum-shopping, as synonymous with zealous 
representation and perhaps even an ethical duty.240 Whatever the cause, even 
where litigants seek a venue transfer on convenience grounds, courts rarely 
scrutinize the deeper strategic purpose that that request often re-ects. 
#. Will Predictive Forum Selection “Work”? 
While some believe predictive analytics methods hold great promise for 
litigants seeking to maneuver their dispute into an advantageous forum, 
serious questions, unrelated to the NLP challenges discussed previously, 
remain as to legal tech’s ability to deliver on any such promise. These concerns 
may or may not be insuperable. At a bare minimum, they indicate that strong 
headwinds must shape thinking about any procedural response. 
Start with a concrete example: whether a defendant in an already-filed case 
should move to transfer to another forum, given that the defendant plans to 
move to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In this setting, a defendant might 
want to know what share of all Rule !#(b)($) motions has been granted in each 
district. A more refined approach would filter cases by additional available 
details, such as the PACER-reported nature of suit code, the number of parties 
on each side, their corporate status, the number of claims filed, the presence 
of state or federal law questions, and the court and assigned district court 
judge.241 Machine learning methods can determine which, if any, of these 
variables importantly predict the result of Rule !#(b)($) motions among the 
universe of already-litigated cases. If the district court is one of the important 
predictors, then a transfer to a more favorable district might be a good bet. 
This simple example surfaces a key criterion for thinking about what it means 
for predictive analytics to “work”: Available data must be useful in predicting the 
ways important case outcomes would vary across districts. Call this the APU 
criterion—the requirement that Available data is Predictively Useful. 
 
239 See Bassett, supra note #&!, at &'$ (contrasting procedural restrictions on forum-shopping 
with a more “laissez-faire approach”). For key personal jurisdiction cases, see Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S. A. v. Brown, %') U.S. $!% (#"!!); Daimler AG v. Bauman, %*! U.S. !!* (#"!)); Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., !&* S. Ct. !**& (#"!*). 
240 Bassett, supra note #&!, at &)) (“Indeed, the failure to forum shop would, in most instances, 
constitute malpractice.”). 
241 Note, however, that the Nature of Suit (NOS) codes selected by each plainti, in completing 
a civil cover sheet have been found to be problematic guides. See Christina L. Boyd & David A. 
Ho,man, The Use and Reliability of Federal Nature of Suit Codes, #"!* MICH. ST. L. REV. $$*, !""'-
"* (observing that the attorneys who select NOS codes have no training or standardized guidance 
and little incentive for selecting proper codes). This means that a predictive analyst would likely 
need to oversample cases to ensure she is not +ltering out cases with relevant claims. 
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Predictive analytics applied to forum selection could fail the APU 
criterion in any of three ways. The +rst is insu.cient data of the right type. 
While many of the variables relevant to predicting case outcomes are available 
in the docket reports that reside on the federal courts’ PACER e-+ling 
system, capturing the key case features with respect to, say, the plausibility 
standard applied to motions to dismiss under Twombly/Iqbal might vary in 
ways that require a wider catalog of case materials—for instance, complaints, 
memoranda of law supporting a motion to dismiss, or other documents. One 
problem is that PACER’s search interface, which has all the sophistication 
and user-friendliness of its mid-!%%"s design, makes it almost useless for data 
+ltering. The more signi+cant issue is that, even if e.cient +ltering were 
possible, PACER fees, assessed on a document-by-document basis, would 
mount quickly in any e,ort to generate enough observations to support viable 
machine learning methods.242 Federal-level court data, as one pair of scholars 
memorably put it, sits behind “a wall of cash and kludge.”243 
Could some alternative mechanism arise, duplicating PACER’s massive 
holdings and allowing smart sharing of case documents? Westlaw, Lexis, and 
Bloomberg already download PACER docket reports and large numbers of 
underlying case documents. And large law +rms surely possess expansive 
document collections they have +led and downloaded in their own work. 
There is also the insurgent RECAP archive, which makes freely available any 
document the archive’s users have paid PACER to download.244 
But there is little way to know how well some of these document collections 
represent the full population of cases.245 And foreboding economics give good 
reason to doubt that any such collection will become comprehensive. One 
estimate found several years ago that the cost of downloading all of PACER 
 
242 If, based on a power analysis, a litigant needs to download information on #",""" cases to make 
useful predictions, and each case featured an average of three documents at an average cost of 1!.%", total 
costs—for one case—could exceed 1$",""", not including the costs of employing data scientists. 
243 Charlotte S. Alexander & Mohammad Javad Feizollahi, On Dragons, Caves, Teeth, and Claws: 
Legal Analytics and the Problem of Court Data Access, in COMPUTATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES: THE 
PROMISE AND CHALLENGE OF DATA-DRIVEN LEGAL RESEARCH $* (Ryan Whalen ed., #"!$). 
244 Advanced RECAP Search, COURT LISTENER https://www.courtlistener.com/recap 
[https://perma.cc/XSG$-%YLZ]. RECAP, for those who missed it, is “PACER” spelled backward. 
245 Even Westlaw and Lexis have gaps. See McAlister, supra note &* (describing the 
incompleteness of legal databases); Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, !' NEV. L.J. %!%, %!* 
(#"!') (finding that Westlaw and Lexis lacked roughly thirty percent of reasoned decisions by judges 
in two federal district courts). Harvard Law School’s noble Caselaw Access Project claims to eliminate 
these gaps, compiling and making freely available every published decision in the history of American 
law. See CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, https://case.law [https://perma.cc/%BV'-XHZA]. But even this 
is insufficient for many legal analytics applications, since published decisions are only the tip of the 
iceberg of litigation. See Engstrom, supra note #!), at !#"(-"$ (#"!&) (studying published and 
unpublished decisions to draw conclusions on civil processes). 
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would have been as much as 0! billion.246 And that estimate doesn’t include the 
cost of updating the data pool with the tens of millions of additional documents 
filed in the federal courts each year going forward.247 In economics terms, 
PACER enjoys a natural monopoly and seems uninclined to relinquish that 
position, making it hard for new entrants to gain a foothold.248 Further, the 
magnitude of data costs suggests that, even if an entity were willing to invest, 
the tools that ultimately made it to market would not likely be made widely 
available. Indeed, the more likely outcome is that litigation’s “have nots” will 
be priced out, particularly since the value of the tool to litigation’s “haves,” and 
thus the price they are willing to pay for it, will derive at least in part from 
exclusive access to its outputs. That leaves the possibility of public sector-driven 
 
246 Michael Lissner, The Cost of PACER Data? Around One Billion Dollars, FREE L. PROJECT 
(Oct. !", #"!'), https://free.law/#"!'/!"/!"/the-cost-of-pacer-data-around-one-billion-dollars 
[https://perma.cc/C$HM-C%AG]. 
247 John Brinkema & J. Michael Greenwood, E-Filing Case Management Services in the US Federal 
Courts: The Next Generation: A Case Study, INT’L J. CT. ADMIN., Summer #"!%, at &, &. The problem 
is ever greater at the state level, where filings are even higher. In Florida—to choose at random a 
relatively large state—litigants filed roughly #%.% million documents, totaling about !!$ million pages, 




248 Natural monopolies are characterized by declining average costs as output increases, meaning high 
fixed and low marginal costs. PACER is an instance because the fixed costs of collecting and indexing the 
data dwarf the marginal costs of searching and sharing it over the internet. See Prateek Agarawal, Natural 
Monopoly, INTELLIGENT ECONOMIST, https://www.intelligenteconomist.com/natural-monopoly 
[https://perma.cc/*DNG-Z(AE] (Feb. *, #"#"). To concretely play out PACER’s potential invulnerability 
to competition, suppose that PACER generates about 1!%" million in annual fees. This is an upper bound 
for recent years. Compare U.S. CTS., FY #"#" CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REQUEST: JUDICIARY 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FUND !!.# tbl.!!.! (#"!$), https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/
governance-judicial-conference/congressional-budget-request [https://perma.cc/GQJ*-X$BN] (reporting 
fiscal year #"!$ and #"#" estimates of 1!)*.* million in “Estimated Receipts and Prior Year Recoveries” for 
the “EPA Program” (the “Electronic Public Access” program), which encompasses PACER) with U.S. CTS., 
FY #"## CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REQUEST: JUDICIARY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FUND !!.# 
tbl.!!.! (#"#!), https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/governance-judicial-conference/congressional
-budget-request [https://perma.cc/*Z'Q-%FNW] (reporting 1!%'.( million in the same category for fiscal 
year #"#" and estimating 1!)).% million for fiscal years #"#! and #"##). If a competitive entrant could buy a 
stream of revenue of 1!%" million for “only” 1! billion, it would be profitable to do so as long as the entrant’s 
next-best investment yielded returns below !%%, or 1!%" million. This, of course, ignores operating costs, but 
there is reason to think such costs, including data warehousing and bandwidth, would be low. See Lissner, 
supra note #)', at n.& (estimating a cost of 1!#(,""" annually for data warehousing); Comparing Bandwidth 
Costs of Amazon, Google and Microsoft Cloud Computing, ARADOR (May &, #"!*), 
https://arador.com/ridiculous-bandwidth-costs-amazon-google-microsoft [https://perma.cc/R$ZB-YT&Z] 
(suggesting bandwidth costs of roughly 1!"" per TB per month). But, as noted previously, the entity would 
also have to download from PACER tens of millions of additional documents each year. And there is no 
guarantee—indeed, plenty of reason to doubt—that PACER would continue to operate if a competitor 
gobbled up its revenue stream. With no PACER, there would be no bulk source of federal court data. And 
this ignores the possibility that new entrants would appear; once they have sunk the entry costs, price 
competition could render all providers unprofitable. 
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reform, perhaps as a result of litigation challenging PACER’s policies or 
because the Judicial Conference or Congress steps in.249 Short of this, however, 
data limitations may well place a ceiling on predictive forum selection. 
A second way that predictive analytics applied to forum selection might 
fail the APU criterion derives from a particular kind of endogeneity. Using 
predictive analytics to drive forum selection decisions might well cause 
changes in litigant behavior that erode any initial accuracy or usefulness. This 
is an instance of the “Lucas critique”—named for economist and Nobel 
laureate Robert Lucas.250 Put in simplest terms, systematic patterns in 
litigation outcomes re-ect endogenous strategic behavior by litigants. 
Patterns revealed by deployment of predictive analytics methods can be 
expected to induce behavior changes as a result of the use of predictive analytics 
methods themselves. This, in turn, might destroy the future accuracy of the very 
prediction methods that drove the change in behavior. 
Here’s an example of how the Lucas critique problem might operate. One 
core feature of concern to litigants is the amount of time a case takes to wend 
its way to the +nish line. If predictive analytics indicate that a particular 
forum is better for parties with the ability to select it, then parties will -ock 
to this “magnet” forum, clogging up its docket, thereby slowing down all 
litigation there. The opposite will happen in “source” forums. In principle, 
Congress could respond to such a result by increasing the number of 
judgeships in magnet forums. But that would take time, and it presumes that 
Congress would act for e.ciency’s sake, which may not be realistic given the 
current political climate around judgeships.251 This example of source-magnet 
dynamics shows how behavioral changes could endogenously reduce the value 
of the information gained. 
 
249 See Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note &, at #(% (proposing a “public option” legal tech tool 
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See Nat’l Veterans Legal Servs. Program v. United States, $'( F.&d !&)", !&%" (Fed. Cir. #"#") (holding that 
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Peter DiCola, Rachel Davis Mersey, Charlotte S. Alexander, Kristian J. Hammond & Luís A. Nunes 
Amaral, How to Build a More Open Justice System, &'$ SCIENCE !&), !&' (#"#") (“[O]rganizations outside 
government should directly purchase and publicize court records.”). 
250 See Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique, ! CARNEGIE-
ROCHESTER CONF. SERIES ON PUB. POL’Y !$, )!-)# (!$*') (“[U]nannounced sequences of policy 
decisions . . . appear[] to be beyond the capability not only of the current-generation models, but of 
conceivable future models as well.”). 
251 See, e.g., Hasen, supra note #&# (discussing the increased polarization of the judiciary). 
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A third issue, which also re-ects endogeneity, operates prior to the Lucas 
critique problem. Ever since Priest and Klein’s seminal article, it has been a 
commonplace assumption that the set of cases that make it to judgment is 
systematically selected.252 Some cases settle before trial, and it is unlikely to 
be random which ones do.253 A reasonable conclusion to draw is that cases for 
which we observe litigation outcomes di,er from cases that settle before those 
outcomes would be observed, as well as from cases in which those outcomes 
never would be observed. 
To make this more concrete, suppose parties have access to two forum 
options, A and B, of roughly equal size. All cases are diversity cases, and each 
involves one Forum A party and one Forum B party. Without predictive 
analytics, suppose it is essentially random where cases are heard in the sense 
that the plainti, just +les where she lives, and defendants move to transfer in 
some but not all cases. Now assume that some defendants gain access to 
predictive analytics. They +nd that motions to dismiss are granted $"% of the 
time in tort cases heard in Forum A but only #"% of the time in Forum B. 
With predictive analytics, (i) all tort defendants will decline to seek transfer 
out of Forum A and (ii) all tort defendants will seek transfer out of Forum B. 
In short, the advent of predictive analytics causes many more tort cases to be 
heard in Forum A, and many fewer in Forum B. But !#(b)($) grant rates will 
remain three times greater in Forum A only if the cases newly litigated in 
Form A are similar to those previously heard there. If, however, pre-analytics 
Forum B tort cases were stronger or better pleaded than in Forum A, then 
the grant rate will not be $"%. Because the parties’ strategic choices will shape 
 
252 See George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, !&& J. LEGAL 
STUD. !, ) (!$()) (presenting a model in which the determinants of litigation are purely economic, 
such as direct costs of litigation and rational estimates of the outcome). For more recent revisions, 
see Daniel M. Klerman & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Inferences from Litigated Cases, )& J. LEGAL STUD. 
#"$, #!!-!# (#"!)) (discussing the impact of pro-plainti, and pro-defendant legal standards on 
litigation); Jonah B. Gelbach, The Reduced Form of Litigation Models and the Plainti% ’s Win Rate, '! 
J.L. & ECON. !#%, !%" (#"!() [hereinafter Gelbach, Reduced Form] (demonstrating the .exibility of 
the Priest-Klein framework); Eric Helland, Daniel Kerman & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Maybe there Is No 
Bias in the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, !*) J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. !)&, !)&-
)) (#"!() (analyzing data from contingent-fee lawyers in New York); Jonah B. Gelbach, 
Commentary, Maybe There is No Bias in the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, !*) J. INSTITUTIONAL 
& THEORETICAL ECON. !*!, !*! (#"!() (arguing that the data “indicate considerably less similarity 
across adjudicated and settled cases” than previously believed). 
253 This same logic can be applied in other areas of pre-trial litigation, including, e.g., !#(b)(') 
and summary judgment. With respect to the !#(b)(') stage, see, e.g., Gelbach, supra note #!', and 
Issacharoff & Miller, supra note #!'; with respect to summary judgment, see Jonah B. Gelbach, 
Rethinking Summary Judgment Empirics: The Life of the Parties, !'# U. PA. L. REV. !''& (#"!)). Other 
examples include removal, see, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes 
Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, (& CORNELL L. REV. 
%(! (!$$(), and patent litigation, see, e.g., Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, !#! YALE L.J. )*", %!) (#"!!). 
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observed outcomes, it will be di.cult to lay down clear and veri+able 
conditions under which win rates are predictable. 
Thus, whereas the Lucas critique suggests that initially valuable 
prediction methods will induce behavioral changes that destroy predictive 
usefulness, the selection problem Priest and Klein describe might render the 
initial predictions too inaccurate to be useful in the +rst place. Both sources 
of endogeneity support healthy skepticism of the ability of predictive 
analytics methods to “work” in guiding forum selection choices. 
Perhaps all is not lost for legal tech entrepreneurs, because analysts could 
try modeling endogenous behavior directly. Successful estimation of what 
economists call “structural models” of behavior would allow predictions that 
are robust to both the Lucas and Priest-Klein forms of endogeneity described 
above.254 But such estimation typically must rely critically on contestable 
behavioral and statistical assumptions. However, those are rarely the focus of 
predictive analytics methods, which are usually regarded as a black-box-ish 
alternative to structural modeling.255 Still, it is at least possible that, as 
predictive analytics methods proliferate and become pervasive, the system 
will reach a more-or-less stable equilibrium.256 If so, and if enough people 
behave in ways in line with what predictive analytics indicate—possibly 
because of those predictions—then the predictions may turn out to be right in 
equilibrium. So long as no large shocks hit the system, predictions would then 
be useful. But overall, the endogeneity of litigant behavior poses yet another 
 
254 Structural models “focus on distinguishing clearly between the objective[s] . . . of the 
economic agents and their opportunit[ies] . . . as de+ned by the economic environment.” Hamish 
Low and Costas Meghir, The Use of Structural Models in Econometrics, &! J. ECON. PERSPS. &&, && 
(#"!*). By using clearly stated assumptions, researchers who deploy and estimate structural models 
are able to “identify[] mechanisms that determine outcomes,” which allows them to “analyze 
counterfactual policies, quantifying impacts on speci+c outcomes as well as e,ects in the short and 
longer run.” Id. at &&-&). 
255 A researcher focused on predicting the value of a variable implicitly assumes that the 
existing pattern of behavioral relationships will persist during the period when the prediction will 
be used. This means it isn’t important why the prediction is or isn’t accurate—all that matters is the 
accuracy itself. See, e.g., Kleinberg et al., supra note &!, at )$& (“Machine learning techniques . . . 
provide a disciplined way to predict [variables].”). By contrast, structural modelling’s focus is on 
clarifying and quantifying causal mechanisms to enable useful predictions under di%erent conditions. 
See supra note #%). This is not to say there is no overlap between methods used for prediction and 
those used for causal inferences; for an example involving securities litigation, see Andrew C. Baker 
& Jonah B. Gelbach, Machine Learning and Predicted Returns for Event Studies in Securities Litigation, 
% J.L. FIN. & ACCT. #&!, #&& (#"#") (explaining that “event studies, as used in securities litigation, 
can be viewed as out-of-sample prediction problems”). 
256 In mathematical terms, the iteration of predictions and forum choices might function 
together as a “contraction mapping,” causing the system to converge to a stable equilibrium. See, e.g., 
Robert M. Brooks & Klaus Schmitt, The Contraction Mapping Principle and Some Applications, ELEC. 
J. DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS, Monograph "$, #""$, at # (explaining the contraction mapping 
principle in a way that involves conditions under which an end result “may be obtained as the limit 
of an iteration scheme” from “an arbitrary starting point”). 
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signi+cant technical barrier to the world of robojudges and robolawyers 
imagined in much of the existing legal tech literature. 
'. The Future of Forum Selection and Civil Procedure 
The above discussion provides grounds for skepticism that predictive 
forum selection will gobble up the litigation world. But it is at least possible 
that it will “work” well enough to support a robust market for its use. What 
are the implications if legal tech tools applied to forum selection turn out to 
be predictively useful, and reliably so? We address two possibilities. 
First, the emergence of robust outcome prediction tools and a consequent rise 
in digitized forum selection game-playing could revive concerns among judges—
and, eventually, rulemakers and policymakers—about “manipulable justice” and 
“unprincipled gamesmanship” that have otherwise largely fallen away within the 
American system.257 If forum-shopping lost legitimacy as an intrinsic part of the 
litigation landscape, a reformist impulse might break through. 
The opening of policy windows is rarely a given. Of particular importance 
will be the cogency of the empirical showings that can be made—about, say, the 
volume of satellite litigation or the degree to which litigation’s “haves” are 
systematically gaining advantage over its “have nots.”258 So would evidence of 
a sharpening of what some see as a worrying practice of courts openly 
competing for business by offering procedural or other carrots—a phenomenon 
that likely fueled recent patent venue reforms.259 A shift in forum shopping’s 
valence might also gain momentum from interventions elsewhere, such as 
France, where warnings about the “Ravelization of law” accompanied recent 
legislation banning judicial analytics and, indeed, imposing criminal penalties 
for their use.260 To be sure, the French reaction can be chalked up to its status 
 
257 Bassett, supra note #&!, at &((; Bookman, supra note #&* at %*$. 
258 See Ori Aronson, Forum by Coin Flip: A Random Allocation Model for Jurisdictional Overlap, 
)% SETON HALL L. REV. '&, *%-*' (#"!%) (discussing the disparities between parties with more 
resources to gather and use information in forum-shopping); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the 
Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, (" GEO. L.J. !, !) (!$$!) (“As corporations 
often have greater +nancial resources than their ‘victim’ adversaries, they are likely to be more 
e-cient at utilizing that opportunity and to win a disproportionate number of the races [to the 
courthouse of their choice].”); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of 
Forum-Shopping, (" CORNELL L. REV. !%"*, !%!!-!# (!$$%) (describing the disparities in outcome 
between cases that transfer venue and cases that stay put). 
259 See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, !'& U. PA. L. REV. '&!, '&) (#"!%) 
(describing how courts compete for patent litigants with procedural carrots); Daniel Klerman & Greg 
Reilly, Forum Selling, ($ S. CAL. L. REV. #)!, #)) (#"!') (discussing how courts cater to plaintiffs to 
attract litigants); Scott E. Atkinson, Alan C. Marco & John L. Turner, The Economics of a Centralized 
Judiciary: Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit, %# J.L. & ECON. )!!, )!!-!# (#""$) 
(studying the impact of the creation of the Federal Circuit on uniformity of outcome in patent cases). 
260 See Jason Tashea, France Bans Publishing of Judicial Analytics and Prompts Criminal Penalty, 
A.B.A. J. (June *, #"!$, !:%! PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/france-bans-and-creates-
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as a civil code country committed to ex ante codification of law.261 In common 
law systems founded on judge-made decisional law, the threat that predictive 
analytics will yield a legal realist unmasking of law’s politics and 
indeterminacies is less acute, if only because so many observers already accept 
the legal realist view.262 That said, the France example may also reflect a 
growing and more universal distrust, particularly in democratic systems, of use 
of algorithmic decisionmaking throughout society.263 
Forum shopping’s demotion will be important because it is likely to be a 
precondition of a second possible consequence: with forum-shopping’s 
valence -ipped in the judicial or legislative mind, either type of actor might 
take action to reform the system. Congress could, à la France, prohibit use of 
predictive analytics for forum selection purposes. It could also revise the 
federal venue statute to narrow or outright eliminate transfers on pure 
convenience grounds. Either of these approaches, however, brings obvious 
challenges. The former would be hard, if not impossible, to police. The latter 
would be hard to maneuver through the current Congress, or any Congress, 
since any constriction of venue transfer would systematically disadvantage 
defendants, often corporate ones.264 
 
criminal-penalty-for-judicial-analytics [https://perma.cc/KJG%-A*KG] (reporting that France 
imposed a criminal penalty of up to +ve years in prison for publication of judicial analytics). The 
legislative episode was somewhat more complex than the American legal press suggested, as France 
+rst passed a pioneering law establishing fully open court data and then, when judges balked, enacted 
the prohibition. Alschner, supra note *( (manuscript at !#). 
261 J. Lyn Entrikin, The Death of Common Law, )# HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y &%!, )&&-)& (#"!$) 
(providing a comprehensive overview of the distinction between common law and civil law legal systems). 
262 Id. at ))#-)& (noting di,erences in “constraints on judicial discretion” and “legal 
development” across the two systems, with common law systems following an “incremental” and 
“case by case” approach that embraces judicial policymaking, and civil law systems adhering to the 
idea that judicial decisions are “persuasive but never binding” and a “‘gloss’ [on] codi+ed law,” with 
the code providing the “authentic statement of fundamental principle” (quoting F.H. Lawson, A 
Common Law Lawyer Looks at Codi!cation, # INTER-AM. L. REV. !, % (!$'"))); see also Antonin Scalia, 
Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the 
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION !" (Amy Gutmann ed., new ed. #"!() 
(“It is only in this [#"th] century, with the rise of legal realism, that we came to acknowledge that 
judges in fact ‘make’ the common law . . . .”). 
263 See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS 
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (#"!') (discussing the problems of privacy and 
transparency in an increasingly tech-driven society). 
264 See supra note #%( and accompanying text. Equally unlikely, and more the stuff of academic 
inquiry, is a statutorily prescribed randomized allocation system. See Aronson, supra note #%(, at '' 
(proposing a lottery system allocate cases among jurisdictions). Still another possibility is that 
Congress could enact a federal choice-of-law statute to reduce the advantage plaintiffs can gain by 
filing in a forum to get their preferred choice of law under Van Dusen. Note, however, some problems. 
Many have questioned whether choice of law is amenable to statutory codification at all, and most 
proposals coming out of the last round of anxiety about forum-shopping, in the !$$"s, advanced a 
thicket of competing canons tailored to specific subjects or types of collisions between legal rules. See, 
e.g., Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, $" COLUM. L. REV. #**, &##-)" (!$$") (recommending 
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Instead, the most likely procedural response to an escalation in e,ective 
predictive forum selection practices will come from judges, not legislators. 
And given this, the most likely intervention over the near- to medium-term 
will not take the form of legislative amendments to the venue rules but rather 
a regime of disclosure, via judicial demands for litigants’ machine outputs. 
What, precisely, would this look like? Consider several options. Judges 
facing a transfer motion could require the parties to disclose the fact of their 
use of predictive analytics. More aggressively, parties could be required to 
disclose to all sides, including the judge, their models’ predictions for each 
forum they considered. Most aggressive of all would be a requirement that a 
party who uses predictive analytics give direct access to the programs and/or 
code used to generate predictions. Disclosure could, in turn, lead to the 
crafting of new rules, whether by judges or via the rulemaking process, 
distinguishing types of reasons surfaced via predictive analytics. Some 
predictions could be treated as affirmative reasons for transfer, akin to reduced 
litigation costs. That would make sense in the case of timing-related 
predictions. After all, it may be less costly to litigate in a district where, all else 
equal, the case moves more quickly. By contrast, predictions related to who 
will win dispositive motions relate to a zero-sum variable, so the associated 
“convenience” for one party is “inconvenience” for the other. The case for 
transfer in such cases turns importantly on distributional considerations—
which party do we want to favor?—rather than on efficiency-based arguments. 
In the current political climate, a judge-made disclosure regime is more 
realistic than Congress tweaking the venue statute, but it is also, in a system 
founded upon adversarialism, more bracing. Compelled disclosure of 
machine outputs or source code would implicate the anti-free-riding 
justi+cation for work product protection.265 For now, however, it is worth 
noting that there remain many further questions about whether and when a 
disclosure regime would make sense as a policy matter. 
For instance, a threshold question—and one we also return to later—is 
whether judge-litigant or litigant-litigant information asymmetry is the 
critical challenge. In cases with sophisticated, well-+nanced parties on all 
sides, perhaps adversarialism will take care of judge-litigant information 
 
a series of different canons for different types of cases); see also LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF 
LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS !'!-'*, !(%-($ (!$$!) (evaluating reciprocity 
requirements, uniform legislation and the restatements published by the American Law Institute as 
potential “choice of law solutions”); Gottesman, supra note #%(, at ! (suggesting legislative enactment 
of choice of law rules for multistate litigation). The bigger problem is that a unified choice-of-law 
regime might not accomplish much if, as noted previously, predictive forum selection proves most 
useful in exploiting the ideology-inflected decisions of an increasingly politicized judiciary and 
demographically sorted jury pools. See supra notes #&!–#&& and accompanying text. After all, these 
choices operate within law’s interstices; they do not depend on choices among legal rules. 
265 We systematically address issues related to the work product doctrine momentarily, in Section II.C. 
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asymmetry. If both sides have access to the same quality predictions, then at 
least one of them will have the incentive to inform the court that predictive 
analytics likely motivates the quest for a change of venue. Thus, litigant-
litigant information asymmetry—itself likely to result from litigant-litigant 
resource asymmetry—is ultimately the source of judge-litigant information 
asymmetry. This interesting result indicates that predictive forum selection, 
if it comes to be disfavored, likely requires active policing by judges only in 
the presence of signi+cant litigant resource disparities—that is, only when 
litigation’s “haves” and “have nots” face o,. 
Another key policy question is whether compelled disclosure would chill 
use of predictive analytics for forum selection and whether we should care. For 
example, disclosure might induce some defendants—particularly those with 
pre-existing knowledge about a “magnet” district’s desirability—not to use 
predictive analytics at all. Our hunch is that this should not matter: It is in 
middle-ground cases where forum choices are less obvious that defendants 
would use analytics even when forced to disclose, and these are, by 
construction, the cases where analytics are likely most valuable to defendants. 
Even so, more thinking will clearly be required to work through the costs (e.g., 
distributive concerns across litigation’s “haves” and “have nots”) as against its 
benefits (e.g., earlier and potentially socially efficient settlements266). That 
cost-benefit comparison, and the many other research questions flagged above, 
will provide fruitful avenues for further inquiry as predictive forum selection 
tools improve and their procedural regulation comes into clearer focus. 
C. From Borrowed Wits to Borrowed Bits: Legal Tech and the Work Product 
Doctrine 
This section turns to an issue that has lurked in the background of the 
analysis to this point: the treatment of legal tech tools, including TAR and 
predictive forum selection tools but also tools that perform advanced legal 
analytics, under the work product doctrine. 
 
266 Suppose predictive analytics tells its users where each party is most likely to win. One view 
might be that it involves nothing but a redistribution from plainti,s to defendants. But that’s too 
facile. After transfer, both parties might become certain the defendant would win, so the case is 
likely to settle, reducing both private and public litigation costs. Presumably the settlement would 
be on poor terms for the plainti,, so now we have a tradeo, between normative considerations 
related to the plainti, ’s loss of bargaining power and litigation-cost considerations related to early 
settlement. Such e,ects on settlement behavior greatly complicate any attempt to predict the net 
bene+ts of changes in litigation policy. See Jonah B. Gelbach, Can the Dark Arts of the Dismal Science 
Shed Light on the Empirical Reality of Civil Procedure?, # STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. ##&, #$# (#"!)) 
(discussing the problems with employing empirical research to evaluate changes to procedural 
questions); Jonah B. Gelbach, Rethinking Summary Judgment Empirics: The Life of the Parties, !'# U. 
PA. L. REV. !''&, !''(-'$ (#"!)) (describing empirical evidence consistent with the claim that 
parties change their settlement demands in response to changes in the context of the trial). 
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!. Information and Adversarialism: Reframing Legal Tech’s Distributive 
Costs 
Legal tech, we noted way back in Part I, is likely a double-edged sword as 
a distributive matter. On one hand, it can narrow adversarial inequities by 
providing a force multiplier to under-resourced counsel and by making legal 
redress available to categories of claimants who are not served, or poorly 
served, within the current system.267 On the other hand, legal tech can deepen 
distributive divides because, among other things, the “haves” may be better 
positioned to capture legal tech’s e.ciencies and then use them to deploy 
more law, and deploy law more e,ectively, against the “have nots” rather than 
the other way around.268 
These are important and interesting possibilities that will surely repay 
further research as legal tech proliferates. But command of the full landscape 
of legal tech and some of its technical possibilities and limits also permits a 
more focused and concrete set of claims about legal tech’s likely distributive 
consequences. In particular, virtually every tool in the legal tech toolkit 
aspires to confer on users better information than their adversaries—about 
the best forum in which to litigate, the most damaging documents in a vast 
production, the likelihood of winning before this judge or jury, and the best 
arguments to lay before either actor to get there. It follows that, as various 
tools within the legal tech toolkit improve, and if only the “haves” can access 
the best of them, one could expect a widening of information asymmetries—
whether in particular litigation areas, or even across the system as a whole—
that will exacerbate, rather than mitigate, distributive concerns and permit 
some groups to systematically win out over others. 
Consider two concrete examples. First, a key question in emerging e-
discovery debates is whether TAR increases or decreases gaming and abuse.269 
TAR’s champions hold that it can replace human subjectivity and bias with the 
 
267 See supra notes !"!–!"%, !&!–!&% and accompanying text. 
268 Id. 
269 For an overview of longstanding debate about discovery abuse’s prevalence, see Linda S. 
Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for 
Unfounded Rulemaking, )' STAN. L. REV. !&$& (!$$)). Empirical studies have also surveyed the debate. 
See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWS. & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., 
INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK 
FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM ) (#""(), https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/interim_report_
final_for_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/W*BH-A$&D] (reporting that )%% of lawyers surveyed believed 
discovery abuse occurred in “almost every case”); INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL 
SYS., CIVIL CASE PROCESSING IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A #!ST CENTURY ANALYSIS )' 
(#""$) (finding discovery sanctions are filed in about three percent of cases and imposed in twenty-six 
percent of the cases in which they were filed); LEE & WILLING, supra note !%#, at !) (same). 
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“mechanical objectivity” of a machine.270 TAR also leaves a decisionmaking 
trail with methods and models and, taking a page from the wider algorithmic 
accountability literature, means that litigants must “show their work” in ways 
that can increase transparency relative to analog approaches.271 However, TAR 
may also increase gaming opportunities.272 Indeed, better-heeled parties can 
construct seed sets and make modeling choices they know will yield fewer 
relevant documents and exclude especially harmful ones. Many of these 
artifices, embedded deep in code, will likely go unnoticed and unchallenged, 
particularly where less sophisticated parties sit on the other side. Even where 
sophisticated litigants negotiate ex ante a protocol governing seed set 
construction, statistical methods, and back-end evaluation and validation 
techniques,273 the opacity of algorithmic outputs and the hands-on nature of 
training and tuning machine learning models can deprive TAR systems of 
basic “contestability.”274 Far from bringing transparency and “mechanical 
objectivity,” automated discovery might breed more abuse, and prove less 
amenable to oversight, than an analog system built upon “eyes-on” review. 
A second example focuses on a type of legal tech tool that has not yet 
occupied much of the discussion to this point: legal analytics tools that help 
a litigant predict a case’s resolution, not for forum-shopping purposes, but to 
inform a party’s settlement calculus and litigation strategy once a case sits 
before a particular judge. These tools, we noted previously, are currently most 
advanced in technical, self-contained areas of law like tax and employment, 
but they are likely to branch out, particularly as entities with privileged data 
access—large, repeat institutional players like Walmart, or law +rms that 
specialize in particular litigation—use their privileged access to data to 
develop potent analytics tools in less siloed areas.275 The distributive concern 
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analog versions. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom & Daniel E. Ho, Algorithmic Accountability in the 
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275 See supra notes !)"–!)) and accompanying text. 
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these tools raise draws from the long literature on settlement bargaining, 
emphasizing the idea that litigation’s “haves” will have more precise 
information about the likely outcome of the case and the best arguments to 
lay before the judge to get there. If true, will superior information yield 
settlement bargaining power over those with less? 
This is a harder question than it might seem at +rst blush. Standard 
Coasean models of litigation and settlement are of little use because they 
assume that parties have common knowledge of one another’s beliefs about 
who would win if the case does not settle.276 This does not describe one-sided 
use of legal tech, whose very purpose is to improve the (paying) party’s 
information.277 More apposite are a family of models that involve one-sided 
asymmetric information and some form of equilibrium bargaining.278 Taken 
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real-world litigation were characterized by such extreme circumstances, one would expect the litigation process 
to unravel down to the demand-letter moment, with no cases filed at all in equilibrium. Casey & Niblett, 
however, do not have a demand-letter stage, i.e., plaintiffs have to file suit to have a chance to receive a 
settlement. Accordingly, this otherwise interesting model is somewhat limited in its utility for understanding 
how algorithmic predictions might affect the nuts-and-bolts of pre-trial procedure. 
278 See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Litigation and settlement under imperfect information, !% RAND 
J. ECON. )"), )!) (!$()) (showing how the informational asymmetry between the parties could 
in.uence settlement decisions or lead to a failure to settle); Klerman & Lee, supra, note #%#, at #!!-
!# (showing that under asymmetric information models, the proportion of plainti, victories varies 
in predictable fashion with the legal standard, legal decision makers, and case characteristics); Ivan 
P’ng, Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care, &) J. PUB. ECON. '!, '#-'& (!$(*) (discussing the 
role of asymmetric information in settlement decisions); Jennifer Reinganum & Louise L. Wilde, 
Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs, !* RAND J. ECON. %%*, %'!-'# (!$(') 
(describing how information asymmetry about damages can a,ect settlement, even when there is 
symmetrical information about the probability of judgment). 
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at face value, these models contemplate at least some information-sharing in 
equilibrium, making them potentially useful for thinking about how changes 
in one side’s information might a,ect party outcomes. Distilled to their 
essentials and glossing over substantial complexity, these models suggest that 
defendants armed with superior information will enjoy better litigation and 
settlement outcomes than less informed plainti,s. The reason is that, without 
precise probabilities, defendants facing a slew of suits cannot tell the stronger 
cases from the weaker ones and so must settle at a weighted average of their 
probabilities. With better information about the probability of a win in each 
case, defendants can litigate the weak cases and settle the strong ones.279 More 
 
279 For an example, consider the Bebchuk screening model with informed defendants. See 
Bebchuk, supra note #*(, at )"'-"*. In this model, there are many cases, and there is a distribution 
over the plainti, ’s probability of winning in the event of trial. Thus, plainti,s are highly likely to 
win some cases and less likely to win others. The plainti, makes a settlement demand, and the 
defendant either accepts or rejects. If the defendant rejects, the case goes to trial. In each case, the 
defendant knows the probability with which the plainti, will win, but the plainti, knows only the 
overall distribution of probabilities with which plainti,s win. Thus, plainti,s must choose their 
settlement demand behind a veil of ignorance about their probability of winning. Defendants facing 
plainti,s with strong cases will accept the settlement demand, while those facing plainti,s with 
weak cases will go to trial. 
To address the possibility that legal tech allows defendants to usefully refine their beliefs about 
plaintiffs’ win probabilities, consider a set of cases in which the plaintiff ’s probability of winning is 
P; call these, “P-type cases.” Suppose that among P-type cases, some are actually the sub-type in 
which plaintiffs would win with probability Plow<P, and some are the sub-type in which plaintiffs 
would win with probability Phigh>P. We assume that without legal tech, at least some defendants in P-
type cases can’t tell the difference between Plow and Phigh cases. For these defendants, P equals a 
weighted average of Plow and Phigh (the weights are the shares of cases that are of the respective type). 
Defendants who use legal tech can always tell the difference. (We allow that there may be some 
defendants who know as much without as with legal tech. If these defendants are arrayed at the 
extremes of the type distribution, then it should be possible to construct the model such that the 
overall distribution of plaintiff win-probability types will be unaffected by the introduction of legal 
tech, which simplifies the rest of our discussion.) Thus, in our simple extension of the screening 
model, legal tech allows defendants to refine their knowledge of what would occur if the case went to 
trial. Note that the issue of whether credible voluntary disclosure is possible or desirable arises here. 
In the screening model with informed defendants, defendants benefit from being informed, because 
they get to litigate only when the plaintiff is weak. Thus, it might not be in their interests to share 
information with plaintiffs. We will assume for simplicity that no information sharing occurs. 
Assuming that the overall distribution of case types is the same with legal tech as without, 
plaintiffs have the same information as before and thus make the same settlement offers. Now suppose 
Plow is low enough that defendants would litigate a case with that probability of plaintiff ’s win, and 
let P be high enough that defendants would not litigate a case with that probability. Without legal 
tech, defendants would settle all P-type cases. With legal tech, defendants will choose to litigate those 
P-type cases that have probability Plow of plaintiff win. Plaintiffs are worse off as a result of legal tech, 
because they now have to litigate a weak case that previously would have settled for an amount pegged 
in part to the settlement value of stronger cases. What about defendants in P-type cases that have 
probability Phigh of a plaintiff win? Defendants using legal tech will continue to settle these cases, 
because Phigh>P, and we know from the no-legal-tech world that P-type cases are best settled from 
defendants’ point of view. Thus, plaintiffs in Phigh cases are unaffected by the adoption of legal tech. 
In other words, unilateral adoption of legal tech by defendants makes some defendants better off at 
the expense of their corresponding plaintiffs, and leaves all other parties unaffected. 
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research is plainly needed to say something systematic on this point, but our 
intuition—concededly contestable and not founded on a single theoretical 
framework or rigorous empirical test—is that, on balance, unilateral use of 
legal tech can be expected to bene+t the party using it, while harming less-
informed opposing parties. 
In the e-discovery context, where legal tech confers clearer advantages, a 
growing literature proposes ways to mitigate distributive concerns. Among 
the +xes are creation of an ethical duty to disclose defects in the other side’s 
TAR protocol,280 or the subjection of discovery-centered expert battles to 
Daubert constraints and Federal Rule of Evidence )"# in order to narrow 
expertise asymmetries.281 Another proposal, as noted previously, would re-
allocate seed set construction and model tuning to the requesting party—
referred to as a “task allocation” rule, to distinguish it from a “cost allocation” 
rule—as a way to mitigate the cost-externalization and cross-party-agency 
concerns that a/ict the system.282 Each of these can be thought of as a 
discovery-speci+c patch on the distributive concerns raised by the continued 
proliferation of legal tech. 
Our central claim in what follows is that, even if one or more of these silo-
speci+c +xes could work, then legal tech’s continued di,usion throughout the 
litigation system will place increasing pressure on, and often come to be 
analyzed through the lens of, a cross-cutting and critically important tenet of 
the adversarial system: the work product doctrine. In particular, if legal tech 
is unevenly distributed and is seen to confer a signi+cant advantage, then 
litigants will seek the other side’s machine outputs. What labels did you apply 
to the seed set? How much does your software say this case is worth? What 
legal arguments did your software say would be most persuasive? Faced with 
these questions, judges will increasingly be asked to decide whether and when 
the venerable work product rule should bend. 
 
280 See Remus, supra note &), at !*!' (describing the Sedona proposal to create a Rule &.) 
violation for failure to suggest a revised predictive coding protocol that captures documents known 
to be responsive); see also id. at !*!% (advocating for a broader duty to ensure that opposing party has 
access to needed technology); Endo, supra note &), at ('& (same). 
281 Note that this could raise barriers to entry to participate in discovery disputes at all. As it 
is, Federal Rule of Evidence *"# (and Daubert) typically do not apply to the pre-trial stage—though 
a growing chorus argues that it should apply to predictive coding. See, e.g., Daniel K. Gelb, The Court 
as Gatekeeper: Preventing Unreliable Pretrial c-Discovery from Jeopardizing a Reliable Fact-Finding 
Process, (& FORDHAM L. REV. !#(*, !#$* (#"!)) (arguing that courts should act as “gatekeepers” of 
e-discovery methods); David J. Waxse & Brenda Yoakum-Kriz, Experts on Computer-Assisted Review: 
Why Federal Rule of Evidence )*+ Should Apply to Their Use, %# WASHBURN L.J. #"*, ##" (#"!&) 
(“[S]earch methodologies such as computer-assisted review should be treated as an expert process 
subject to Rule *"# and Daubert challenges.”); see also Kitzer, supra note !!*, at #!% (echoing the 
“gatekeeper” view of Daubert and FED. R. EVID. *"#). 
282 See supra notes !''–!*" and accompanying text. 
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#. Hickman’s Work Product Bargain 
For better or worse, the American litigation system is a thoroughgoing 
adversarial one.283 This litigant-driven system pits the parties against one 
another on virtually all matters, but particularly discovery, by requiring the 
combatants to negotiate a mutual exchange of information in order to surface 
all claims and defenses and the materials relevant to each. The judge is called 
in only to resolve disagreements that arise during an otherwise non-public 
process. While American law is full of paeans to this adversarial approach and 
the role lawyers play within it, much of the hard work of maintaining it is a 
quiet, technocratic corner of civil procedure: the work product doctrine. First 
set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Hickman v. Taylor and inserted 
into federal and state rules of civil procedure thereafter, the work product 
doctrine protects from an adversary’s discovery those documents and other 
tangible and intangible “things” that are prepared at the direction of counsel in 
anticipation of litigation.284 Importantly, though the doctrine’s protection is 
near-absolute in cloaking attorney mental impressions and other “opinion” 
work product, it can give way with respect to other types of materials, dubbed 
“fact” work product, where the requesting party can show a compelling need.285 
The rationale for the work product doctrine is contested, but most 
accounts settle upon one of two grounds. First, the work product doctrine 
creates a “zone of privacy” within which counsel can operate free of 
interference and without worry that outputs will fall into others’ hands, thus 
permitting them to focus on zealous client representation.286 Permitting 
discovery of litigation-related materials, on this view, would lead to 
inadequate strategic preparation and recording of information.287 Much 
 
283 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW xi 
(#""!) (describing “Adversarial legalism[’s]” quick rise to prominence as a foundation of the 
American legal system after #"""). 
284 &#$ U.S. )$%, %!" (!$)*). 
285 FED. R. CIV. P. #'(b)(&)(A)(ii), #'(b)(&)(B). 
286 See Hickman, &#$ U.S. at %!"-!! (“[I]t is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree 
of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.”). 
287 See Je, A. Anderson, Gena E. Cadieux, George E. Hays, Michael B. Hingerty & Richard 
J. Kaplan, The Work Product Doctrine, '( CORNELL L. REV. *'", *(% (!$(&) (voicing conventional 
view that work product permits attorneys to develop facts and legal theories in private, and thus 
more fully). For other analyses of work product’s incentive scheme, see Ronald J. Allen, Mark F. 
Grady, Daniel D. Polsby & Michael S. Yashko, A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and 
the Work Product Doctrine, !$ J. LEGAL STUD. &%$, &%$-'" (!$$"), which describe the tension between 
the openness underlying discovery rules and the need for con+dentiality, Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, !$(! SUP. CT. 
REV. &"$, &!& (!$(!), who notes that allowing free-.owing information maximizes the wealth of both 
users but also reduces the ability of those who create the information to receive the bene+ts of their 
labor, James A. Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law of Attorney-Client Privilege: Privilege and “Work 
Product” Under Open Discovery (pt. +), )# U. DET. L.J. #%&, #*" (!$'%), who outlines the various ways 
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lawyerly judgment would remain “unwritten,” as Justice Murphy put it in 
Hickman, depriving the system of sustained and rigorous consideration of 
legal obligations and options for compliance.288 Attorneys who fear discovery 
of their outputs might also minimize the negative aspects and exaggerate the 
positive aspects of their cases. This will engender mutual (and undue) 
optimism among clients and even the lawyers themselves that can stymie 
settlement e,orts and yield ine.cient resort to full-blown trials.289 
Second, the work product rule protects against free-riding on the other side’s 
diligence. A “learned profession,” as Justice Jackson famously but somewhat 
cryptically put it in his Hickman concurrence, should not be made “to perform 
its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary.”290 Part 
of this is properly read as just a clarifying extension of the zone-of-privacy 
rationale: Attorneys may incompletely prepare their cases for fear of developing 
adverse information in the process of investigation and analysis and may even 
forego inquiry that might expose information helpful to the other side.291  
But Justice Jackson’s invocation of a “learned profession” and “borrowed 
wits” should not be read to merely restate the notion that key information 
will remain unwritten or that lawyers will over-memorialize case strengths 
and under-memorialize weaknesses. The choice of language is deliberate and 
embodies a second, and deeper, rationale: The work product doctrine creates 
the conditions necessary for a well-functioning adversarial system by 
safeguarding returns on, and thus investment in, legal talent. Viewed this way, 
free-rider constraints, lawyer privacy zones, and even the maintenance of a 
market for legal talent are not ends unto themselves. Rather, they are means 
to an ultimate and more normatively satisfying end: a legal profession with 
 
in which unlimited discovery would disturb the adversarial system, and Kathleen Waits, Work Product 
Protection for Witness Statements: Time for Abolition, !$(% WIS. L. REV. &"%, &#*-&' (!$(%, who argues 
against the assumption the removing the work-product protection would lead to a “parade of 
horribles” by removing an incentive to fully investigate. 
288 Hickman, &#$ U.S. at )$%. 
289 Edward H. Cooper, Work Product of the Rulesmakers, %& MINN. L. REV. !#'$, !#(& (!$'$) 
(arguing that “lawyers would quickly become accustomed to formulation of only the most glowing 
prospects for success,” yielding “unduly optimistic forecasts” that would in.ate client expectations 
and undermine reasonable settlements); see also Waits, supra note #(*, at &&&-&% (defending work 
product for witness statements based on fear that discovery would lead to inaccurate recording). 
290 Hickman, &#$ U.S. at %!' (Jackson, J., concurring). 
291 See Anderson et. al., supra note #(*, at *(% (arguing that without work product protection 
an attorney may be deterred from conducting thorough research out of fear that their opponent 
would bene+t more than their client); Cooper, supra note #($, at !#*$ (“[A] party who did investigate 
would be fearful of developing potentially adverse information only to have to hand it to his 
opponent.”); Leland L. Tolman, Developments in the Law—Discovery, *) HARV. L. REV. $)", !"#$ 
(!$'!) (describing how unlimited discovery could undermine the adversary system); see also CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE § #"!'(g) (West !$(&) (repealed #""%) (observing work product purpose is to 
encourage attorneys to prepare thoroughly and investigate favorable and unfavorable aspects of 
cases); OHIO R. CIV. P. #'(A) (same). 
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the skill, information, and professional authority necessary to counsel 
compliance, and accurately determine non-compliance, in an increasingly 
dense legal and regulatory system.292 The work product rule, then, is the 
cornerstone of a deeply adversarial model of law rooted in a set of 
assumptions about the self-perpetuating virtues of competition—for the 
maintenance of lawyers’ status, for the system’s truth-seeking capacity, and 
for optimizing law compliance in a complicated world. 
As with any foundational framework, the work product doctrine has not 
been immune from criticism. Some contend that incentives for preparation 
that lawyers face are so strong, and the risks of non-preparation so grave, that 
they will prepare regardless.293 An edgier criticism holds that maximal 
preparation may not be socially optimal in the +rst place, and so abolishing 
work product might just free up resources that could be better put toward 
social projects other than adjudicating disputes.294  
Sitting atop these assorted concerns, however, is a further critique of the 
work product doctrine—or, perhaps better put, a compromise baked into its 
terms from the start. Put simply, some litigants can afford better lawyers than 
others. Some litigants, it follows, will enjoy better counsel in understanding 
their legal obligations and their optimal level of compliance in a growing 
regulatory state. And, in turn, some litigants will enjoy a decided edge in their 
courthouse struggles with other litigants. The New Deal Justices and Rule 
#$(b)(')’s framers were not ignorant of these concerns.295 But they nonetheless 
 
292 See Hickman, &#$ U.S. at %!)-!% (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[I]t too often is overlooked that 
the lawyer and the law o-ce are indispensable parts of our administration of justice. Law-abiding 
people can go nowhere else to learn the ever changing and constantly multiplying rules by which 
they must behave and to obtain redress for their wrongs. The welfare and tone of the legal profession 
is therefore of prime consequence to society . . . .”) 
293 See Kathleen Waits, Opinion Work Product: A Critical Analysis of Current Law and a New 
Analytical Framework, *& OR. L. REV. &(%, )%" (!$$)) (arguing that the built-in incentives to prepare 
witnesses exceed any downsides of helping the opponent); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Work Product 
Rejected: A Reply to Professor Allen, *( VA. L. REV. $%*, $'' (!$$#) (arguing that the work product 
doctrine yields only a marginal increase in the incentive to investigate); Easterbrook, supra note #(*, 
at &%$-'! (arguing that a stronger evidentiary privilege could exacerbate the problem of 
overinvestment while making the outcome of cases less accurate); Elizabeth Thornburg, Rethinking 
Work Product, ** VA. L. REV. !%!%, !%#( (!$$!) [hereinafter Thornburg, Rethinking] (arguing that 
attorneys who rely on their opponents’ research will be less successful over time and earn poor 
reputations); but see Ronald J. Allen, Work Product Revisited: A Comment on Rethinking Work Product, 
*( VA. L. REV. $)$, $%!-%% (!$$#) (arguing against Professor Thornburg, but conceding that some 
investigation would nonetheless occur in the absence of the work product doctrine). 
294 See Easterbrook, supra note #(*, at &%$-'" (“Because the parties’ investment is in.uenced 
largely by the size of the stakes rather than by the value of the case as a precedent, they may invest 
far too much (as society sees things) in litigation.”); Thornburg, Rethinking, supra note #$&, at !%%"-
%! (“[W]ork product immunity costs society in duplicated e,orts, repeated disputes, skewed case 
outcomes, and overuse of attorneys.”). 
295 See, e.g., Luke P. Norris, Labor and the Origins of Civil Procedure, $# N.Y.U. L. REV. )'#, )''-
*" (#"!*) (arguing that one of the “central aims” of the framers of the federal rules of civil procedure 
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bracketed the work product rule’s distributive concerns—a necessary casualty 
in the service of maintaining a properly functioning adversarial scheme and 
safeguarding the competitive virtues that flow from it. 
Only once Hickman and the work product rule it inscribed in American 
civil procedure are framed in these terms and placed on their proper footing 
can one see the challenge that legal tech will pose for the adversarial system’s 
continued legitimacy and operation. While a prior generation of 
commentators declared that it would be “an intolerable intrusion on the 
bargaining process to allow one party to take advantage of the other’s 
assessment of his prospects for victory and an acceptable settlement +gure,”296 
rapid advances in legal technologies and their asymmetric deployment could 
lead in a very di,erent direction. If some litigants have access to legal tech’s 
fruits while others do not, the burning question courts will increasingly face 
is, to invoke the pun one last time, whether the civil procedure rules should 
treat “borrowed bits” the same way it treats “borrowed wits.” 
'. Work Product for a Digital Age 
Return to our two core examples: discovery battles around TAR and use 
of legal analytics tools to inform a party’s settlement calculus and litigation 
strategy. How does, or should, the work product rule apply? Can a litigant, 
particularly a resource-strapped one who lacks access to the full legal tech 
toolkit or needed data, successfully demand the other side’s machine outputs? 
Start with the question whether a party can or should be made to share a 
seed set used to train a TAR model—a question, we noted previously, that 
has divided federal courts.297 Such a request might aim to allow a requesting 
party to gauge the comprehensiveness of the responding party’s production. 
Or, as discussed previously, it might come in response to a judge’s order 
authorizing the requesting party to attach her own labels to a seed or training 
set or even to perform some or all of the work of training the model. 
On a +rst pass through the work product rule, one might conclude that a 
seed set is o,-limits because it is generated through counsel’s judgment and 
skill and, more damningly, it may re-ect counsel’s litigation strategy. At least 
one court has decided as much in the context of an in camera letter demanded 
by the court and then sought by the other side.298 A smattering of other courts 
 
was to provide “countervailing power” to the less powerful and “ensur[e] that procedural rules did not 
reflect and magnify the economic power imbalances immanent in industrial capitalism”). 
296 Cooper, supra note #($, at !#(&. 
297 See supra notes #"%–#!" and accompanying text. 
298 Winfield v. City of New York, No. !%-"%#&', #"!* WL %'')(%#, at *!# (S.D.N.Y. Nov. #*, #"!*). 
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have rejected work product claims.299 As work product claims mount in the 
TAR context, operational details and the analogies they inspire will matter. 
Some courts are apt to liken seed sets to the +nite lists of key documents and 
witnesses that an attorney might create to prep a witness for deposition, the 
situation in the leading case of Sporck v. Peil.300 This “process of selection and 
distillation,” many courts have concluded, can reveal attorney mental 
impressions and understandings of the case and so justi+es fuller, unyielding 
protection as “opinion” work product.301 In the TAR context, the Sporck 
analogy might be especially strong with seed sets created via “judgmental” 
sampling based on counsel’s weighting of particular issues or custodians, but 
not seed sets created using random sampling and thus drawn from the full 
universe of discoverable materials.302 Yet a court could also see even seed sets 
of the judgmental sort as closer to the instruction manuals used to guide 
document review teams to ensure a form of inter-coder reliability, where the 
answer is less clear,303 or liken them to a large cache of documents taken 
during a document inspection. Some courts have held these do not pose a risk 
of conveying counsel’s mental impressions or revealing other strategically 
 
299 See Hinterberger v. Catholic Health Sys., Inc., No. "(-&(", #"!& WL ##%"%$!, at *## 
(W.D.N.Y. May #!, #"!&) (“[N]either the scanning nor objective coding work required any access or 
need for such con+dential information, including attorney work product.”) Meanwhile, a trio of 
decisions from West Virginia courts found that search terms used within a predictive coding scheme 
did not constitute work product. See Burd v. Ford Motor Co., No. !&-#"$*', #"!% WL )!&*$!%, at *!" 
(S.D. W. Va. July (, #"!%) (holding that the sharing of search terms used by custodians who searched 
the defendant’s records does not amount to attorney work product); Burnett v. Ford Motor Co., No. 
!&-!)#"*, #"!% WL )!&*()*, at *!" (S.D. W. Va. July (, #"!%) (holding that search terms used by 
custodians can be disclosed without revealing substance of discussions with counsel); Johnson v. 
Ford Motor Co., No. !&-"'%#$, #"!% WL )!&**"*, at *!" (S.D. W. Va. July (, #"!%) (+nding that 
search terms and custodian names are not work product and collecting cases), objections sustained in 
part and overruled in part, No. !&-'%#$, #"!% WL '*%(#&) (S.D. W. Va. Nov. %, #"!%). 
300 *%$ F.#d &!#, &!' (&rd Cir. !$(%) (holding counsel’s selection of documents for deposition 
protected work product because the “process of selection and distillation” can “reveal important 
aspects of [an attorney’s] understanding of the case”). 
301 See, e.g., Shelton v. Am. Motors Corp., ("% F.#d !&#&, !&#(-#$ ((th Cir. !$(') (holding 
document selection protected work product because counsel “identi+ed, selected, and compiled 
documents that were signi+cant to her client’s defenses in this case”); In re Allen, !"' F.&d %(#, '"( 
()th Cir. !$$*) (concluding that counsel’s choice of materials constituted opinion work product). 
Scholars have also joined this discussion. See, e.g., Kitzer, supra note !!*, at #!" (arguing that seed 
sets may fall under the work product doctrine); Sean Grammel, Comment, Protecting Search Terms 
as Opinion Work Product: Applying the Work Product Doctrine to Electronic Discovery, !'! U. PA. L. REV. 
#"'&, #"'' (#"!&) (arguing that search terms deserve protection as work product). 
302 See John M. Facciola & Philip J. Favro, Safeguarding the Seed Set: Why Seed Set Documents 
May Be Entitled to Work Product Protection, ( FED. CTS. L. REV. !, $ (#"!%) (arguing that only the 
seed sets developed through judgmental sampling should merit work product protection); Christian, 
supra note &), at %!!-!( (arguing that judgmental seed sets are analogous to search terms). 
303 See Kitzer, supra note !!*, at #!!(“[T]eaching the predictive coding software to identify 
relevant documents is indistinguishable from teaching contract attorneys to do the same by using 
an instruction manual or examples of relevant documents.”). 
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valuable information because of the sheer amount of material.304 In the TAR 
context, a court might even go so far as to shunt a dispute over seed sets into 
the separate realm of “discovery about discovery,” where the usual discovery 
rules, including work product, are relaxed when addressing an assertion 
reasonably questioning another party’s discovery compliance.305 
Even less obvious is whether the work product rule applies to legal tech 
tools beyond discovery, such as those that predict case outcomes. For starters, 
machine outputs attaching probabilities to di,erent case outcomes need not 
take documentary or “tangible” forms, but rather can be requested via 
interrogatories, thus pushing a court’s inquiry into the common-law realm of 
Hickman, or perhaps Rule #$(b)(*)’s provision regarding non-testifying 
experts, but perhaps not Hickman’s partial codi+cation in Rule #$(b)(').306 
More fundamentally, a legal analytics tool that requires no more than that 
counsel feed in the pleadings and papers to date, or a tool primed by inputting 
only a set of rote case facts, does not involve substantial lawyerly judgment or 
effort, at least for the particular litigation in question. At best, such a tool may 
qualify only for Rule #$(b)(')(A)’s lower, qualified protection reserved for 
“fact” work product.307 Where that threshold determination has been made, a 
party must show both “substantial need” for the information and “undue 
hardship” in obtaining its equivalent elsewhere. While courts carefully 
scrutinize claims of inconvenience and resource constraints in judging 
 
304 See Disability Rts. Council of Greater Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., #)# F.R.D. 
!&$, !)!-)) (D.D.C. #""*) (“[W]ith the number of those documents said to be totaling into the 
thousands, it would be di-cult to conceive that Plainti,s’ trial strategy could be gleaned solely 
by . . . disclosure of the documents selected.”); In re Shell Oil Re+nery, !#% F.R.D. !&#, !&) (E.D. 
La. !$($) (“[I]t is highly unlikely that [defendant] will be able to discern the [plainti, ’s] ‘theory of 
the case’ or thought processes simply by knowing which '%,""" documents out of ''",""" 
documents have been selected for copying.”). See generally Christian, supra note &), at %!' (discussing 
how the size of the document production in question may a,ect the judicial calculus in determining 
the applicability of the work product rule). 
305 For an overview of this “process-directed discovery” and arguments for and against treating 
it separately, see Craig B. Sha,er, Deconstructing “Discovery About Discovery,” !$ SEDONA CONF. J. 
#!%, ##" (#"!(). 
306 For old and new commentary on the rules governing tangible and intangible work product, 
see Kevin Clermont, Surveying Work Product, '( CORNELL L. REV. *%%, *%* (!$(&), and Michael A. 
Blaise, The Uncertain Foundation of Work Product, '* DEPAUL L. REV. &%, %) (#"!*). 
307 This is important because many courts hold that “opinion” work product is never 
discoverable, elevating the work-product doctrine to something approaching an absolute privilege. 
See In re Murphy, %'" F.#d &#', &&' ((th Cir. !$**) (“[O]pinion work product enjoys a nearly 
absolute immunity and can be discovered only in very rare and extraordinary circumstances.”); 
Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., $*' F.#d %*&, %** ($th Cir. !$$#) (requiring “a 
compelling need” to obtain material otherwise considered opinion work product); Duplan Corp. v. 
Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, %"$ F.#d *&", *&) ()th Cir. !$*)) (“[N]o showing of relevance, 
substantial need or undue hardship should justify compelled disclosure of an attorney’s mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories.”). 
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“hardship,”308 a party can readily make out the necessary showing where a deep-
pocketed, repeat-player litigant enjoys privileged access to data, making 
replication of an analysis more of a factual impossibility309 than a situation 
raising thornier questions about the amount of expense310 or the parties’ relative 
resources.311 The “need” showing, however, may prove more of a sticking point, 
at least in the short-term. While the implementations vary, courts typically 
require that the evidence in question be “essential” or “crucial” to the moving 
party’s case.312 This is a plastic requirement for sure, but also one that would 
need to stretch considerably to include machine outputs, at least given the 
current state of the technology.313 Faced with these complexities, some courts 
have split the difference on both “hardship” and “need” by requiring cost-
sharing. In one particularly apposite case, a constitutional challenge to the City 
of Chicago’s practice of making custodial arrests even for fine-only violations, 
 
308 A standard formulation is that “hardship” requires a demonstration that it is “significantly more 
difficult, time-consuming or expensive to obtain the information from another source than from factual 
work product of the objecting party.” Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., #*! F.R.D. %(, (! (S.D.N.Y. #"!"). 
309 See, e.g., Castaneda v. Burger King Corp., #%$ F.R.D. !$), !$* (N.D. Cal. #""$) (holding 
that a request for pre-renovation measurements of a restaurant that was already under construction 
satis+ed the requirement of undue hardship); Fisher v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. !!-&&$', #"!# 
WL #&**#"", at *' (E.D. Cal. June ##, #"!#) (+nding undue hardship in securing the contents of an 
incident report when both the sole witness and the plainti, herself had no memory of the incident). 
310 See, e.g., Carr v. C.R. Bard, Inc., #$* F.R.D. &#(, &&) (N.D. Ohio #"!)) (holding that the 
plainti, did not face undue hardship, because replication of a report was within the plainti, ’s 
means); In re Experian Data Breach Litig., No. !%-"!%$#, #"!* WL )&#%%(&, at *& (C.D. Cal. May !(, 
#"!*) (“A showing of expense or inconvenience to Plainti,s in hiring an expert to perform the same 
analysis isn’t su-cient to overcome the protection of the work product doctrine.”); Martin v. Bally’s 
Park Place Hotel & Casino, $(& F.#d !#%#, !#'& (&d Cir. !$$&) (+nding a machine test enjoyed work-
product protection because the party seeking to compel its production had the “technical capability” 
to replicate the analysis and the “resources necessary” to do so would not be “prohibitive”). The 
most “have not”-friendly approach compares the cost of reproduction to the cost of securing the 
materials from the opposing party. See Sec. & Exchange Comm’n v. Thrasher, No. $#-'$(*, !$$% 
WL )''(! (S.D.N.Y. Feb. *, !$$%). 
311 See, e.g., Burrow v. Forjas Taurus S.A., &&) F. Supp. &d !###, !#&!-&# (S.D. Fla. #"!() (pointing 
to the moving party’s relative lack of knowledge of the steps required to reproduce the requested analysis 
and needed “facilities, equipment, technology, staffing, and expertise” in compelling production). 
312 Many courts interpret this to require that the information the party seeks is “an essential 
element” in its case, or of “great probative value on contested issues,” that cannot be contained 
elsewhere. Fletcher v. Union Pac. R.R., !$) F.R.D. ''', '*! (S.D. Cal. #"""); Nat’l Cong. for Puerto 
Rican Rts. v. City of N.Y., !$) F.R.D. !"%, !!" (S.D.N.Y. #"""). Importantly, “need” is typically separate 
from hardship and keyed to the importance of the information to the party’s prosecution of her case 
and, in particular, required evidentiary showings. See, e.g., Local *"& v. Regions Fin. Corp., No. !#-!%'!, 
#"!# WL !&"#*%*#, at *) (S.D. Cal. Sep. !!, #"!#) (finding a lack of “substantial need for the particular 
information sought, beyond [the] need to reduce . . . investigative costs by riding on [the opposing 
party’s] coattails”) (internal citation omitted). This makes application to machine outputs an awkward 
one. The outputs of an outcome-prediction tool might aid a party’s prosecution of a litigation by, for 
instance, informing its settlement calculus, but it is not evidence to be adduced at trial. 
313 See supra notes ''–$* and accompanying text (surveying the current limits of NLP-based 
legal tech tools, particularly those that perform outcome prediction). 
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the court compelled plaintiffs’ production of an arrest database that was not yet 
the basis of expert testimony or evidence, but conditioned its disclosure on the 
City paying half the cost of its compilation.314 
Rule #$(b)(')’s terms bring still other complexities. Even in cases where 
need or hardship cannot be shown, it is possible that advanced legal analytics 
tools will not qualify for work-product protection in the +rst place if found 
not to have been created “in anticipation of litigation.”315 Legal analytics tools 
that predict case outcomes might involve substantial attorney e,ort during 
their development—including months or even years of intense, lawyerly 
e,ort to manually construct computationally useable legal ontologies and 
labeling data316—but little to no e,ort in their subsequent deployment 
beyond inputting pleadings and papers and a keystroke. The real work of 
developing legal ontologies and training and tuning ML models happens 
miles upstream, far removed from the particular case. True, FTC v. Grolier, 
one of the Supreme Court’s rare explorations of work product since Hickman, 
squarely held that work product protection extends beyond the speci+c 
litigation for which the materials were prepared.317 The question is how far. 
Temporal proximity did not matter in Grolier. As Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence explained, materials related to hundreds or even thousands of 
“essentially similar” enforcement actions brought by government agencies, or 
the stream of cases of the “commonly recurring type” facing private sector 
insurers, manufacturers, and employers, could still reveal mental processes 
and tactical approaches relevant to current actions long after those litigations 
have ended.318 However, a legal analytics tool feels distant from a particular 
case in more than just a temporal sense. While concededly designed for no 
other purpose than to counsel clients in litigation, such a tool will have been 
 
314 Portis v. City of Chi., No. "#-&!&$, #"") WL !%&%(%), at *' (N.D. Ill. July *, #"")). 
315 The general rule is that a document was prepared “in anticipation of litigation” if it prepared 
or obtained “because of” the prospect of litigation. However, courts vary in the stringency with which 
they apply that rule. Cf. United States v. Adlman, !&) F.&d !!$), !#"# (#d Cir. !$$() (holding document 
must have been “prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation”); In re Sealed Case, !)' 
F.&d ((!, (() (!$$() (“[T]he lawyer must at least have had a subjective belief that litigation was a real 
possibility, and that belief must have been objectively reasonable.”); United States v. Davis, '&' F.#d 
!"#(, !")" (%th Cir. !$(!) (applying work product protection only where the “primary motivating 
purpose behind the creation of the document was to aid in possible future litigation”). 
316 For discussion, see supra notes ''–$* and accompanying text. 
317 )'# U.S. !$ (!$(&). The other notable work product case is United States v. Nobles, )## U.S. 
##%, #&(-&$ (!$*%), which made clear that Hickman’s common-law protection of work product extends 
to non-attorneys performing work for attorneys, one of several ambiguities that emerged following 
Hickman. Blaise, supra note &"', at %). 
318 Grolier, )'# U.S. at &"-&! (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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created neither in the midst of nor in anticipation of any particular litigation, 
but rather for use in future litigations in only the most general sense.319 
Moving outside Rule #$(b)(')’s text, judicial willingness to narrow the 
work product rule’s ambit may stem from the fact that legal tech tools +t 
awkwardly with several of the rule’s key normative underpinnings. For 
instance, legal tech tools pose little risk that compelled disclosure will cause 
counsel to shade outputs—that is, over-emphasizing the positive, or 
underemphasizing the negative—that is central to the “zone of privacy” view. 
Similarly, concerns about free-riding, “borrowed wits,” and the need to 
maintain a market for legal talent have little purchase when it comes to 
software investments. Indeed, one could argue just the opposite: a rule that 
rewards technological investments may do as much to shrink the market for 
legal talent, at least of the human variety, as it does to bolster it. Finally, there 
is the fact, noted at length previously,320 that legal tech tools do not 
principally perform, at least for the moment, higher-order legal cognitions. 
Many legal tech tools are about jockeying for advantage in ways that sit 
outside the conventional core of litigation judgment, attorney-client 
communication, and law compliance. A purely machine output that compares 
the likelihood of prevailing in forum X as opposed to forum Y based mostly 
on “external” factors—including docket loads, or the political and ideological 
predispositions of judge and jury—is not likely to strike judges as the kind of 
information production that the work product rule is designed to promote. 
Commentators have long called for pruning of the work product doctrine—
removing business advice321 or compliance322 from its ambit. As distributive 
concerns mount, legal tech tools may create similar pressure. 
The above analysis is, at best, a cursory mapping of some possible fault lines 
within a sprawling doctrinal landscape. More thinking is needed. This is 
particular so because, among the three case studies offered herein, the future of 
the work product doctrine is plainly the wildcard, both because of Rule #$(b)(')’s 
 
319 Cf. Prater v. Consol. Rail Corp., #*# F. Supp. #d *"', *"( (N.D. Ohio #""&) (holding that 
a study of employee repetitive stress complaints, though performed at counsel’s direction, were 
business and not legal work, despite being motivated by past lawsuits and risk of future lawsuits). 
Another analogous case is United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, %** F.&d #!, #%-#' (!st Cir. 
#""$), in which the en banc First Circuit faced a work product claim by a company against an IRS 
e,ort to obtain the company’s analysis of the “hazards of litigation percentages,” a calculation of 
probabilities that its tax positions would prevail if challenged by the IRS used by auditors to ensure 
su-cient reserves have been set aside. The First Circuit rejected the work product claim, +nding 
that the documents were not created “because of ” litigation but rather would have been created in 
the ordinary course of its compliance with auditor and securities +ling requirements. 
320 See supra notes ''–$* and accompanying text. 
321 See, e.g., Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Taking the Business Out of Work Product, *$ 
FORDHAM L. REV. !('$, !(*) (#"!!). 
322 See, e.g., Christine Parker, Lawyer Deregulation via Business Deregulation: Compliance 
Professionalism and Legal Professionalism, ' INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. !*%, !(( (!$$$). 
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interpretive uncertainties and also because of its capacity to reshape large 
swathes of the adversarial system well beyond TAR-centered discovery disputes. 
Bending the work product doctrine to meet a world pervaded by legal tech will 
also yield significant costs that commentators have only begun to identify. 
Judicially compelled sharing of machine inputs and outputs, whether in the TAR 
context or beyond, might blunt adversarialism’s inequities, but, in so doing, it 
could also “disable[] lawyers from providing strong and effective client 
representation” and weaken the many protections adversarialism affords.323 
The challenge for courts—and, in time, rulemakers and legislators—will 
be how to balance these concerns and to do so under a set of procedural rules 
crafted and elaborated in a very di,erent, analog era. In Part III, we step back 
from the case studies and, working across them, ask some wider-aperture 
questions that judges and policymakers will need to ask as they oversee that 
process and help chart the future course of American adversarialism. 
III. LEGAL TECH AND “OUR ADVERSARIALISM” 
Among the legal systems of the world, the American system has long been 
thought exceptional in its commitment to a lawyer-dominated, adversarial 
process. Indeed, a rich academic literature details the ways American 
adversarialism departs from the judge-centered approach that prevails in 
much of the world,324 debates why and when the American commitment to 
adversary over judicial control took root,325 and tallies adversarialism’s virtues 
and vices.326 But the overwhelming focus of those inquiries has been the past 
and present of American litigation. Legal tech’s advance provides an occasion 
to ask di,erent, future-looking questions: How, if at all, will American 
adversarialism bend in a newly digitized civil justice system? And what role 
will judges—and, in time, rulemakers and legislators—play in that process? 
In this concluding Part, we work outward from Part II’s more bounded case 
studies and, ranging across the full legal tech toolkit, o,er some concluding 
thoughts on these vital questions. 
As before, it is important to acknowledge the limits of our inquiry. Our 
observations about legal tech and the future of American litigation are subject 
to the same caveats, noted previously, about the contingency of technological 
innovation. Predicting legal tech’s technical trajectory is hard enough. 
 
323 Remus, supra note &), at !*!%, !*!*-!(; see also Endo, supra note &), at (%$ (examining the 
protections built into the adversarial system). 
324 See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, %# U. CHI. L. REV. (#&, 
()&-') (!$(%) (discussing the comparative bene+ts of active judging). 
325 See AMALIA D. KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE, !(""-!(**, at !%!-$$ (#"!*). 
326 See generally KAGAN, supra note #(& (o,ering a book-length argument about the merits and 
demerits of an adversarial approach). 
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Predicting its e,ects on a sprawling litigation system verges on foolhardy. 
Moreover, our focus on higher-tech and litigation-focused legal tech 
applications plainly excludes potentially important tools, among them lower-
tech ones that value recurrent types of claims (e.g., personal injury torts) or 
online legal advice and DIY dispute resolution tools that empower litigants 
to go it alone or avoid formal adjudication entirely. As already noted, these 
applications are both important in their own right and can also shape the 
formal litigation system by shrinking its domain and creating pressure to 
adapt in response. We leave it to others to speculate about legal tech’s e,ects 
beyond the formal court settings that have been the focus of our inquiry.327 
With that established, we highlight two synthetic insights that emerge from 
Part II’s case studies about legal tech’s incorporation into the civil justice system. 
The first insight concerns what we think will be increasing entwinement of 
intellectual property and civil procedure. Section III.A engages the very 
different analytical foundations of IP and civil procedure, offering our rough 
guess at how the tensions between them will shape and be shaped by procedural 
innovation in a digitized litigation system. The second insight engages the 
competing arguments for adversarial and inquisitorial procedural models. 
Section III.B thus provides a brief—surely too-brief—reassessment of the 
German advantage John Langbein famously found in civil procedure.328 These 
insights offer the beginnings of some wider conceptual frames that can inform 
the thinking of judges, policymakers, and academics as they help pilot the 
process of legal tech’s incorporation into the civil justice system. 
A. An IP for Civil Procedure 
An initial insight is that, as legal tech moves to the center of the litigation 
system, it will increasingly draw together civil procedure and a set of concerns 
that more conventionally sound in intellectual property. Indeed, civil 
procedure’s gatekeepers, including judges but also, in time, rulemakers and 
legislators, will preside over what amounts to a shadow innovation policy that 
incorporates IP considerations into current civil procedure frameworks.329 
This innovation-and-IP framing is hardly obvious at +rst. After all, civil 
procedure and IP are vastly di,erent. Civil procedure aims to organize the 
litigation process by balancing a set of meta-values, among them e.ciency, 
 
327 For an overview of the burgeoning field of computer science and access to justice, see NAT’L 
SCI. FOUND., COMPUTING, DATA SCIENCE AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE (#"!$), 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/!m(G-"JqZjTfdurDHkYxYp#GYUOZ$LA%oBJFAlP*Fa)A/edit 
[https://perma.cc/R**&-XEE%]. 
328 See generally Langbein, supra note &#). 
329 The forms of IP most relevant to legal tech are patents, copyrights, and trade secrets. 
Trademarks, which are focused predominantly on consumer protection from confusion, are excluded 
from this analysis. 
!"&& University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !$%: !""! 
accuracy, fairness, and access. It is resolutely, if imperfectly, focused on 
regulating conduct within the con+nes of formal adjudication rather than 
primary conduct out in the world. IP, by contrast, seeks to reward creators of 
knowledge goods with temporary exclusive rights to their creations.330 It 
focuses predominantly on regulating the upstream, primary conduct of 
creators by balancing incentives to innovate against the cost of exclusivity. 331 
Aside from a generic focus on crafting optimal incentives, civil procedure and 
IP could not sit further apart from one another. 
The coming revolution in legal tech, however, will bring increasing overlap 
between the two. For one, courts will now have to increasingly deal with 
traditional IP concerns, now in a technical area that directly affects their own 
functions. An example that is easy to see is the optimal discoverability of 
algorithmic and other software tools in litigation.332 To date, those cases have 
surfaced most often in the criminal context—for instance, use of the trade 
secret evidentiary privilege to block disclosure of the technical guts of criminal 
risk assessment tools used to make bail, sentencing, and parole decisions.333 
But judges hearing civil cases will increasingly face similar questions—when, 
for instance, a litigant embroiled in a discovery dispute demands the source 
code of an adversary’s proprietary TAR tool. Beyond trade secrets, courts will 
also surely entertain suits by producers of legal tech tools asserting 
infringement of patent or copyright rights—and will thus grapple with the 
uncertainty about software’s protectability that afflicts American IP law more 
 
330 While incentivizing innovation is not the sole goal of the various IP regimes, it is a primary 
objective. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., )($ U.S. !)!, !%! (!$($) (implying the 
very purpose of patent laws is to increase the range of ideas readily available to function as the building 
blocks of innovation); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., )*! U.S. %&$, %)' (!$(%) 
(“The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a 
fair return for their labors.”); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., )!' U.S. )*", )(% (!$*)) (referring to 
trade secret law as an alternative regime to patent law for the purpose of incentivizing innovation). 
331 On paper, IP does affect end users. See &% U.S.C. § #*! (defining “infringement” to include “use” 
of patented inventions along with production and sale); !( U.S.C. § #&!$ (criminalizing moderate scale 
copyright infringement). In practice, however, IP rights—especially patent and trade secret protections—
are most often enforced against competitors or other such “deep pockets,” not end consumers. 
332 See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, The Paradox of Source Code Secrecy, !") CORNELL L. REV. !!(&, !#*)-*$ 
(#"!$) (discussing the problems with protecting trade secrets while permitting discovery of source code). 
333 See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice 
System, *" STAN. L. REV. !&)&, !&'( (#"!() (describing how some actuarial tools used to predict 
recidivism can be exempt from the rules of evidence); Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, !!# 
NW. U. L. REV. '%$, *") (#"!() (noting that developers of criminal justice algorithms have “pursued 
trade secret protection” as an alternative to patents); Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the 
Age of Arti!cial Intelligence, '' UCLA L. REV. %), !!*-!#" (#"!$) (discussing the “substantial civil 
rights concerns that algorithms raise” in criminal justice and the barrier posed by trade secrets). 
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generally.334 Decisions in each of these areas of IP law will help shape legal 
tech’s cost structure and its distribution within the system.335 
But these disputes, while drawing civil procedure and IP closer, will not 
be the sole, or even the most important, point of intersection. Indeed, Part 
II’s case studies suggest that an equally and perhaps more important collision 
will center on disputes over disclosure of the inputs and outputs of legal tech 
tools, not in disputes over IP rights, but rather in a much wider range of 
litigation disputes adjudicating other types of rights. This fact is signi+cant, 
for it means that civil procedure will serve as the front-line regulator of legal 
tech in the crucial early years of its incorporation into the civil justice system, 
critically shaping its use by litigants and the market for its production and 
distribution.336 This is particularly so because legal tech tools derive much of 
their value from their exclusivity—i.e., the fact that one litigant has them and 
the other does not—and civil procedure rules can either bolster or undermine 
that exclusivity.337 As a result, in making procedural choices, judges and 
policymakers will preside over what amounts to a shadow innovation policy, 
weighing the bene+ts of exclusivity against its costs. 
Concrete examples abound—and were sprinkled throughout Part II’s case 
studies. When a litigant embroiled in a discovery dispute demands disclosure 
 
334 Uncertainty about the patentability of software arises from the distinction between laws of 
nature, ideas, and applications. See Gottschalk v. Benson, )"$ U.S. '&, '* (!$*#) (“[A]n idea of itself 
is not patentable.”); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., %'$ U.S. %*', %(" (#"!&) 
(holding that a law of nature is not patentable); Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, %*& U.S. #"(, 
#!' (#"!)) (“Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”). In 
particular, the Supreme Court has held that mathematical processes are too abstract unless the 
invention includes an “inventive concept” via its incorporation into a real-world application. Mayo 
Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., %'' U.S. '', *#-*& (#"!#); Alice, %&* U.S. at #!*-!(. It 
follows that, alone, computer algorithms are often nonpatentable. Cf. Bilski v. Kappos, %'! U.S. %$&, 
'!# (#"!") (rejecting a patent for a business procedure). Importantly, software’s imperfect 
protectability fuels resort to the trade secrets evidentiary privilege. See Ram, supra note &&&, at *"&-
") (explaining how creators of criminal justice algorithms often seek trade secret protection). 
335 See supra note !)* and accompanying text. 
336 As already noted, France has already taken steps to regulate legal tech. See supra notes #'"–
#'& and accompanying text. But similar legislative regulation in the United States seems unlikely. 
See Sam Skolnik, France’s Judicial Analytics Ban Unlikely to Catch on in U.S., BLOOMBERG L. (June %, 
#"!$, !#:#' PM) https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/frances-judicial-analytics-ban-
unlikely-to-catch-on-in-u-s [https://perma.cc/(J%%-TFK$] (quoting legal tech experts who believe 
France’s regulations will have limited in.uence in the States). 
337 The exact degree to which exclusivity will affect legal tech’s value is unclear. In general, scarcity 
tends to drive up a good’s value. See Michael Lynn, Scarcity Effects on Value: A Quantitative Review of the 
Commodity Theory Literature, ( PSYCH. & MKTG. )&, )'-)* (!$$!) (“[S]carcity enhances the value of 
anything that can be possessed.”). However, software products are particularly successful at overcoming 
the issue the scarcity principle causes. Vasilis Kostakis & Andreas Roos, New Technologies Won’t Reduce 
Scarcity, but Here’s Something That Might, HARV. BUS. REV. (June !, #"!(), https://hbr.org/#"!(/"'/new-
technologies-wont-reduce-scarcity-but-heres-something-that-might [https://perma.cc/W(#R-HT'P]. 
The technology may also be so beneficial that the cost of missing out when other parties possess it may 
outweigh the downsides of having to share the technology with others. 
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of an adversary’s seed set in order to contest the completeness of a document 
production, a trial judge must determine whether to compel sharing of the 
entire seed set, only positively -agged documents (which, as noted previously, 
are the only “relevant” ones within the meaning of Rule #$(b)(#)), or none at 
all. As Section II.A showed, courts are all over the map on which level of 
disclosure they require and in what circumstances.338 But it is not hard to see 
how an accretion of rulings on the issue will determine the value of TAR tools 
to litigants and, by extension, the incentives for further innovation.339 
Compelled sharing of TAR inputs could depress the technology’s 
development—or convince litigants not to use it at all, either because it 
confers little advantage or, worse, risks putting non-responsive and privileged 
documents into an adversary’s hands.340 Conversely, judicial decisions on 
motions to compel permitting requested discovery conditional on use of 
TAR, as judges have begun to do, will spur use of TAR and, with it, grow the 
market that produces it. Wise decisions on these questions must, whether 
explicitly or implicitly, weigh TAR’s utility (e.g., its potential to reduce 
litigation costs) against its costs (e.g., adversarial inequities, discovery abuse). 
Similar questions will condition the development and use of other parts of 
the legal tech toolkit, most notably outcome-prediction tools. As explored in 
Section II.B, judicial demands for the outputs of outcome prediction engines—
whether in connection with motions practice around choice-of-forum or choice-
of-law disputes, such as a party’s request to transfer venue, or even dispositive 
motions seeking summary judgment—will depress the value of those tools to 
litigants, potentially limiting their use and slowing their development. Similarly, 
if judges compel adversaries to share machine outputs—for instance, by 
compelling party responses to contention interrogatories requesting them—the 
value and use of those tools, and the market for their production, could contract 
substantially. As legal tech tools advance in sophistication, these and other 
 
338 See supra notes #"%–#"(, #$'–#$* and accompanying text. 
339 See Christian, supra note &), at %!" (noting that judicial resolution of whether and when 
TAR inputs, especially seed sets, are subject to privilege could “impede the acceptability of 
predictive coding technology in civil litigation”). 
340 There are several factors at play here, some of which may push for a market’s existence even 
in the face of judicial rulings. Some “haves” say that simply knowing what a tool says isn’t sufficient 
for “have nots” to pose a threat. See Victoria Hudgins, They Come in Peace: Why the Legal Research 
Market Welcomes Nonprofit Entrants, LAW.COM (Jul. #!, #"#", !!:&" AM), 
https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/#"#"/"*/#!/they-come-in-peace-why-the-legal-research-market-
welcomes-nonprofit-entrants [https://perma.cc/RVN&-#RRG]. In many cases, tech just tells a user 
where to look and what to pay attention to. Therefore, a scenario where both parties are equipped 
with, for example, an outcome prediction tool (or its output) would be preferable to a scenario where 
neither party has it. Each party still needs to know what to do with the output to maximize the utility 
gain. The haves are confident in their ability to make the most of the data using their better-funded 
resources. Granted, that still may mean that obligating disclosure of the inputs and outputs of legal 
tech tools may still increase the justice gap between haves and have nots. 
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conflicts will sharpen the tension between civil procedure values and the 
incentives to produce and use the tools in the first place. 
In resolving these tensions, IP has much to offer civil procedure because it 
provides a ready-made vocabulary and a familiar set of conceptual frameworks 
for formalizing and weighing the trade-offs between legal tech’s benefits 
(efficiency, accuracy) and the distributive and other costs that derive from its 
exclusivity. The benefits are substantial, for the many procedural doctrines 
implicated by legal tech do not expressly consider trade-offs between innovation 
incentives and the social costs of exclusive rights that are the fundamental 
analytic building blocks of IP. The work product doctrine, or any other part of 
civil procedure for that matter, was simply not built for that wider, innovation-
focused inquiry. Going forward, however, judges may well incorporate the 
considerations first established in the IP realm into the civil procedure space. 
Questions of efficiency, for example, will no longer be limited in scope to 
litigation but will, even if only implicitly, expand to include market effects. 
As legal tech proliferates through the civil justice system, additional 
regulatory opportunities may present themselves. Indeed, an innovation-and-
IP frame helps us to imagine potential interventions other than a judge-led 
process of muddling through with procedural tools built for other tasks. As a 
growing literature in IP makes clear, trade secrecy and conventional IP 
protection are but two levers in a wide portfolio of innovation policies that also 
includes prizes, grants, and tax incentives, which can be coupled with disclosure 
requirements or other conditions.341 If proliferating legal tech opens up 
distributive divides by allowing the “haves” to systematically win out over the 
“have nots,” one could imagine a wide range of policies focused on mitigating 
distributive costs without threatening the robust market for legal tech. Indeed, 
it is precisely where conventional IP rights fail to yield a socially optimal 
outcome that prizes and public subsidies may be preferred to conventional IP 
rights.342 Among the possibilities are a government-funded open-source legal 
tech platform designed to provide litigation’s “have nots” with a baseline set of 
tools, or even a courthouse discovery arm, with technologist magistrates or law 
clerks, that oversees or even performs e-discovery.343 
 
341 See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, !#( YALE 
L.J. %)), %)) (#"!$) (stating that elements of IP protection can be combined with incentives like 
prizes, tax preferences, and government grants); Ram, supra note &&&, at *""-"! (describing policy 
mechanisms in addition to trade secret protection that can promote innovation). 
342 See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, $# 
TEX. L. REV. &"&, &*', &(! (#"!&) (describing the economic bene+ts of these subsidies compared to 
the deadweight losses of patent monopolies). 
343 See Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note &, at #(% (noting the possibility of “public option” 
legal tech or public subsidization or provision of data as “an institutional counterweight to 
proprietary datasets”). For an excellent and broader introduction to the ways in which access to data 
is becoming an access to justice issue, see Alexander & Feizollahi, supra note #)&. 
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Of course, there are limits to the IP analogy in thinking about legal tech’s 
future. IP is primarily focused on the production of innovation, not its use.344 
But in the legal tech context, work product and other rules confer exclusivity 
on the user, not the inventor.345 IP’s critics have also long groused that IP 
under-incentivizes production of social bene+ts—e.g., environmental 
bene+ts346—or is too solicitous of inventions that lack any objective social 
value, as one might say of a legal tech tool that promotes pure rent-seeking 
behavior by litigants who uniquely possess it.347 
In short, many details of an IP-and-innovation framework remain to be 
worked out. But the potential implications are substantial: The coming 
revolution in legal tech will require judges and policymakers to incorporate a 
new covering value into the traditional pantheon of efficiency, accuracy, 
fairness, and access. Innovation incentives, not just these traditional procedural 
values, will become a central feature of the meta-level procedural calculus. 
B. Legal Tech and the German (Dis)Advantage 
If marrying civil procedure and IP was all that was needed to oversee legal 
tech’s incorporation into the litigation system, then the process, and the 
analytics required, might seem manageable. For instance, in the e-discovery 
 
344 See supra note &#$; U.S. CONST. art. I, § (, cl. ( (granting Congress the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). See generally ! PETER 
S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE #"#" (#"#") (surveying federal IP law). 
345 Despite this apparent inconsistency and the fact that regulating legal tech through the civil 
procedure lens would likely directly target users of legal tech, the policies would also a,ect the 
incentives of the entities creating the legal tech. In fact, the rationale for work product seems oddly 
similar to the innovation rationale in IP: to encourage the party producing something to put as much 
e,ort into it as they can instead of hedging against copying. In an interesting overlap between the 
two, “protecting creators’ work product” has been cited as a motivation for copyright law. VHT, Inc. 
v. Zillow Grp., Inc., $!( F.&d *#&, *&$ ($th Cir. #"!$). 
346 See Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Intellectual Property Law and the Promotion 
of Welfare !& (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. '"*, #"!*) (“[T]he same 
patent rules that are helpful for pharmaceuticals might be harmful for environmental 
technologies.”); Hemel & Ouellette, supra note &)!, at %%%-%', %*%-*' (explaining that market 
institutions may inadequately reward environmental innovations); Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 
&)#, at &#(-#$ (stating that patents are ine,ective at linking social value and private returns). 
347 Courts do not typically require patented inventions to serve a particularly useful function. See 
Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., #$# F.&d *#(, *)% (Fed. Cir. #""#) (“[A]n invention’s deceptive 
nature has no bearing upon its utility . . . .”). The more modern trend is that an invention has utility so 
long as it carries out a function specific to the invention (specific utility) which applies to the real world 
(substantial utility). The invention does not need to be performed well, nor does the invention need to 
necessarily improve the public. The invention just cannot fail to carry out its asserted function at all. 
Grunenthal GmbH v. Alkem Labs. Ltd., $!$ F.&d !&&&, !&)% (Fed. Cir. #"!$); Gene Quinn, 
Understanding the Patent Law Utility Requirement, IPWATCHDOG, https://www.ipwatchdog.com/#"!%/
!!/"*/understanding-the-patent-law-utility-requirement/id/'&""* [https://perma.cc/(CVM-'F$T]. 
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context, determining when to compel party collaboration or sharing of 
machine outputs will turn on a tractable inquiry weighing litigation cost-
savings, the equity costs of gaming and discovery abuse, and litigant 
incentives to use TAR in the +rst place. 
But Part II’s case studies suggest a second broad framing, and a second 
challenge, that is further-ranging and more complex. In particular, legal tech’s 
integration into the civil justice system will also entail explicit or implicit 
judgments about the optimal distribution of information within the system, 
both horizontally, between litigants and litigants, and also vertically, between 
judges and litigants. In determining the distribution of information along 
these two axes, judges and policymakers will help set the balance of adversary 
and judicial control within the system and, in so doing, shape the future 
course of American adversarialism. 
While there are many ways to conceptualize this framing, a good way to 
start is to consider, as students of American procedure long have, the contrast 
between American adversarialism and the more judge-centered approach that 
prevails in much of the rest of the world, particularly Continental Europe.348 
The so-called “German advantage” in civil procedure, coined in Langbein’s 
iconic !%&( study, has many rich facets. But its core claim is that the judge-
centered “inquisitorial” approach, in which judges oversee the pace, phasing, 
and substantive direction of fact- and issue-development in cases, o,ers a 
superior alternative to an American system de+ned by adversary control.349 
This comparison has become a central organizing framework for thinking 
about the optimal mix of adversary and judicial control in litigation systems. 
It is the dominant lens, to cite just one example, for weighing the virtues and 
vices of the much-debated trend in American civil procedure toward 
“managerial judging,” whereby American judges have steadily adopted a more 
intrusive approach, particularly in complex litigations, by directing the pace, 
content, and character of litigation.350 
The German comparison takes on new relevance in a litigation world 
infused with legal tech because it lays bare a core bet that underpins the 
design of any litigation system about the salience of litigant-litigant as against 
judge-litigant information asymmetries.351 The judge-centered, inquisitorial 
 
348 Langbein, supra note &#). 
349 Id. at ()* (contrasting the “inquisitorial zeal” of the Continental system with the “truth-
defeating excesses of American adversary fact-gathering [which] cause knowable facts to be obscured”). 
350 Resnik, supra note &$; see also Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, !#$ YALE 
L.J. #, '" (#"!$) (reviewing the literature and noting managerial judging’s durability). For the 
traditional judicial role, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, ($ HARV. 
L. REV. !#(!, !#(' (!$*'). 
351 Only one analysis of which we are aware connects legal tech to the choice between an 
adversarial and inquisitorial system, but it does so only in passing in making the argument that 
disillusionment with lawyer advocacy and its perceived capacity to mobilize bias and leverage 
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approach is premised on an intuition that judge-litigant information 
asymmetries will not be as signi+cant, or as consequential, as litigant-litigant 
information asymmetries.352 Judges might not know as much as the parties, 
but they can nonetheless oversee litigation’s conduct, steering the phased and 
targeted acquisition of evidence and witness examination, all the while 
searching for the “jugular” issue that permits an early and de+nitive end to a 
case.353 By implication, the inquisitorial approach is founded on the further 
view that litigant-litigant asymmetries are signi+cant—and that an 
unregulated adversarial process in which litigants fend for themselves, and 
some can a,ord more and better counsel, will yield signi+cant costs in 
e.ciency and equity.354 Judge control of the proceedings, on this view, is a 
hedge against adversarialism’s excesses. 
In stark contrast, the American system is built upon the notion that judge-
litigant asymmetries are apt to be substantial, and that judicial control over 
the proceedings will yield too many ine.ciencies and errors. Litigants know 
their case better than judges, and so it is only partisan fact-gathering, which 
aligns responsibility and incentive, that can consistently achieve a full 
ventilation of facts.355 One need not deny the costs of partisan control in order 
to hold this view. Rather, the costs of a blindered judge running the show 
outweigh the social costs of the inequities created in a world in which some 
litigants can a,ord more and better counsel than others. 
Framing litigation design in these terms powerfully captures the stakes of 
legal tech’s advance. A key question going forward will be whether legal tech’s 
proliferation throughout the civil justice system will shift the core bargain 
 
ignorance might push adversarial systems in an inquisitorial direction. See Re & Solow-Niederman, 
supra note &, at #*%. But the authors go on to note that AI’s capacity to “pull[] back the judicial 
curtain” could equally undermine judges and a more inquisitorial approach. Id. 
352 Langbein, supra note &#), at ()& (noting that the “active role of the judge places major limits 
on the extent of the injury that bad lawyering can work on a litigant”). 
353 Id. at (&"-&! (noting “jugular” idea and fact that a German court “functions without 
sequence rules” and, in particular, without any distinction between pre-trial and trial); id. at ()' 
(noting that “judicial control of sequence works to con+ne the scope of fact-gathering to those 
avenues of inquiry deemed most likely to resolve the case”). 
354 Id. at &)& (“[V]ery little in our adversary system is designed to match combatants of 
comparable prowess . . . [T]he active role of the judge [in Germany] places major limits on the 
extent of the injury that bad lawyering can work on a litigant.”); see also William W. 
Schwarzer, Managing Civil Litigation: The Trial Judge’s Role, '! JUDICATURE )"", )"%-"' (!$*() 
(o,ering another classic statement of the problem). A further claim is that inquisitorialism protects 
litigants from their own counsel, mitigating lawyer-client agency costs. See E. Donald Elliott, 
Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, %& U. CHI. L. REV. &"', &&"-&# (!$(') (discussing 
the principal-agent problem for lawyering in an adversarial system). 
355 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, #( CARDOZO 
L. REV. !$'!, !$$! (#""*) (“The conventional assumption underlying the commitment to adversarial 
fact-+nding is that competition between adversaries is likely to ferret out the truth.”). Of course, 
Bone contests this assumption, calling it “excessively optimistic.” Id. 
#"#!] Legal Tech, Civil Procedure, and the Future of Adversarialism !"%( 
that undergirds the American commitment to adversary control, whether 
across the board or for particular tools or litigation types. It also allows us to 
imagine a set of possible futures as legal tech proliferates. Table # makes this 
concrete by representing, in stylized form, four di,erent combinations of 
litigant-litigant and judge-litigant information asymmetries that might 
emerge over time as the market for legal tech takes shape. For each 
combination, one can then ask how, or if, procedure should adjust in response. 
Consider first Table #’s northwest quadrant—a fully democratized system in 
which litigants and judges alike have access to the complete legal tech toolkit.356 
In this scenario, there are few distributive concerns, and the choice between 
adversary and judicial control becomes less salient, since all sides have the same 
degree of transparency into the pool of evidence, probabilities over case 
outcomes across different fora, and even the assigned judge’s own (latent) 
predispositions in similar past cases. To be sure, this future is not unproblematic. 
As noted in Section I.C, some might worry that such a system will suffer from 
creeping automation bias—undue reliance by actors within the system on 
machine outputs—and drain the system of its capacity to adapt to social change 
or apply equitable principles in hard cases. Others might further worry that an 
uptick in settlements driven by a leveling of information will depress or even 
distort the set of litigated cases on which predictive tools can be trained and 
updated,357 stymie the public elaboration of legal norms,358 or reduce litigant 
conduct of socially valuable but privately costly discovery.359 Compared to other 
options, however, the northwest future may provide an ideal baseline. 
  
 
356 Note that this is the situation modeled in Casey & Niblett, supra note #**. 
357 Compare Alarie et al., supra note $&, at #%) (“These technologies increase the likelihood of 
settlement, while the likelihood of cases going to court will fall, save perhaps for the most 
ambiguous, where further legal development will be most valuable.”), with Casey & Niblett, supra 
note #** (noting concern about both “a reduction in the production of judicial precedent” and also 
selection bias because “only cases with close and perhaps confounding factual situations end up in 
court,” yielding a set of past cases upon which predictive tools can be trained that “may not re.ect 
the full picture” of litigation). 
358 See supra note !#' and accompanying text. For the classic critique of pervasive settlement, see 
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, $& YALE L.J. !"*&, !"*% (!$()). For a full airing of the debate, see 
generally Symposium, Against Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later, *( FORDHAM L. REV. !!!* (#""$). 
359 See Zambrano, supra note !%", at *# (reviewing literature showing how discovery costs a,ect 
the ability of the system to produce fair outcomes). 
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Now move to Table #’s northeast quadrant, in which litigants on both sides 
of the “v” pervasively use legal tech tools but judges do not.360 This system 
features wide information asymmetries of the vertical (judge-litigant) sort 
but not the horizontal (litigant-litigant) sort. As with the +rst scenario, we 
have few concerns about distributive e,ects resulting from an unequal 
distribution of technological capacity across parties. Armed with the same 
information about case outcomes, and with the optimism bias and 
information asymmetries that can stymie negotiations banished from the 
system, rational parties will quickly reach settlements.361 In this world, there 
is little warrant for a procedural response along the lines of compelled sharing 
of legal tech’s inputs or outputs. While one might still worry about the loss 
of public elaboration of legal norms or the ability of the system to update in 
a pool of litigated cases that may su,er from selection bias, the system will 
 
360 Note that this is the situation treated, in a brief appendix, in Casey & Niblett, supra note 
#** (considering the situation in which “the parties have access to litigation prediction tools (but 
judges and other decision makers do not)”). It is also the world predicted by Eugene Volokh, who 
argues that legal tech is likely to come to lawyers before judges. Volokh, supra note &, at !!%!. 
361 See Alarie et al., supra note $&, at #&& (noting that the closing of informational asymmetries 
will eliminate “wasteful expenditure on litigation”). 
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have nonetheless achieved something close to the Hickman ideal: “mutual 
knowledge of all the relevant facts.”362 
Note, however, that this does not necessarily mean preservation of the 
status quo as a procedural matter. In a world defined by bilateral litigant control 
of legal tech, there is a strong case to be made that judicial control—including 
the “managerial judging” that has increasingly characterized the American 
system—will and, indeed, should erode. For some, a level legal tech playing field 
would provide a welcome opportunity to pare back an overweening judicial 
presence that, as Judith Resnik cogently noted long ago, often plays out 
“beyond the public view, off the record, with no obligation to provide written, 
reasoned opinions, and out of the reach of appellate review.”363 If that view 
prevails, democratized but litigant-centered legal tech will likely move the 
American system further away from a proto-German, inquisitorial model. 
Turning southward, Table #’s southwest quadrant captures a system 
characterized by wide horizontal but narrow vertical information asymmetries. 
As a practical matter, this future is harder to glimpse, and it seems least likely 
to unfold in reality. In particular, it would require a legal tech toolkit that is 
available to and adopted by budget-strapped courts but not large classes of 
litigants. Still, consideration of the southwest future’s contours is instructive. 
One possibility is that such a system might generate fewer distributional 
concerns, since the judge will be well-positioned to level the litigant playing 
field, at least where a dominant litigant deploys legal tech tools for pure rent-
seeking purposes. Note that the case for managerial judging here is strong. In 
stark contrast to the prior scenario, the answer here might be more managerial 
judging and more judicial control over the conduct of the proceedings. 
The most concerning of all the scenarios—a kind of litigation dystopia—is 
the southeast quadrant, a system characterized by wide asymmetries along both 
dimensions (litigant-litigant, judge-litigant). A relatively narrow set of litigants—
likely well-heeled ones—would exercise something like unilateral control over 
legal tech’s informational advantages and could thus engage in litigation rent-
seeking, using their privileged command of case outcomes to choose the most 
advantageous forum, game the discovery process to ensure that the most 
 
362 Hickman v. Taylor, &#$ U.S. )$%, %"* (!$)*). Casey and Niblett complicate this rosy picture 
somewhat by noting that, in certain circumstances (e.g., the litigants, rather than su,ering from the 
usual optimism bias about their chances that the predictive tools helps to correct, instead both hold 
views about the plainti, ’s chances that are higher than the algorithmic prediction), better 
information can reduce the likelihood of an e-cient settlement. Casey & Niblett, supra note #**. 
363 Resnik, supra note !%!, at &*(, &("; see also Langbein, supra note &#), at ('! (noting the rise 
of managerial judging “has not been accompanied by Continental-style attention to safeguarding 
litigants against the dangers inherent in the greatly augmented judicial role”); Todd D. Peterson, 
Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, #$ U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
)!, *( (!$$%) (making a similar argument and emphasizing the threat to party “autonomy”). See 
generally Engstrom, supra note !%", at '" (summarizing the literature). 
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damaging evidence remains under wraps, and craft winning legal arguments that 
reflect the latent predilections of particular judges. Legal tech’s “haves” would 
systematically win out over its “have nots,” whether in pre-trial jockeying over 
dispositive motions at trial or in the capture of settlement surplus. 
Here, the case is strongest for a procedural response, via compelled sharing 
of legal tech tools, judicial demands for litigants’ machine outputs, or both. But 
note that it is here that the incentives to innovate may be at their most 
powerful—and one might expect a hyper-sophisticated technological trajectory, 
or substantial effort by litigation actors with privileged access to data to develop 
a suite of advantage-conferring proprietary tools. Here, the IP-and-innovation 
framing helps to mark out the trade-offs and even points the way to some other 
potential remedies. First, procedural interventions can level the playing field 
but only while also blunting litigant incentives to use legal tech in the first 
place, thus depriving the system of its potential accuracy-enhancing and cost-
reducing virtues. On the other hand, the right policy decision should, in fact, 
be to stifle innovation if its social inequity costs are determined to outweigh 
the benefits rooted in improved efficiency and accuracy. Second, and as noted 
previously, legislators concerned that the litigation system is moving toward 
the southwest quadrant might consider funding a “public option” set of legal 
tech tools or taking substantial action to improve data accessibility as an 
“institutional counterweight to proprietary datasets.”364 
Of course, these four futures are unlikely to hold across the board, for all 
kinds of litigation, at all levels of the judicial system. A key challenge for 
judges and policymakers, and a key pressure given civil procedure’s facial 
commitment to transubstantivity, will be how to craft a variegated response 
across litigation types to ameliorate concerns where they arise most acutely. 
* * * 
Looking across Part II’s case studies helps us to see a larger landscape, and 
a wider-angle frame for thinking about legal tech’s incorporation into the civil 
justice system. That said, neither the IP-and-innovation nor the information-
asymmetry frame is comprehensively treated here. Nor do these frames 
exhaust the ways one could conceptualize legal tech’s incorporation into the 
civil justice system. Neither says anything about the allocation of power as 
between judge and jury, another front in the procedural battles fought in 
recent decades, particularly around summary judgment. But taken together, 
they capture some of the essential puzzles that will face judges and 
policymakers going forward. As these actors remodel civil procedure in the 
years to come, they will make a wide range of judgments—about how much 
 
364 Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note &, at &''. 
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innovation is a good or bad thing, how much exclusivity to permit, and which 
asymmetries and inequities to tolerate—that will help set the balance of 
adversary and nonadversary values within the system and, in the process, 
chart the future course of American litigation. The two frames thus provide 
a rough roadmap for the kind of work that lies ahead as the details of a newly 
digitized litigation system come into focus. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that legal tech is likely to reshape the American 
system of litigation not merely by changing how lawyers do their work, but 
also by resetting several of the system’s procedural cornerstones. Along the 
way we have raised, but only partially answered, numerous questions, 
empirical and otherwise, that will repay research as the next era of American 
litigation comes into focus. We nonetheless hope that the insights o,ered in 
this Article—from our sober accounting of legal tech’s likely trajectory to our 
case studies of tools and rules to our more synthetic thoughts on system 
design—can aid the thinking of judges, policymakers, and scholars as they 
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